Judge Alison Mackenzie, Case Number: 22STCV04185, Date: 2023-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 22STCV04185, Date: 2023-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV04185 Hearing Date: November 7, 2023 Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Defendant GREEN KNIGHT SECURITY, INC.’s Demurrer To Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint; Motion To Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. Defendant CRESCENT HOTELS AND RESORTS, LLC’s Demurrer To Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint; Motion To Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint.

Tentative

Both demurrers are sustained in part (as to the 4th Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotion Distress, without leave to amend), and are otherwise overruled.

Both motions to strike are denied.

Twenty days to answer.

Background

On 2/2/22, two individual plaintiffs anonymously filed a Complaint using their names initials, H.C. and S.A.

On 2/17/22, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), alleging that plaintiffs were patrons at the Mayfair Hotel at 1256 W 7th Street, Los Angeles, where a hotel security guard committed sexual battery on Plaintiff H.C.

The causes of action are:

1. NEGLIGENCE

2. NEGLIGENT HIRING, RETENTION, AND SUPERVISION

3. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

4. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

5. PREMISES LIABILITY

6. ASSAULT

7. BATTERY

8. SEXUAL BATTERY

9. FALSE IMPRISONMENT

10. VIOLATION OF BANE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

11. VIOLATION OF RALPH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT.

Crescent’s Demurrer

Defendant Crescent Hotels and Resorts, LLC (“Crescent”) requests an order sustaining the demurrer to the Fourth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Cause of Action, and the prayer for relief, in the FAC, and granting the motion to strike punitive and treble damages and attorneys’ fees from the FAC. Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer except as to the Fourth Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. The Court therefore will sustain the demurrer as to the Fourth Cause of Action. Plaintiffs also oppose the motion to strike.

Ninth Cause of Action- False Imprisonment

Crescent argues that Plaintiffs’ claim for false imprisonment is time-barred. The statute of limitations for a false imprisonment cause of action is one year. CCP § 340(c). The FAC alleges that incident occurred on February 14 or 15, 2020. (FAC ¶ 2.) Crescent contends that the complaint, filed on February 2, 2022, falls outside of the statute of limitations. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs, however, that the recent statutory amendment to Section 340.16 revived the claim of false imprisonment alleged to have been part of the sexual assault of H.C. “Effective January 1, 2023, section 340.16 was amended in two respects to revive certain claims seeking to recover damages suffered as a result of a sexual assault that would otherwise be barred by application of a statute of limitations.” Jane Doe #21 (S.H.) v. CFR Enterprises, Inc., (2023) 93 Cal. App. 5th 1199, 1208.

Tenth Cause of Action- Bane Act and Eleventh Cause of Action- Ralph Act

Crescent argues that these claims fail to allege any violations against it and are time-barred. According to Crescent, Crescent cannot be liable for a Bane Act or a Ralphs Act violation based on the alleged conduct of the security guard Corrales employed by Defendant Green Knight Security, because Corrales was not Crescent’s employee. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs adequately pled facts that Crescent is vicariously liable for Corrales’ conduct because he was performing services on behalf of Crescent as Defendant’s agent and in the scope of his employment, which includes detaining and removing visibly intoxicated patrons of the hotel when he violated H.C.’s rights. (FAC, ¶¶ 19, 43, 96, 105-109, ¶¶ 116-120). Plaintiffs also adequately pled facts that give rise to violations of the Bane Act and Ralphs Act, including violent acts motivated by gender. (Id.)

Contrary to Crescent’s argument, the Bane Act and Ralphs Act claims are timely, because the amended Complaint adding those claims relates back to the time of the filing of the initial Complaint, as being based on the same general set of facts. See Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 276.). The claims are also timely due to Covid Emergency Rule 9 that tolled all limitations periods from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020—178 days. Accordingly, 178 days must be tacked onto the end of the limitations period for both claims. Assuming Plaintiffs had until February 15, 2022 to commence the Bane Act claim, and February 15, 2023 to commence the Raph Act claim, tacking on 178 days to both deadlines means that Plaintiffs’ claims, filed on February 17, 2022, are timely.

Prayer for Relief

Crescent contends that the prayer for relief is uncertain because it does not specify the causes of action for which the relief is requested, and thus the demurrer should be sustained as to the prayer. A prayer for relief cannot, however, be the subject of a demurrer. Neblett v. Neblett (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 304, 306.

Crescent’s Motion to Strike

Crescent seeks an order striking Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages, statutory damages, treble damages, and attorney’s fees. Crescent contends that Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages, and that the claims upon which the other forms of relief are sought are the Bane Act and Ralph act claims that should fail.

Regarding punitive damages, sufficient allegations are stated regarding availability and involvement of an officer, director or managing agent of Crescent (e.g., FAC ¶¶ 113 (“113. The above-described actions were perpetrated and/or ratified by a managing agent or officer of Defendants Green Knight, Hotel Management, and Mayfair. These acts were done with malice, fraud, oppression, and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff H.C.’s rights.”) Alleging that persons acted “with the permission and consent” of all defendants including corporate defendants is sufficient to plead corporate employer liability for punitive damages. O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. (1977) 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 806 (“it was alleged that the misrepresentations were made by persons who acted ‘with the permission and consent’ of all the defendants. For the purpose of meeting a general demurrer, this was a sufficient allegation that the corporations had authorized their agent's acts; a corporation is liable for punitive damages when it authorizes the wrongful act.”).

As discussed above, Plaintiffs sufficiently pled claims based on the Bane Act and Ralph Act. A plaintiff may seek fees and statutory, punitive, and treble damages for such claims. See, e.g., D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake Sch. (2009) 176 Cal. App. 4th 836, 856 (Ralph Civil Rights Act provides for actual damages, civil penalty of $25,000, punitive damages and attorney fees).

Green Knight’s Demurrer

Defendant Green Knight Security, Inc. (“Green Knight”) requests an order sustaining the demurrer to the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Cause of Action of the FAC, and granting the motion to strike punitive and treble damages and attorneys’ fees from the FAC. Just as with Crescent’s demurrer, Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer except as to the Fourth Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Plaintiffs also oppose the motion to strike.

First and Second Causes of Action- Negligence and Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision

Green Knight contends these claims are duplicative and based on the same theories of recovery. But the elements of the two claims are different. See County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal. App. 4th 292, 318 (negligence claim elements); Federico v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 1207, 1213-14 (negligent hiring claim elements). Moreover, the allegations in the FAC contain different facts for the two claims. The FAC focuses on providing inadequate security at the hotel and inadequate supervision of the hotel’s premises, in the negligence claim, and hiring the security guard with reckless disregard for his level of fitness and competence, as well as the possible risk to the public, in the negligent hiring, retention and supervision claim (FAC, ¶¶ 45, 61). The Court therefore finds that these two claims are not duplicative, and they survive demurrer.

Ninth Cause of Action- False Imprisonment, Tenth Cause of Action- Bane Act and Eleventh Cause of Action- Ralph Act

Green Knight contends that these claims fail because Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged liability as to Green Knight for the actions of the security guard Corrales. The Court disagrees. Here, the FAC alleges sufficient bases for Green Knight’s vicarious liability, such as an employer-employee relationship, and the employee acting in the course and scope of employment when he detained Plaintiff (e.g., FAC, ¶ 19 (“As provider of security services, Defendant Green Knight screened, hired, trained, deployed and stationed the security staff at the Hotel at all times relevant hereto, in association and cooperation with Defendants Mayfair and Hotel Management.”), 43, 96 and 109).

Further, the reply errs in citing factually distinguishable cases as to which sexual battery in the course and scope of employment was not found. Here, the FAC adequately alleges defendants’ own unique conditions attributable to motivating emotions of sexual battery, including Green Knight’s own negligent supervising, a bar leading to Plaintiff’s subsequent intoxication and vulnerability to rape, and a security guard known to the employer have been “convicted of Domestic Violence the year before,” who directed Plaintiff to an isolated elevator, floor and restroom on the subject premises (e.g., FAC, ¶¶ 22, 25, 29, 41, 45-46 and 55).

Green Knight’s Motion to Strike

Green Knight seeks an order striking Plaintiffs’ requests for punitive damages, treble damages, and attorney’s fees, because they stem from Plaintiffs’ Bane Act and Ralph Act claims that Green Knight contended should fail. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately pled the statutory claims and therefore, their requests for damages and fees survive. See D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake Sch. 176 Cal. App. 4th at 856.