Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 21STCV39406, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV39406 Hearing Date: March 21, 2025 Dept: 55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Cross-Complainant's Motion to Set Aside/Vacate
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sandra Will
Carradine filed this action against De
Witte Mortgage Investors Fund LLC, Peter
De Witte, CLE Capital Partners, LLC, and Christopher Powell (Defendants).
Peter De Witte and De Witte Mortgage Investors Fund LLC (Cross-Complainants) filed a Cross-Complaint
against 1565 Haslam, LLC, Sandra Will Carradine, LW Asset Management, LLC, and
Lee Wong.
On October 23, 2024, the
Court entered a default judgment against Cross-Defendants Lee Wong and LW Asset
Management, LLC.
On February 25, 2025, Wong filed
a motion to set aside the default and vacate the
default judgment. Cross-Complainants filed an Opposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d)
provides in relevant part that a court “may … on motion of either party after
notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” “A judgment
is ‘void’ only when the court entering that judgment ‘lack[ed] jurisdiction in
a fundamental sense’ due to the ‘entire absence of power to hear or determine
the case’ resulting from the ‘absence of authority over the subject matter or
the parties.’” People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
226, 233 (quoting People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33
Cal.4th 653, 660) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is
fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” AO Alfa-Bank
v. Yakovlev (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 189, (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for
service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction.... Thus, a
default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons
in the manner prescribed by statute is void.” American Express Centurion
Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 387 (quoting, Dill v. Berquist
Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444) (internal quotations
omitted).
A judgment void for improper service must be set aside
regardless of the merits of the underlying case or the defendant’s delay in
rectifying it. See Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc. (1988) 485
US 80, 86-87 (“Where a person has been deprived of property in a manner
contrary to the most basic tenets of due process, it is no answer to say that
in his particular case due process of law would have led to the same result
because he had no adequate defense upon the merits.” [citation omitted]
[internal quotation marks omitted]); Los Angeles v. Morgan (1951) 105
Cal.App.2d 726, 731 (“[I]n the absence of service of process upon such a party
there is no duty on his part even though he has actual knowledge to take any
affirmative action at any time thereafter to preserve his right to challenge
the judgment. What is initially void is ever void and life may not be breathed
into it by lapse of time.”).
ANALYSIS
Wong moves to set aside and
vacate the default and default judgment, arguing that the judgment is void
because she was never served.
The burden of proof is on the party
seeking relief from default to show that service was improper. See Cruz v.
Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495 (“Although a trial
court has discretion to vacate the entry of a default or subsequent judgment,
this discretion may be exercised only after the party seeking relief has shown
that there is a proper ground for relief….”). Evidence Code section 647
provides that a registered process server's declaration of service establishes
a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence of the
facts stated in the declaration. See American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390 (citing Floveyor Internat., Ltd. v. Superior
Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 795). “[I]f a presumption affecting the
burden of producing evidence ‘applies to a proposition, the proponent of the
proposition need not prove it unless the opposing party produces evidence
undermining it, in which case the presumption is disregarded and the trier of
fact must decide the question without regard to it.’” Farr v. County of
Nevada (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 669, 680-681 (quoting Pellerin v. Kern
County Employees' Retirement Assn. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1106).
Cross-Complainants submit
with their Opposition a proof of service dated March 20, 2022. Opp. at
p. 15, Ex. A. The proof of service states that registered process server James
Baird personally served Lee Wong on March 11, 2022. Therefore, Cross-Complainants are entitled to a rebuttable
presumption that process occurred as stated in the proof of service.
In support of her motion, Wong submits her own declaration,
and that of her sister, Pleonpidh Houston, attesting that, from March 5, 2022,
to March 12, 2022, they were both out of the country on a cruise. Wong
additionally offers as evidence airline tickets, cruise activity logs, and
photographs of her trip. Houston Decl. at pp. 5-22. This evidence is sufficient
to rebut the presumption of the proof of service’s accuracy. However, the Court
notes that the photographs Wong submitted appear to show her in Costa Maya,
Mexico, and Belize, but neither location appears on the cruise itinerary.
Houston Decl. at pp. 5, 16, 17,18,19, 22. Therefore, absent an explanation, the
photographs tend to undermine, rather than support, the cruise confirmation and
airline receipts.
Cross-Complainants submit
the declaration of James Baird, further attesting that he served Wong at her
address on March 11, 2022. Moreover, Baird declares that he subsequently served
Wong with other documents on April 6, 2022, April 28, 2023, and June 15, 2023. Finally,
Baird identifies Wong as the person he served in one of the photographs she
submitted. Opp. at p. 13 ¶ 9, Ex. C; Houston Decl. at p. 17.
Because of the conflicting evidence, the Court grants Cross-Complainants’ request for an evidentiary
hearing where the parties may present testimony from Wong, Baird, and any other
witnesses with relevant information regarding the service of summons and Wong’s
location on March 11, 2022.
CONCLUSION
The Court declines to rule on
Wong’s motion to set aside default and vacate default judgment pending an
opportunity to hear oral testimony regarding the service of process. The Court
will set an evidentiary hearing in consultation with counsel at the 3/21/25
hearing.