Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 20STCV14617, Date: 2024-05-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV14617 Hearing Date: May 15, 2024 Dept: 55
Tentative Rulings on Motions in Limine – Continued
FSC on 5/15/24
On 6/23/22, the Court denied Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, and granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion for
summary adjudication with respect to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. As a
result of the Court’s ruling, the following claims remained in the case:
Violations of the FEHA (discrimination, harassment, retaliation,
failure to prevent, promptly investigate and correct FEHA violations, failure
to engage in the interactive process, and failure to accommodate) based on disability
for conduct that occurred within one year of Plaintiff’s 3/20/20 DFEH
Complaint, i.e., wrongful conduct based on disability that occurred before
3/19/19 is time-barred. The Court specifically granted summary adjudication against
Plaintiff with respect to his claims for violation of the FEHA based on race
and age.
Plaintiff then sought leave to amend the pleading to
add new claims and legal theories that had arisen since he filed the case. In
granting Plaintiff’s motion, the Court noted in its order on 8/1/23 that
Plaintiff could reallege summarily adjudicated claims to avoid waivers on
appeal, but that issues summarily adjudicated could not be relitigated merely
because such allegations were contained in the amended pleading. This means
that Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims based on race and age remained dismissed because
the Court had previously summary adjudicated those claims along with other
claims for violation of the CFRA, violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5, and defamation.
Accordingly, following the filing of the Third Amended Complaint, the following
claims are in the case to be tried at trial:
(1) Violation
of the FEHA - discrimination based on disability for conduct that occurred
within one year of Plaintiff’s 3/20/20 DFEH Complaint;
(2) Violation of the FEHA – harassment based on disability
for conduct that occurred within one year of Plaintiff’s 3/20/20 DFEH Complaint;
(3) Violation
of the FEHA – retaliation based on disability for conduct that occurred within one
year of Plaintiff’s 3/20/20 DFEH Complaint;
(4) Violation
of the FEHA – failure to engage in the interactive process based on disability for
conduct that occurred within one year of Plaintiff’s 3/20/20 DFEH Complaint;
(5) Violation
of the FEHA – failure to accommodate based on disability for conduct that occurred
within one year of Plaintiff’s 3/20/20 DFEH Complaint; and
(6) Violation
of the FEHA – failure to prevent/investigate based on disability for conduct that
occurred within one year of Plaintiff’s 3/20/20 DFEH Complaint.
With this backdrop, the Court makes the following rulings
on the motions in limine.
Plaintiff’s MIL No. 3
is GRANTED. All argument, testimony, or evidence regarding Plaintiff’s
statement in or around 2018 that Paul Bebek is a “honky ass motherfucker” is
excluded because Plaintiff’s FEHA claims based on race have been dismissed and thus
evidence regarding Plaintiff’s own race-based statements is not relevant and/or
is inadmissible under Evidence Code Section 352.
Plaintiff’s MIL No. 4
is GRANTED as follows: All argument, testimony, or evidence regarding Plaintiff’s
collateral source payments from his worker’s compensation payments is excluded.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks a broader exclusion order, such a request is
denied.
Plaintiff’s MIL No. 5,
which was filed on 5/10/24, is DENIED as untimely because it was not filed
before the initial FSC on 5/3/24 in violation of the Court’s Trial Preparation Order.
Plaintiff’s MIL No. 6,
which was filed on 5/10/24, is DENIED as untimely because it was not filed
before the initial FSC on 5/3/24 in violation of the Court’s Trial Preparation Order.
Defendants’ MIL No. 1
is DENIED. This motion in limine is plagued by the same defects noted by the
Court of Appeal in Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49
Cal.App.4th 659:
“On the other hand, many
of the motions filed by Amtech were not properly the subject of motions in
limine, were not adequately presented, or sought rulings which would merely be
declaratory of existing law or would not provide any meaningful guidance for
the parties or witnesses. For example, motion No. 19 sought to “... exclude any
testimony of the plaintiffs which is speculative.” No factual support or
argument was presented to suggest the nature and type of speculative testimony
which Amtech expected to be elicited from plaintiffs. Motions No. 8, 20 and 21
sought to exclude evidence of prior incidents unless an appropriate foundation
was established to show the relevance of such evidence or that the prior
incidents were similar in nature to the incident involved in the suit. Again,
no factual support was presented in connection with the motions, meaning the
court would have to rule in a vacuum. Motion No. 7, previously referred to,
sought to limit the opinions of plaintiffs experts to those “rendered at
deposition and in written reports.” Again, there was no supporting evidence to
suggest what opinions had been rendered at the depositions, leaving the court
and the parties to guess what opinions during trial may be included within the
scope of the ruling. Motion No. 6 sought an order precluding plaintiffs from
calling any witnesses “not previously identified in plaintiffs' discovery
responses.” Absent a meaningful and expressed belief that this may occur, this
was a meaningless motion unless and until plaintiffs attempted to call such
witnesses.”
(Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49
Cal.App.4th 659, 670–671.)
For the same reasons stated in Kelly v. New West
Federal Savings, the motion in limine here is not specific enough for the
Court to make a meaningful order. The
motion seeks to preclude any evidence or argument for claims dismissed by way
of the summary adjudication motion. This is too broad because it fails to
identify what specific evidence Defendants seek to exclude. As such, the motion in limine also fails to
comply with Local Rule 3.57. (CA R LOS
ANGELES SUPER CT Rule 3.57(a)(1) [“Motions made for the purpose of precluding
the mention or display of inadmissible and prejudicial matter in the presence
of the jury must be accompanied by a declaration that includes the following: (1)
Specific identification of the matter alleged to be inadmissible and
prejudicial.”].) Instead of identifying
the specific evidence that the motion seeks to exclude, this motion in limine
amounts to little more than a restatement of the law and general legal
principles. The moving party fails to demonstrate
that there are no circumstances which would permit admission of this evidence. The Court declines to rule on this motion in
limine in a vacuum. Accordingly, the
motion in limine is DENIED.
Defendants may at trial assert an objection to the
introduction of specific evidence if this issue arises. In addition, the Court
will require Plaintiff to make an offer of proof outside the presence of the
jury before seeking to introduce any evidence or argument regarding conduct regarding
Plaintiff’s disability claim that occurred before 3/19/19 and/or any evidence
or argument regarding any other claims that have been dismissed (i.e., claims
based on race, age, defamation, Labor Code and CFRA violations).
Defendants’ MIL No. 2
is GRANTED. All argument, testimony, or evidence regarding the alleged inappropriate
touching of Plaintiff by Paul Bebek and/or Johnny Calderon in or around 2018 is
excluded because Plaintiff’s FEHA claims for conduct that occurred prior to
3/2019 is time-barred and thus such evidence is not relevant and/or is
inadmissible under Evidence Code Section 352.
Defendants’ MIL No. 3 is
DENIED. The motion in limine is not specific enough for the Court to make a
meaningful order. Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiff’s defamation
claim was dismissed but Defendants do not explain what specific evidence or
argument regarding the dismissed claim they seek to exclude.
Defendants may at trial assert an objection to the
introduction of specific evidence if this issue arises. In addition, the Court
will require Plaintiff to make an offer of proof outside the presence of the
jury before seeking to introduce any evidence or argument regarding conduct involving
the now-dismissed defamation claim.
With respect to all motions in limine above that have
been denied, the moving party may renew the objection to the introduction of
this evidence at trial, and the Court will rule on the evidentiary objection
anew in the context of the other evidence that is presented at trial.