Judge: John J. Kralik, Case: 22BBCV00200, Date: 2023-04-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22BBCV00200    Hearing Date: April 28, 2023    Dept: NCB

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

North Central District

Department B

 

 

noemi villalobos,

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

 

omra LOERA, et al.,

                        Defendants.

 

  Case No.:  22BBCV00200

 

  Hearing Date:  April 28, 2023

 

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

demurrer; motion to strike

 

           

BACKGROUND

A.    Allegations

Plaintiff Noemi Villalobos (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she is a tenant of residential property located at 1236 N. Orchard Dr., Burbank, CA 91506.  She alleges that she took possession in 2012.  She alleges that prior to, but specifically since March 30, 2019, she was paying money to Defendant for use of the property until she vacated the property in March 2022.  Plaintiff alleges Defendant Oasis Builders is the alter alias of Defendant Omar Loera (“Loera”) and the manager of the property.  Loera is alleged to be the legal owner of the property. 

Plaintiff alleges that she was renting an illegal and unpermitted converted backhouse at the property zoned for single family residency.  She alleges that the backhouse did not have a certificate of occupancy.  She alleges that she discovered water damage throughout the interior and exterior walls of the property in September 2021.  She alleges that in 2019 to 2022, she sustained injuries in connection with the water intrusion and subsequent mold and mildew.  (SAC, ¶¶9-13.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the minimum California State requirements because the property had non-functional or lack of adequate heating, unimproved and illegal construction, rubbish, electrical wiring not up to code, filth, intentional interference with estate, lack of hot water and water/leaking plumbing, and general non-maintenance.  (Id., ¶14.)  Plaintiff alleges she notified Loera about the violations.  She alleges that unbeknownst to her until October 2021, the property lacked any permitting or certificates of occupancy.  (Id., ¶17.)  She also alleges that the property did not contain functioning smoke or carbon monoxide detectors.  (Id., ¶18.)  In October 2021, Defendants told Plaintiff that she must vacate the property on February 15, 2022 so he could personally use the property.  (Id., ¶19.)  Plaintiff alleges that after vacating the property, the property was advertised for rent at a higher rate.  (Id., ¶20.) 

The second amended complaint (“SAC”), filed January 9, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) tortious breach of warranty of habitability; (2) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (3) nuisance; (4) negligence; (5) breach of contract; and (6) intentional interference with estate (Civ. Code, § 789.3).

B.     Motions on Calendar

On February 15, 2023, Defendant Loera filed a demurrer to the 1st, 2nd, and 5th causes of action alleged in the SAC.  Concurrently, Loera filed a motion to strike portions of the SAC.

On April 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief to the demurrer only.

On April 24, 2023, Defendant filed a reply brief to the demurrer.  Defendant also filed a notice of non-opposition to the motion to strike, stating that Defendant was not in receipt of an opposition brief from Plaintiff.

DISCUSSION RE DEMURRER

A.    1st cause of action – tortious breach of warranty of habitability

In the Court’s prior ruling on the demurrer to the complaint, the Court sustained the demurrer to the 1st cause of action, finding that Plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts showing when she provided notices of the alleged defects in the property to Loera.  In its ruling on the demurrer to the FAC, the Court again found that Plaintiff failed to allege when she gave notice about the defective conditions (sometime in 2019 to 2022). 

Loera again demurs to the 1st cause of action, arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts stating when she provided notice of any defects to him. 

The SAC alleges that she lived at the premises from 2019 to 2022 and she documented and noticed the violations from 2019 to 2022.  (SAC, ¶¶13-14.) She alleges she directly notified Loera about the violations and that code enforcement for Los Angeles notified Loera of the violations in writing in October 2021.  (Id., ¶15.)  She alleges that through notices to him in 2021 and the notice from city agencies, Defendants had actual and constructive notice of the defective conditions because “[s]pecifically on multiple dates and times throughout 2019, 2020, 2021, and as recently as March 2, 2022, Plaintiff and/or code enforcement of Los Angeles notified Defendant Loera of these defective conditions.”  (SAC, ¶25.)  (The Court notes that the initial complaint was filed on March 28, 2022.) 

Here, Plaintiff has now alleged that she notified Loera about the violations throughout 2021, sometime in October 2021, and on March 2, 2022.  Plaintiff has put Defendant on notice in the pleading of when she provided notice of the substandard conditions at the property.  While specifics have not been provided as to when Plaintiff provided notice as to each and every violation alleged in the SAC, she has at least alleged viable cause of action as to some of her claims.  Further, specific dates of when she provided notice of a violation at the property will be better left for discovery.  As such, the Court overrules the demurrer to the 1st cause of action.  

B.     2nd cause of action – breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment

In the absence of language to the contrary, every lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, whereby the landlord impliedly covenants that the tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession of the premises.”  (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588.)  Substantial interference of the tenant’s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy (as opposed to minor inconveniences and annoyances) is required to establish a breach of quiet enjoyment.  (Id. at 589.) 

In the 2nd cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that: “Defendants have breached the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment as alleged herein, including, but not limited to failure and refusal to repair the alleged habitability violations and to maintain The Property in a habitable condition and in a condition consistent with the purpose for which it was rented.”  (SAC, ¶32.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ refusal to repair and abate the multiple issues was made after and despite being notified of the conditions by Plaintiff and/or third parties on multiple occasions throughout the lease, from 2014 through 2019, and on multiple occasions in 2019, 2020, 2021 and as recently as March 3 2022, although Plaintiff did not understand the breadth of the illegality until about October 2021.  (Id., ¶¶33-34.)  Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants breached the implied covenant by failing to address the concerns.  (Id., ¶35.)  Plaintiff alleges that she incorrectly claimed she was unaware of these issues when in fact she was aware and made Defendant aware of the issues throughout the tenancy; what she was unaware of until October 2021 was the lack of certificate of occupancy and otherwise illegal and unpermitted conditions at the property.  (Id., ¶36.) 

Loera argues that the 2nd cause of action lacks facts that there was a substantial interference.  In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the FAC shows facts that the possession of the property “involved everything but quiet enjoyment,” which involved issues that were never corrected and which ultimately led to complaints to city officials that were never remedied by Loera.  (Opp. at p.5.) 

Similar to the Court’s prior ruling on the demurrer to the initial complaint and the FAC, the allegations of the 2nd cause of action lack facts showing there was a substantial interference.

The Court notes that in the initial complaint, Plaintiff had alleged that she “lived without issue for over 10 years,” but was only made aware of the violations in 2021 around the time when she received notice to vacate the property.  (Compl., ¶¶2, 15, 17.)   This allegation was omitted from the FAC without explanation.  In the SAC, Plaintiff adds paragraph 36, alleging that she incorrectly claimed she was unaware of the issues as a whole, but that she meant to state that she was in fact aware of the issues and gave Defendants notice thereof throughout the tenancy, but that she was only unaware of the lack of certificate of occupancy and illegal/unpermitted structures until October 2021.  (SAC, ¶36.)  The Court finds that Plaintiff has explained this inconsistency in the pleadings by way of this clarification. 

However, Plaintiff has not included additional facts regarding the interference by Defendant.  Her allegations appear to remain unchanged on this element, though the Court has informed Plaintiff on numerous occasions that additional facts were necessary.

As such, the demurrer to the 2nd cause of action is sustained.  Plaintiff has the burden of showing the manner in which Plaintiff can amend the pleadings to correct this defect and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.  (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)  Thus, the Court will hear oral arguments on whether leave to amend is proper.

C.     5th cause of action – breach of contract

The essential elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are: “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff.”  (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)  A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms—set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference—or by its legal effect.”  (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.)

In the 5th cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that the lease agreement is in the possession of Defendant and is no longer in her possession, but that it constitutes valid contracts in writing between Plaintiff and Defendant(s).  (SAC, ¶58.)  Plaintiff alleges she performed in good faith on her respective obligations by paying rent in exchange for the quiet enjoyment of a legal and permitted property.  (Id., ¶59.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ obligations and promises included keeping the property in a legally tenable and habitable state, providing hot water and functional heat, and other mandatory amenities, as well as not interfering with her exclusive use and enjoyment of the property.  (Id., ¶60.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants rented an illegal unit that lacked a certificate of occupancy and was illegal, thereby breaching the terms of the lease agreement.  (Id., ¶61.)

In the Court’s prior order on the demurrer to the FAC, the Court sustained the demurrer to this cause of action, finding that the FAC failed to allege sufficient facts regarding the material terms of the lease, such as Plaintiff’s failure to allege facts regarding when the lease was entered, rental payments, the term of the lease, etc.  The Court also noted that the Plaintiff interchanged between lease agreements (plural) and a lease agreement (singular), such that it was unclear how many lease agreements were at issue.  In addition, it is unclear who the lease was entered between. Plaintiff alleges that the lease agreements were entered between “Plaintiff and Defendant(s),” but did not specify if the lease agreement or agreements were entered between Plaintiff and Defendants Loera and Oasis Builders or just Plaintiff and Loera. 

The same defects persist in the 5th cause of action in the SAC.  Again, Plaintiff alleges “Lease Agreement,” “valid contracts,” “Lease Agreements,” etc. in her 5th cause of action, such that the Court cannot ascertain whether there is only one or multiple lease agreements/contracts at issue.  Next, Plaintiff still has not alleged who the contract(s) were entered between, as the SAC alleges that it was entered between “Plaintiff, and Defendant(s).”  (SAC, ¶58.)  While Plaintiff alleges that contract(s) are in writing and that she lacks the contract(s), she still has not alleged its material terms despite the Court’s prior demurrer orders.

The demurrer to the 5th cause of action is sustained.  The Court will determine at the hearing whether it will allow amendment on this cause of action. 

DISCUSSION RE MOTION TO STRIKE

            Loera moves to strike portions of the SAC seeking punitive damages at paragraph 55 (page 8, line 24, “punitive”) and the Prayer for Damages at item 4 (page 10, line 20). 

A.    Punitive Damages

A complaint including a request for punitive damages must include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  A claim for punitive damages cannot be pleaded generally and allegations that a defendant acted "with oppression, fraud and malice" toward plaintiff are insufficient legal conclusions to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)  Specific factual allegations are required to support a claim for punitive damages.  (Id.)

Civil Code § 3294 authorizes a plaintiff to obtain an award of punitive damages when there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in malice, oppression, or fraud.  Section 3294(c) defines the terms in the following manner:

(1)   "Malic means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2)   "Oppressio means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

(3)   "Frau means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. 

In the complaint, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in connection with the 4th cause of action for negligence.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions constituted malice, oppression, or fraud under Civil Code, § 3294.  (SAC, ¶55.)   

The Court previously found in its ruling on the motion to strike punitive damages in the FAC and still finds in the SAC that the allegations seeking punitive damages are conclusory and are not alleged with the requisite particularity.  “To support punitive damages, the complaint asserting one of those causes of action must allege ultimate facts of the defendant's oppression, fraud, or malice.”  (Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 306, 316-17.)  For example, the complaint in Brousseau v. Jarrett, which the court held was “a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied’”, as it stated:

Defendant engaged in the conduct described in the second count ‘intentionally, wilfully, fraudulently, and with a wanton, reckless disregard for the possible injuries [sic] consequences ... and as a result of ... said intentional, wilful, wanton, reckless, oppressive, and fraudulent conduct, plaintiff is entitled to exemplary damages. . . .

(Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 869 & 872.)  Here, the facts fail to meet the requisite particularity to allege a claim for punitive damages.  At most, they allege the words of the statute in a conclusory manner. 

            In addition, as stated in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 832: “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  While a nonintentional tort that has the characteristic of an intentional tort may be the basis of a punitive damages award, there must be a showing of malice or intentionality under Civil Code, §3294 or that defendant’s conduct was of a severe or shocking character that warrants the same treatment as that accorded to willful/intentional misconduct. (Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286.)  Here, Plaintiff is seeking punitive damages in connection with the negligence cause of action.  As alleged, the negligence cause of action simply alleges facts that Defendants acted negligently, as opposed to intentionally or maliciously. 

            The Court has given Plaintiff the opportunity to amend the punitive damages request against Loera, but it does not appear that further facts were provided to support a request for punitive damages.  Punitive damages must be alleged with particularity and the SAC does not rise to this level.  Further, the motion to strike is not opposed, such that Plaintiff has not shown how, upon amendment, the punitive damages could be supported by further facts.  As such, the motion to strike the allegations for punitive damages is granted without leave to amend.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendant Omar Loera’s demurrer to the second amended complaint is overruled as to the 1st cause of action.  The demurrer is sustained as to the 2nd and 5th causes of action and the Court will hear oral argument regarding whether amendment is proper.  If both parties submit to the tentative order prior to the hearing, the demurrer to the 2nd and 5th causes of action will be sustained without leave to amend.

Defendant Omar Loera’s motion to strike is granted without leave to amend as to the allegations for punitive damages.  

Defendant shall provide notice of this order.