Judge: Mark C. Kim, Case: 22SMCV00217, Date: 2022-12-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV00217    Hearing Date: December 8, 2022    Dept: S27

1.     22LBCV00049

On 2/01/22, SEJ Properties, L.P. filed 22LBCV00049 against Defendants, 1801-1899 Willow, LLC and Alma D. Barnes for specific performance and related claims arising out of Defendants’ alleged refusal to close escrow on Plaintiff’s purchase of a commercial property.

 

On 3/29/22, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to expunge lis pendens, finding Plaintiff had established the probable validity of its claims against Defendants. 

 

2.     22SMCV00217

On 2/16/22, SEJ Properties, L.P. filed 22SMCV00217 against Defendants, Escrow L.A., Inc. and Sharon L. Sharp for breach of fiduciary duty and related claims arising out of Defendants’ refusal to release the funds that were deposited into the escrow account in connection with the transaction at issue in 22LBCV00049.

 

3.     Motion for Reconsideration

a.     Procedural History

On 4/26/22, the Court, Honorable Mark H. Epstein presiding, denied Plaintiff’s motion for release of funds.  The Court denied the motion on the ground that 1801-1899 Willow, LLC was a necessary party to the motion and had not been added as a defendant.  Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the order.  It contends it has now added Willow as a doe defendant, it will prevail on the merits of the motion, and it will suffer irreparable harm if a mandatory injunction ordering Escrow LA to release the funds is not issued.

 

b.     Reconsideration

The Court is inclined to find that the addition of all necessary parties to the action is sufficient to show a new fact, circumstance, or law, such that reconsidering the prior order is procedurally proper.  The Court will, therefore, rule on Plaintiff’s request for a mandatory injunction on its merits. 

 

c.     Request for Mandatory Injunction

As an initial note, orders granting mandatory, as opposed to prohibitive, injunctions are extremely rarely granted.  Mandatory preliminary injunctions are rarely granted (and if granted, are subject to stricter scrutiny on appeal): “The granting of a mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established.”  Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Furlotti (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1493; Integrated Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. VitaVet Labs, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1184; Brown v. Pacifica Found., Inc. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 915, 925.

 

Plaintiff concedes that “irreparable harm” must be shown in order to impose injunctive relief.  It contends irreparable harm is presumed when there is a very strong probability of prevailing on the merits of the action.  It cites King v. Meese (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217, 1226 to support this position.  Plaintiff mis-cites King.  In King, the Court held that an injunction could be imposed where the “balancing of harms” favored the defendant, if the plaintiff’s showing of likelihood of success on the merits was extremely strong.  The Court noted that there is a balancing test used, and the stronger one of the showings is, the less strong the other showing need be.  Irreparable harm, however, is an initial threshold requirement for injunctive relief, separate and apart from the “balancing of harms” test that is conducted AFTER the showing of irreparable harm is made.  In other words, it is often the case that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted, but the defendant will also suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is granted; in those situations, the Court must balance the harms to the parties against the likelihood of success on the merits of the action.

 

Irreparable harm is often related to the “inadequate legal remedy” (i.e., the damages remedy is inadequate because some immeasurable harm is threatened). But it is also a separate consideration. Relief is unlikely unless someone will be significantly hurt in a way that cannot later be repaired. People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 863, 870-871. 

 

Plaintiff herein has failed entirely to show irreparable harm or that the legal remedy is inadequate.  On the contrary, if the request for a mandatory injunction is denied, the money will remain on deposit in escrow.  The only harm to Plaintiff is that the money will not be released until the conclusion of the litigation.  This is hardly “irreparable,” and clearly monetary damages are adequate, as the money is literally sitting in an escrow account. 

 

d.     Conclusion

The motion for reconsideration is granted; the request for substantive relief in the form of a mandatory injunction is, however, denied. 

 

4.     CMC

The parties are reminded that there is a CMC on calendar today concurrently with the hearing on the above motion.  The Court asks Counsel to make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on the motion and the CMC.