Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 21STCP03671, Date: 2024-05-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCP03671 Hearing Date: May 22, 2024 Dept: 55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Motion of Defendant Nancy Bargmann for Judgment on the Pleadings. Harbor
Regional Center’s Joinder in Defendant Nancy Bargmann’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Padres Buscando El Cambio aka Coalision De
Padres Buscando El Cambio (“Plaintiff”) filed a Verified Second Amended Complaint
(SAC) against NANCY BARGMANN, in her official capacity as Director of
California Department of Developmental Services (DDS) (“Bargmann”) and HARBOR
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES FOUNDATION (“Harbor”) (Bargmann and Harbor referred
to collectively as “Defendants”) based on Defendants’ alleged discriminatory
practices with respect to the regional center run by Defendants.
As alleged in the SAC, Plaintiff is an association of
Hispanic/Latinx families having developmentally disabled children entitled to
state-funded services under the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services
Act, Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 4500 et seq. (Lanterman Act). Defendants, who run
a regional center serving southeast Los Angeles County as one of 21
state-funded regional centers, are required to administer the assistance in a
non-discriminatory manner. Plaintiff alleges that Harbor provides fewer
comprehensive services and spends less money on Hispanic/Latinx children as
compared to white children. Plaintiff alleges that DDS, overseeing California regional
centers, has failed to adequately correct actions having disparate impacts on
Hispanic/Latinx families. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges three
causes of action against Defendants: (1) Discrimination in State-Funded Programs
(Gov’t Code § 11135); (2) Waste of Public Funds (Civ. Proc. Code § 526a); and
(3) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 526, 1060).
Bargmann moves for judgment on the pleadings on the
entirety of the SAC and each cause of action in the SAC. Harbor joins in the
motion. Plaintiff opposes the motion and joinder.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of court records and
agency statements/opinions/reports. The Court sustains all of Bargmann’s
objections to the RJN. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 (cannot take judicial notice of hearsay in
court filings, but only their existence); Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 365 (judicial notice as to demurrer requires
there cannot be a factual dispute about the item); Arce ex rel. Arce v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482 (judicial
notice of official records does not include the truth of the matters); Barratt
Amer., Inc. v. City of San Diego (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 809, 812, fn. 2
(court denied judicial notice of government resolutions as being irrelevant to
demurrer).
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for judgment on the pleadings involves the
same type of procedures that apply to a general demurrer. E.g., Burnett v.
Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064. Demurrers
are to be sustained where a pleading fails to plead adequately any essential
element of the cause of action. Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 857, 879-880. However, judgment on the pleadings does not involve resolving
material factual issues requiring evidentiary considerations. Schabarum v.
California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.
ANALYSIS
A. Procedure
Plaintiff asserts that the Court should exercise its
discretion to deny the motion as untimely. A statutory motion for judgment on
the pleadings may not be made "if a pretrial conference order has been
entered pursuant to Section 575, or within 30 days of the date the action is
initially set for trial, whichever is later, unless the court otherwise
permits." Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (e). Courts have discretion to
consider late statutory motions for judgment on the pleadings, without any
requirement of good cause. Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 1057, 1063. The Court exercises its discretion to address the
merits of the motion.
B. Merits
1. First
Cause of Action-- Discrimination in State-Funded Programs Gov’t Code § 11135.
Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that
Defendants violated Government Code section 11135 by denying Hispanic/Latinx
families with full access to services at the Harbor regional center. SAC, ¶ 124.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a discrimination
claim under either a disparate impact or a discriminatory treatment theory.
To allege disparate-impact claims, plaintiffs must
plead facts that establish a facially neutral policy or practice that caused disproportionate
harm to a protected class of people. Villafana v. Cnty. of San Diego (2020)
57 Cal. App. 5th 1012, 1017–1018.
To evidence a prima facie case of disparate impact,
plaintiffs must use an appropriate comparative measure such as statistics considering
the correct population base and racial makeup. Ibid. As to claims of
disparate impact, plaintiffs usually prove the disproportionate harm piece of
the claim with statistical disparities, showing that facially neutral
employment practices, adopted without any discriminatory motive, had
significant adverse effects on protected groups, making those the equivalent of
intentional discrimination. Jumaane v. City of L.A. (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 1390, 1404-1405. A disparate impact claim involves comparing the
people affected and those unaffected by a facially neutral policy as to the
total group to which the policy or decision applies. Cnty. Inmate Tel. Serv.
Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 354, 368.
Harbor’s joinder reply cites United States Supreme
Court decisions for the proposition that supporting statistics must be pled, and
not just proven at trial. Reply, 2:12-18. But California
courts follow procedures governing litigation in their courts. E.g., Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin.
Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 409. In addition, the federal
decisions often cited by Defendants do not govern in California trial courts. The
state courts are not free to depart from California Supreme Court precedent by
applying different federal law. Fujifilm Corp. v. Yang (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 326, 333.
Also, evidentiary statistics can be obtained via
discovery. “There is no need to require specificity in the pleadings because
'modern discovery procedures necessarily affect the amount of detail that
should be required in a pleading.'” Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.
California opinions often reference analogous statutes
as including omissions as being a practice supporting a claim of disparate
impact, without always requiring affirmative acts. E.g., Martinez v. City of
Clovis (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 193, 258–259 (City's failure to adopt zoning accommodations
qualified as a discriminatory practice). More particularly, the regulations applicable
here do not require only affirmative actions, but instead include various alternatives
such as an entity using methods of administration that perpetuate
discrimination caused by another recipient on the basis of ethnic group
identification. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11154, subd., (I).
Applying the full scope of governing law summarized
above, the Court observes that the SAC adequately alleges that Defendants took
no steps to end discrimination caused by unequal distribution of funds to Hispanic/Latinx
children having developmental disabilities. E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 1-4. Beyond statistical
underfunding, Defendants also have allowed intimidation to deter the families
from requesting possibly needed services. E.g., ibid. at ¶ 5. The relevant
scope of the statistics about underfunding in discrimination relate to an
alleged population of a state-funded regional center obligated to serve the
geographical areas of southeast Los Angeles County that Harbor administers.
E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 2 and 36-40. Above-cited case law does not necessarily require
state-wide statistics. Further, the specifics of supportive statistics, such as
race-based differences, are a matter of proof, and not of pleading sufficiency.
Additionally, Defendants’ discrimination flows from their policies, administration
and methods of not evaluating services that Hispanic/Latinx families need.
E.g., ibid. at ¶¶ 52-66 and 71-93. While DDS took some steps against the
alleged discrimination, it knowingly refused to take meaningful steps to address
all concerns. E.g., ibid. at ¶¶ 94-119.
Hence, the Court denies the motion as to the First
Cause of Action.
2. Waste
of Public Funds Civ. Proc. Code § 526a
Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges that Defendants
administer their state-funded programs and services in a manner that
discriminates against Hispanic/Latinx consumers in violation of Government Code
section 11135, and thus Defendants are engaged in an illegal expenditure of
public funds. SAC, ¶ 131. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, Plaintiff
seeks a declaration and injunction to prevent Defendants from continuing their
allegedly illegal expenditure of taxpayer funds. Id., ¶ 132.
Defendants argue that this claim is derivative of the
discrimination claim and thus fails because the first cause of action fails. “Cases
that challenge the legality or constitutionality of governmental actions fall
squarely within the purview of section 526a.” California Dui Laws. Ass'n v.
California Dep't of Motor Vehicles (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1247, 1261. In
contrast, a claim for waste of taxpayer funds will not lie if the challenged
governmental conduct is legal or discretionary. Collins v. Thurmond
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 879, 910.
As analyzed above, the SAC sufficiently alleges
illegal race-based, and disability-based, discrimination in violation of
various statutory provisions outlawing such discrimination. Thus, Plaintiff’s
second cause of action, which is premised on the allegations of illegal
discrimination as alleged in the first cause of action, survives the MJOP.
3. Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief Civ. Proc. Code §§ 526, 1060
Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges that a
controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants regarding whether
Defendants’ actions violate various laws. SAC, ¶ 134. Defendants seek dismissal
of this claim, arguing that the claim is derivative of the “defective” first
and second causes of action. Mot. at 20:5. As discussed above, those claims are
not defectively pleaded and thus this argument fails.
Defendants further argue the cause of action should be
dismissed because declaratory and injunctive relief are remedies unsupported by
a viable claim.
The great weight of authorities establish that
declaratory relief is a stand-alone claim, without any need for an underlying
claim. E.g., Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 592, 605-606. But see Batt v. City and County of San Francisco
(2007) 155 Cal. App. 4th 65, 82 (declaratory relief is an equitable remedy, not
an independent cause of action), disapproved on other grounds by McWilliams
v. City of Long Beach (2013) 56 Cal.4th 613, 626. Similarly, injunctive
relief is a cognizable cause of action, according to the weight of authorities.
E.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1352. But see, e.g.,
Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 154, 162 (“An
injunction is a remedy, not a cause of action.”).
Where there is a split of authority, trial courts have
discretion to choose between the decisions. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456. Here, the Court follows
the authorities approving declaratory and injunctive relief as stand-alone
claims.
Finally, Defendants argue that the request for declaratory
relief fails because Plaintiff improperly seeks to litigate the effectiveness
of Defendants’ actions. As a matter of procedure, a demurrer (and thus likewise,
a motion for judgment on the pleadings) must be overruled if an actual
controversy is alleged, even if plaintiffs are not entitled to a judgment in
their favor. Nede Mgmt. Inc. v. Aspen American Ins. Co. (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 1121, 1132. Importantly, “[d]eclaratory relief has been held to be
the proper remedy when it is alleged an agency has a policy of ignoring or
violating applicable laws.” Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
(1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1566.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to take steps
to end discrimination at the Harbor regional center. Plaintiff seeks a
declaration that Defendants administer Lanterman Act programs and services at
the regional center in a discriminatory manner in violation of state law. SAC, ¶¶
134-136. Also, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief enjoining Defendants from
further violating the Lanterman Act and illegally expending public funds, as
well as an injunction mandating Defendants to adopt and implement policies and
procedures free from discrimination. Id., ¶¶ 127, 132, 137. Substantively,
the Court determines that Plaintiff’s third cause of action is supported by the
allegations.
Therefore, the motion is denied as to the claim
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
The Court denies the motion and joinder.