Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 21STCV34200, Date: 2024-12-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV34200 Hearing Date: December 17, 2024 Dept: 55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Defendants’ Motion
for Reconsideration
Defendants’ Motion
for Reconsideration is continued.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Razmik Bagumyan
filed this action against Rolls-Royce Motor Cars
NA, LLC (Rolls-Royce), O’Gara Coach
Company LLC (O’Gara), and Rusnak Corporation, alleging causes of action
relating to his purchase of a used 2015 Rolls Royce Ghost, including breach of
implied and express warranties.
In May 2023, the Court denied Defendants’ Rolls-Royce and O’Gara’s
(Defendants) motion for summary adjudication in its entirety, including as to
the breach of warranty claims.
Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Plaintiff opposes.
LEGAL STANDARD
ANALYSIS
Defendants move for reconsideration of the Court’s May 3, 2023,
Minute Order denying summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims for breach of
implied and express warranties.
I. Untimely Motion for Reconsideration
Defendants style the motion as a “Motion for Reconsideration”
and cite section 1008, subdivision (a) as its statutory basis. However, a
motion for reconsideration must be brought “within 10 days after service upon
the party of written notice of entry of the order.” § 1008, subd. (a)
Defendants have not abided by this requirement, as there is no merit to their
interpretation of “the statute to mean 10 days after the entry of an order by
another Court, which results in a change of law.” Reply at p. 3:22-23. This
interpretation is at odds with the statute’s plain language and the case law. See
Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 102 (“Code
of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a) prohibits a party from moving
for reconsideration after 10 days have passed from service of notice of entry
of the original order.”).
II. Defective Motion for Summary Adjudication
Defendants alternatively ask the Court to grant their motion
under section 1008, subdivisions (b) and (c).
“Under both Code of Civil Procedure sections 1008,
subdivision (b), and 437c, subdivision (f)(2), the motion made more than 10
days after an original motion is a new motion.” UAS Management, Inc. v.
Mater Misericordiae Hospital (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 357, 368 (UAS). Therefore,
despite Defendants’ styling it as a motion for reconsideration, the instant
motion is, in fact, a motion for summary adjudication. See Graham v. Hansen
(1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 965, 970 (“defendant’s second motion for summary
judgment, regardless of its label, was not a motion for reconsideration but
rather a subsequent application for summary judgment.”).
“Motions for summary judgment may be brought only under Code
of Civil Procedure section 437c and in accordance with its requirements.” UAS,
supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 357, 368. Therefore, “the motion was required to
provide 75 days’ notice and to be supported by a separate statement of
undisputed material facts, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivisions (a) and (b).” Ibid. Defendants argue that they were not
required to produce a new separate statement because they are only arguing a
change in law, not facts, but that distinction has no bearing on the 75-day
notice requirement. See ibid (“The court was without authority to
shorten the minimum notice for the motion over appellant’s objection.”) Parties
are “afforded a minimum notice period for the hearing of summary judgment
motions so that they have sufficient time to assemble the relevant evidence and
prepare an adequate opposition… trial courts do not have authority to
shorten the minimum notice period for summary judgment hearings.” McMahon v.
Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 112, 118 (emphasis added).
Defendants’ argument that the 75-day notice requirement should only apply on a
renewed motion based on changed facts, not changed law, is without textual or precedential
support.
Nor can the Court dispense with these requirements by
applying its authority to reconsider its interim rulings on its own motion. In Le
Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108, the California Supreme
Court held that “Unless the requirements of section 437c, subdivision (f)(2),
or 1008 are satisfied, any action to reconsider a prior interim order must
formally begin with the court on its own motion. To be fair to
the parties, if the court is seriously concerned that one of its prior interim
rulings might have been erroneous, and thus that it might want to reconsider
that ruling on its own motion—something we think will happen rather rarely—it
should inform the parties of this concern, solicit briefing, and hold a
hearing.” See Abassi v. Welke (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1353,1360 (“The
trial court invited Welke to file a second summary judgment motion indicating
it wanted to reassess its prior ruling …. The parties had an opportunity to
brief the issue, and a hearing was held.”)
In its May 3, 2023, Minute Order,
the Court noted that “[t]he law is somewhat unsettled about whether used
vehicles, purchased from retail sellers unaffiliated with manufacturers,
statutorily qualify as new motor vehicles, when there is a balance remaining on
manufacturers’ warranties.” Since then, in Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024)
17 Cal.5th 189, 206 (Rodriguez), the California Supreme Court clarified
that “the phrase ‘other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car
warranty’—considered in the context of the surrounding text of section 1793.22,
subdivision (e)(2) and in the broader context of the Song-Beverly Act’s
provisions distinguishing between new and used goods—means a vehicle for which
a manufacturer’s new car warranty is issued with the sale.” Contrary to Plaintiff’s
argument, “change of law” includes changes in binding judicial authority.
See Phillips v. Sprint PCS (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 758, 769 (affirming the trial court’s grant of a renewed motion to
compel arbitration after the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal
Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) preempted California’s case law on class
action waiver because this constituted a “‘major change in California law.’”). Without
reaching the issue’s merits, the Court concludes that the Rodriguez
decision reflects a change in law permitting Defendants to file a renewed
motion for summary adjudication.
Because Defendants make it
clear that they are not raising additional facts and only seek summary
adjudication of the warranty and Song-Beverly Act issues based on the Rodriguez
case, the Court will treat their motion for reconsideration as a renewed motion
for summary adjudication incorporating the arguments and separate statement from
their initial summary adjudication motion. To comply with the 75-day notice
period and allow Plaintiff time to file an Opposition, at the hearing, the Court
will continue the motion to a date determined in consultation with the parties.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration is continued.