Judge: Robert S. Draper, Case: 21STCV41669, Date: 2022-08-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV41669 Hearing Date: August 4, 2022 Dept: 78
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MARY PAT DODSON, Plaintiff, vs. City of monterey park, et al. Defendants. |
Case No.: |
21STCV41669 |
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Hearing Date: |
August 4, 2022 |
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[TENTATIVE]
RULING RE: Plaintiff mary pat dodson’s motion to quash defendant’s deposition
subpoena for employment records.
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Plaintiff Mary Pat Dodson’s Motion to
Quash Defendant’s Deposition Subpoena for Employment Records is DENIED.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
This is an employment action. The
operative First Amended Complaint alleges as follows.
Plaintiff Mary Pat Dodson (“Plaintiff”)
was hired by Defendant City of Monterey Park (the “City”) as a literacy
coordinator in September, 2019. (FAC ¶ 4.) She worked there until her
termination on or around October 7, 2020. (Ibid.) While employed with the City,
Plaintiff was subject to discrimination based on her age and disability. (FAC ¶
7.)
On March 13, 2020, the Premises closed
to public due to the COVID pandemic, and Plaintiff was sent home because
‘people of a certain age had to go home.” (FAC ¶ 10.)
Additionally, Plaintiff suffered from a
disability as defined by the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). (FAC ¶
11.) This disability made her exceptionally susceptible to COVID. (FAC ¶ 11.)
Nonetheless, in late March or early
April 2020, Plaintiff was told she had to return to work, in person. (FAC ¶
13.) Plaintiff provided the City with a doctor’s note stating that she was to
work remotely while the pandemic continued. (FAC ¶ 14.) She submitted several
similar notes over the coming months. (FAC ¶ 15.)
The City required that Plaintiff return
to work in person in August, 2020. (FAC ¶ 39.) She was subjected to retaliation
and discrimination. (Ibid.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was terminated. (FAC
¶ 40.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed
the Complaint.
On January 28, 2021, Plaintiff filed
the operative First Amended Complaint.
On March 1, 2022, the City filed an
Answer.
On April 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed the
instant Motion to Quash.
On July 22, 2022, the City filed an
Opposition.
No Reply has been filed.
DISCUSSION
I.
Motion
to quash
Plaintiff moves to quash the City’s
subpoena requesting documents from Plaintiff’s former employer, the City of
Glendora. The subpoena requested her application for employment, pre-employment
examinations, performance evaluations, disciplinary records, and all documents
related to requests for reasonable accommodation made by Plaintiff. (Motion at
pp. 2-3; Exh. 1.) Plaintiff moves to quash pursuant to California Code of Civil
Procedure section 1978.1.
Section 1978.1 states:
If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of
books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a
court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition,
the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision
(b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an
opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely,
modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as
the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court
may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from
unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the
right of privacy of the person.
Here, Plaintiff argues that the
subpoena impinges on Plaintiff’s Constitutional right to privacy. (See Puerto
v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252-53 (holding
disclosure of information in personnel files requires balancing of competing
interests).) The competing interest test is described in Williams v.
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552:
“The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected
privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given
circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation] The party
seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important
countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection
may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective
measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance
these competing considerations. [Citation]” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017)
3 Cal.5th 531, 552.
Plaintiff has established that she has
a legally protected privacy interest in her personnel records. Next, Plaintiff
argues that the requested records are not relevant to the instant suit because they
address Plaintiff’s disability before her employment by the City, not as it
presently exists. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the subpoena is unnecessarily
broad, as it seeks employment records that could only be used by the City to
attack Plaintiff’s character, and are not relevant to her requests for
reasonable accommodations.
In response, the City argues that the
records are relevant, as Plaintiff was employed in the exact same position with
the City of Glendora, and received accommodations for her disability there.
Second, the City notes that in Plaintiff’s discovery responses, she stated that
the interactive process meeting notes from the City of Glendora support her
claims and contentions in this litigation. Finally, the City argues that Plaintiff
has a diminished expectation of privacy, as in her employment application,
Plaintiff gave Defendant permission to contract her prior employers about her
work history.
The Court finds that, though Plaintiff
does have a right to privacy in her employment records, her permission for the
City to contact her former employers evinces a diminished privacy expectation.
More importantly, the fact that the City seeks records of reasonable
accommodations provided by Plaintiff’s former employer, for Plaintiff’s same
position, for Plaintiff’s same disability, makes the records extremely relevant
to the instant litigation. Finally, the Court finds that it is not in the
interest of justice to allow Plaintiff to use her prior accommodations as
evidence of the City’s failure to provide accommodations, without granting the
City full access to those same records.
With respect to Plaintiff’s claim that
the documents produced might be used as impermissible character evidence, if
this use it is impermissible they will not be used because Plaintiffs will
object to their introduction at trial and that objection will be sustained. But
whether or not the use is impermissible, and whether or not the objection will
be sustained, are subjects for another day. That would be the day of trial.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to
Quash is DENIED.
DATED:
August 4, 2022
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Hon. Robert S. Draper
Judge of the Superior Court