Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 21STCV06572, Date: 2023-11-17 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 21STCV06572    Hearing Date: November 17, 2023    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:  Motion of Plaintiff for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement.

 

The Court will conduct the required fairness hearing, and consider granting the motion.  CRC Rules 3.769(h) and 3.771.

 

 

On 2/18/21, Plaintiff DELMY PORTILLO DE HERNANDEZ filed a Complaint alleging that, in response to Plaintiff’s complaints about various wage-and-hour violations in employment, Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff, and terminated the employment in approximately March of 2020.  The causes of action are (1) Wrongful Termination;  (2) Retaliation (California Labor Code § 98.6 And 1102.5);  (3) Violation Of California Labor Code §§ 510 And 1198 (Unpaid Overtime);  (4) Violation Of California Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197 And 1197.1 (Unpaid Minimum Wages);  (5) Violation Of California Labor Code § 226.7 (Unpaid Rest Period Premiums);  (6) Violation Of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 And 512(A) (Unpaid Meal Period Premiums);  (7) Violation Of California Labor Code § 226(A) (Failure To Provide Accurate Wage Statements);  (8) Violation Of California Labor Code §§ 201, 202 And 203 (Final Wages Not Timely Paid);  (9) Failure To Provide Personnel Records;  (10) Violation Of California Business And Professions Code § 17200, Et Seq.;  (11) Private Attorney General Act, Labor Code §2698 Et Seq.

On 7/24/23, the Court granted in this case the Motion for Order for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement.

In that ruling, describing much applicable law, the Court also found that the subject PAGA settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, meaningful and consistent with the purposes of PAGA, as to all subject, affected employees, including because class counsel contemplated the risks of proceeding with the PAGA action and the potential liability of Defendant. Further, the Court found that the moving documents provided sufficient information about the nature and magnitude of the claims, amounts in controversy, the realistic range of outcomes of litigation, and the bases for settlement amounts, to enable the Court to intelligently ascertain that the proposed compromise is fair, adequate, and reasonable as to the class members.  Additionally, the Court found that the proposed notices to class members were clearly organized, uncomplicated and clear, and sufficiently contained explanations of the settlement, procedures for class members to object at a specified hearing, and information about the effects of settling, in order to enable them to decide whether to accept the benefits, to opt out, to do nothing, or to pursue claims individually.

 

Now, Plaintiff has filed a motion for final approval of the PAGA and class action settlement. Plaintiff requests that the Court grant the motion and enter Judgment in this case pursuant to the terms of the Settlement.  No statement of objection to the parties’ settlement has been filed.  The Settlement provides for: (1) a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of $507,117.33; (2) attorneys’ fees in the amount of $169,039.11 (33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount); (3) actual litigation costs and expenses incurred by Class Counsel in the amount of $12,303.47; (4) payment of $50,000 for PAGA Penalties (75% of which shall be distributed to the LWDA and 25% to Aggrieved Employees); (5) payment of  $8,250 to the Administrator, Phoenix Settlement Administrators; and (6) a requested class representative service payment of $7,500 and plaintiff general release payment of $10,000 to Plaintiff Portillo de Hernandez.  (Mot., 1:5-12.)  Since the preliminary approval order of 7/24/23, followed by notice to the class members, three hundred sixty-four Class Members did not submit timely and valid Requests for Exclusion and are therefore deemed Participating Class Members  (Declaration of Jarrod Salinas, filed 9/29/23, ¶ 11). 

            Fairness

 

Before finally approving a class-action settlement, the Court must at a hearing inquire into the fairness of the settlement.  CRC Rule 3.768-3:769;  Cal. Prac. Guide:  Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023) §14:139.12. 

 

There is a presumption of fairness where settlements were reached through arm’s-length bargaining, investigation and discovery were sufficient, counsel has experience in similar litigation and the percentage of objections is small.  Civ. Pro. Before Trial, supra, at §14:139.15 (citing, e.g., 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146).  In the context of a settlement agreement, the test is not the maximum amount plaintiffs might have obtained at trial on the complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable under all of the circumstances.  Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 250.

 

In its broad discretion, the Court considers the following factors:

 

·         Strength of plaintiff’s case;

·         risk of maintaining class action status through trial;

·         amount offered in settlement;

·         experience and views of counsel;

·         reaction of the class members.

 

In re Nordstrom Com'n Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 581;  Civ. Pro. Before Trial, supra, at §14:139.13 (citing Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801;  and  In re Microsoft I-V Cases (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 706, 723).

 

Here, the Court finds that the paperwork shows that the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and that the particular claims are amenable to settlement and certification on a class-wide basis pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §382. 

 

 

            Notice

 

The Court finds that reasonable and adequate notice of settlement was provided to the class members.  (E.g., declaration of Jarrod Salinas, filed 9/29/23, ¶¶ 1-10).  See generally  Civ. Pro. Before Trial, supra, at §14:139.11.

 

 

            Attorneys’ Fees

 

Furthermore, the Court finds that the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs requested are fair and reasonable.  

 

As a method for ascertaining reasonable attorney fees, the lodestar “is produced by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate.” Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal. App. 4th 819, 833.  “Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative multiplier to take into account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.” Ibid.  “‘The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.’”  Ibid.  Alternatively, the percentage method is based upon a reasonable percentage of the common fund which must be a calculable sum of money.  Civ. Pro. Before Trial, supra, at §14:145.2.  Reasonable percentages have been about 25-to-40 percent, depending upon facts including the quality of class counsel and the award size.  Ibid. at §14:145.3.

 

 

            Standing To Object

 

 

No issue of standing has arisen before the hearing, but there may be that question at the hearing. There is an “aggrieved party” requirement as to approvals of class-action settlements, and nonmembers to a class action lack standing to contest a class action settlement.  Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1131.  Cf.  Parker v. Bowron  (1953) 40 Cal.2d 344, 353  (“cannot give himself standing to sue by purporting to represent a class of which he is not a member.”).  “A class member who appears at a fairness hearing and objects to a settlement affecting that class member has standing to appeal an adverse decision ….”  Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Mrs. Gooch's Natural Food Markets, Inc.  (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 387, 395.  Accord  Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 235.  “The trial court has discretion to permit a nonparty to intervene where: (1) the proper procedures have been followed, (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action, (3) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation, and (4) the reasons for the intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action.”  Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.  (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 51.  “After the members of the class have been properly notified of the action, they are required to decide whether to remain members of the class represented by plaintiffs' counsel and become bound by a favorable or unfavorable judgment in the action, whether to intervene in the action through counsel of their own choosing, or whether to ‘opt out’ of the action and pursue their own independent remedies,…”  Home Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Sup.Ct. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010.

 

            Conclusion

 

If the Court finally approves the settlement after the required fairness hearing, it must enter a judgment providing for retention of jurisdiction to enforce the settlement terms.  CRC Rules 3.769(h), 3.771.