Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 20STCV14617, Date: 2024-11-27 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 20STCV14617    Hearing Date: November 27, 2024    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate

 

Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate is denied.

 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Roderick Corprue filed this against the City of Lawndale (“Lawndale”), Johnny Calderon, Kahono Oei, and doe Defendants 1 to 100 (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging employment discrimination.

On 6/23/22, the Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication with respect to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. After the 6/23/22 order, the remaining clams alleged violations of the FEHA (discrimination, harassment, retaliation, failure to prevent, promptly investigate and correct FEHA violations, failure to engage in the interactive process, and failure to accommodate) based on disability for conduct that occurred within one year of Plaintiff’s 3/20/20 DFEH Complaint. The Court specifically granted summary adjudication against Plaintiff with respect to his claims for violation of the FEHA based on race and age.

Plaintiff then sought leave to amend the pleading to add new claims and legal theories that had arisen since he filed the case. In granting Plaintiff’s motion to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), the Court noted in its order on 8/1/23 that Plaintiff could reallege summarily adjudicated claims to avoid waivers on appeal, but that issues summarily adjudicated could not be relitigated merely because such allegations were contained in the amended pleading. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s prior FEHA claims based on race and age remained dismissed because the Court had previously summary adjudicated those claims along with other claims for violation of the CFRA, violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5, and defamation.

Plaintiff again sought leave to amend the complaint by adding that Plaintiff had been formally terminated and to re-allege racial discrimination. On 9/23/24, the Court denied the motion as untimely and prejudicial.

On 9/30/2024, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants, case no. 24STCV25195.

On 10/11/2024, the Court found the two cases were related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a).

Plaintiff filed a motion for consolidation. Defendant opposes.

 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of (1) the Right to Sue dated October 11, 2022; (2) the Right to Sue dated August 7, 2024; the Complaint filed on September 30, 2024, Case No. 24STCV25195, Roderick Corprue v. City of Lawndale; (4) and the Notice of Related Case filed in the Related Case, Case No. 24STCV25195, Roderick Corprue v. City of Lawndale is granted.

 

PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

1-4. Overruled

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (a) provides, “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated, and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” The purpose of consolidation is to avoid unnecessary costs or delay, avoid duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both actions, and avoid inconsistent results by hearing and deciding common issues together. Estate of Baker (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 471, 485.) In deciding whether to grant a motion to consolidate, the court should weigh whether the common issues predominate over the individual issues and whether any risks of jury confusion or prejudice to the parties outweighs the reduction in time and expense that would result from consolidation. Todd-Stenberg v. Shield (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978. The granting or denial of the motion to consolidate rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. See Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal. App.2d 509, 511.

 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks consolidation of two cases currently pending in the Los Angeles Superior Court, the instant action, case number 20STCV14617 (the lead case) and case number 24STCV25195 (the related case), both of which are pending before Judge Mackenzie in Department 55 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse.

 

I. Motion for Reconsideration

Defendants argue that in filing the instant motion, Plaintiff effectively seeks an untimely motion for reconsideration of the Court’s September 23, 2024 ruling denying leave to file a fourth amended complaint. Opposition at p. 6: 19-22. The Court agrees.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 “generally states procedures for applications to reconsider any previous interim court order.” Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1098. Section 1008, subdivision (a), “prohibits a party from moving for reconsideration after 10 days have passed from service of notice of entry of the original order.” Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 102. “The name of a motion is not controlling, and, regardless of the name, a motion asking the trial court to decide the same matter previously ruled on is a motion for reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008.” Powell v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1577 (citation omitted).

 

The Court finds that the instant motion for consolidation amounts to an untimely motion for reconsideration. While formally an attempt to consolidate two separate cases, the related case was filed only after the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. The Complaint in the related case contains substantially the same allegations that Plaintiff desired to add in his proposed fourth amended complaint to the senior case. Therefore, in substance, if not form, the instant motion is an untimely motion for reconsideration. As this Court has repeatedly held, the causes of action for race and age-based FEHA violations were summarily adjudicated in Defendants’ favor. Plaintiff’s continued attempts to plead around this decision are unavailing.

 

 

II. Prejudice

Additionally, Defendants argue that consolidating the two cases will prejudice them.

In ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint, the Court found that granting the motion would prejudice Defendants by requiring them to conduct additional discovery and possibly file additional motions contesting the merits of the new claims, necessitating a continuance of the trial date and additional pre-trial litigation. Likewise, the Court concludes that granting Plaintiff’s motion for consolidation would similarly prejudice Defendants.

Plaintiff contends that any potential delay is outweighed by the benefits of avoiding duplicative discovery, recalling witnesses, overlapping work history and details, and inconsistent verdicts. Reply at p. 4: 14-17. However, considering that Plaintiff’s race and age discrimination claims were previously summarily adjudicated on almost identical facts, the Court is skeptical that the claims raised in the related case will make it to trial.

The central new fact that Plaintiff argues distinguishes the claims in the related case from the summarily adjudicated causes of action is Lawndale’s formal termination of Plaintiff in May 2024. Related case Complaint ¶ 25. However, like the Third Amended Complaint in the lead case, the Complaint in the related case alleges that Plaintiff was constructively terminated in 2022. It states, “[t]he City’s refusal to accommodate [Plaintiff’s 15-pound lifting limit] constituted a constructive termination, as Plaintiff was effectively forced out of his job due to the City’s refusal to comply with his medical needs. The financial hardship resulting from the refusal was severe. Plaintiff was cut off from his income, forcing him to deplete his retirement savings and eventually lose his home in Los Angeles compelling him to move back with his parents in Louisiana.” Id. ¶ 20.

The distinction between a constructive termination, which effectively forced Plaintiff out of his job, cut him off from his income, and forced him to leave the state, and formal termination is narrow. The Court finds it unlikely that such a distinction is sufficient to result in a different outcome for the race and age discrimination claims. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s arguments for consolidation based on judicial economy do not outweigh the prejudice to Defendants.

 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate is denied.