Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 21STCV43405, Date: 2024-05-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV43405 Hearing Date: May 8, 2024 Dept: 55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Defendant Flinkman Management, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment
BACKGROUND
LISA PARODI (“Plaintiff”) filed this case in November
2021 against RUTH E. FLINKMAN, individually and as Trustee of the Flinkman Family
Trust (“Flinkman”); FLINKMAN MANAGEMENT, INC. also known as FLINKMAN MANAGEMENT
CO. (“FMI”); and RDM MANAGEMENT, INC. (“RDM”) (Flinkman,
FMI and RDM collectively referred to herein as “Defendants”) alleging damages
based on habitability issues in her apartment. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants owned, operated, and/or managed the apartment complex located at
2928 4th Street in Santa Monica (the “Property”) that includes
Plaintiff’s unit. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges the
following causes of action: 1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability; 2)
Negligence; 3) Nuisance; 4) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; and 5)
Violations of Civil Code Section 1942.4.
FMI has filed a motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that the causes of action against FMI are time barred. Plaintiff subsequently
dismissed the Fifth Cause of Action, making the motion moot as to that claim. Plaintiff
opposes the motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
In moving for summary judgment, a “defendant . . . has
met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the
party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not
separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense
to the cause of action.” Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2). Once the defendant has
satisfied that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff “to show, by
responsive separate statement and admissible evidence, that triable issues of
fact exist.” Ostayan v. Serrano
Reconveyance Co. (2000) 77 Cal. App. 4th 1411, 1418, disapproved on
other grounds by Black Sky Cap., LLC v. Cobb (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 156,
165; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).
“Summary judgment is proper only where there are no
triable issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment in
its favor as a matter of law.” Assad v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1612.
EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
FMI’s evidentiary objection number 8 is sustained and
the other objections are overruled.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges she has lived at the Property since
1995. FAC, ¶ 23. Plaintiff alleges claims against FMI for breach of the implied
warranty of habitability, negligence, nuisance, and breach of the implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment. The limitations period for the breach of implied warranty
and breach of the implied convent claims is four years. Code Civ. Proc., §
337(a). The limitations period for a negligence claim is two years. Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 335.1. Code of Civil Procedure Section 338 requires the commencement of
actions for nuisance as to real property within three years, except that a
continuing (or abatable) nuisance accrues at each continuation, much like the
delayed-discovery rule. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1994) 44
Cal.App.4th 1009, 1017. The determination of when the statute of limitations
begins to run generally is a question of fact. Lauckhart v. El Macero Homeowners
Assn. (2023) 92 Cal. App. 5th 889, 900.
FMI contends that the undisputed facts show it has not
managed the Property since 2007, when “Flinkman Family Trust” entered into a
Property Management Agreement with RDM. FMI further contends that because it ceased
management of the Property in 2007, any allegations by Plaintiff against FMI in
this lawsuit filed in 2021 are time barred under the applicable statutes of
limitations. In its reply brief, FMI contends that the fact that its name appears
on the 1995 lease agreement with Plaintiff cannot bind FMI in this case when it
ceased having any interest in the Property in 2007.
The evidentiary record shows that triable issues of
fact exist regarding the relationship between FMI, the Flinkman Family Trust,
and Plaintiff, which preclude summary judgment.
Landlords can be held liable on claims for breach of
warranty of habitability, and agents or managers of lessors may be liable for
other claims that are torts such as negligence. Stoiber v. Honeychuck
(1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 929. See also Guttman v. Chiazor (2017) 15
Cal.App.5thSupp. 57, 61 (“[U]nder the common law, a landlord has an implied
duty to render residential premises habitable,…”). Similarly, a claim may lie
against a landlord for negligence due to violation of a duty to maintain
habitable conditions. Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 1281, 1299.
In support of FMI’s argument that it had no liability with
respect to Plaintiff after 2007, FMI presented undisputed evidence that in
1995, Plaintiff took possession of unit 2 in the Property pursuant to a written
month-to-month lease agreement with FMI. Flinkman Decl., Ex. A; see also
Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Sep. Stmt. No. 1. It is undisputed that FMI managed
the Property. Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Sep. Stmt. No. 3. It is also undisputed
that Flinkman Family Trust entered into an agreement with RDM in 2007, pursuant
to which RDM has since managed the Property. Morehead Decl., Ex. A; see also
Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Sep. Stmt. No. 5.
Plaintiff presents evidence that conflicts with FMI’s
conclusion from these facts that its responsibilities to Plaintiff ended in
2007. It is undisputed that Plaintiff remained in unit 2 from 1995 to in or
around March 2022, when she moved to another unit in the Property. Def.’s Reply
to Pl.’s Sep. Stmt. of Add’l Facts Nos.2, 6. The 1995 lease agreement was
entered into by FMI as “Lessor-Owner” and provided at paragraph 9 that either side
could terminate the agreement with 30 days written notice. See id. While
FMI disputes Plaintiff’s additional facts that she never sent FMI or “anyone
else” any notice terminating her lease, never received any such notice from FMI
or “anyone else,” and was never presented with a new lease for unit 2, the
supporting evidence by FMI merely confirms that FMI managed the Property until RDM
took over in 2007. See Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Sep. Stmt. of Add’l Facts Nos. 7,
8, 15. Such facts support Plaintiff’s argument that FMI signed the lease
agreement as the lessor-owner, which stayed in effect at all relevant times,
binding FMI through the ongoing alleged unhabitable conditions. Silveira v.
Cnty. of Alameda (2006) 139 Cal. App. 4th 989, 997 (month to month tenancy is
one “having no fixed term that continues indefinitely until terminated”). These
triable issues of fact mean that the Court cannot, as a matter of law,
determine that FMI had no relationship with Plaintiff after 2007 such that the
statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s claims had expired by 2021.
FMI contends that it executed the 1995 lease as an
agent of the Flinkman Family Trust and was never the lessor of the Property.
Reply, p. 3. A “lease is a legal
document between the landlord (lessor, owner, managing agent) and the tenant….”
2 Real Estate Transactions: Structure and Analysis with Forms, § 18:41,
available at Westlaw. “An instrument within the scope of his authority by which
an agent intends to bind his principal, does bind him if such intent is plainly
inferable from the instrument itself.” Civ. C. §2337. Here, if FMI intended to
bind only a principal, as an agent, it does not appear anywhere in the lease or
in any written agreement in evidence. Further, FMI’s evidence in this regard is
the agreement between Flinkman Family Trust as an entity claiming to be the
property owner and a subsequent management company and is not evidence of any transfer
or assignment of interest by FMI. See Moorehead Decl., Ex. A. That exhibit
distinguishes FMI’s cited cases about transferors or assignors causing a
transfer of their leasehold property. See Reply, p. 5. So, FMI’s
evidence leaves logical gaps in the chain of leasehold property interests between
the trust and FMI.
CONCLUSION
Given the triable issues of material fact about when
and whether FMI ceased being the agent of Plaintiff’s landlord, the Court
denies the motion.