Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 22STCV17187, Date: 2024-08-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV17187    Hearing Date: August 15, 2024    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:  Motion to Consolidate

Background

Plaintiff Kristen Wallis (“Wallis”) filed a complaint against Defendant Robinson Helicopter Company, Inc. (“Defendant”) arising out of a March 25, 2022 helicopter accident in Rowlett, Texas that resulted in the death of Plaintiff’s husband, Dr. Tyson ‘Ty’ Wallis, a student pilot on an instructional flight, and flight instructor Lora Trout. The complaint asserts causes of action for: (1) strict product liability; and (2) negligence. The complaint alleges that during the flight, the tail rotor/tail boom section separated from the rest of the helicopter. As the main section of the helicopter fell, it rolled, flipped, and turned violently. It ultimately crashed into a vacant lot adjacent to commercial buildings and a major roadway.

The complaint further alleges that the Robinson R44 helicopter, including “N514CD was defective in its manufacture and/or design and/or lack of warnings, and was otherwise unreasonably dangerous, including but not limited to, by leading to separation of the tail rotor section, tail boom strikes, mast-bumping, loss of control, and sudden catastrophic break up during normal flight.”

One day after Wallis filed her Complaint, in case number 22TRCV00428, Plaintiffs Basia Trout and Roger Trout (“Trout”) filed a complaint against Defendant8/14/24: Almost done, the default against Amistad was rejected. I think because there was an extra "s" in line 6b2, geesh., alleging causes of action for wrongful death based on strict products liability and negligence, arising out of the same March 25, 2022 helicopter accident. Lora Trout was the daughter of Trout.

Trout alleges that the N514CD was defective in each of the following respects:

·         The airframe, rotor system, and other component parts, contained manufacturing defects that caused N514CD to experience a sudden and catastrophic break up inflight during normal flight;

·         The airframe, rotor system, and other component parts, contained design defects that caused N514CD to experience a sudden and catastrophic break up inflight during normal flight;

·         Defective rotor system and mast head susceptible to mast bumping, loss of control, and lack of continuity;

·         Main rotor blades with inadequate mass resulting in inadequate main rotor inertia;

·         Main rotor system that allows each of the blades to teeter and pivot independently of the other, increasing the likelihood of a catastrophic mast bumping event;

·         Lack of adequate main rotor blade stops to prevent the blades from contacting the airframe;

·         Lack of warnings regarding onset of mast bumping; how to determine if in a low G situation; that the R44 is prone to catastrophic mast bumping;

·         Inadequate design causing the R44 to be susceptible to mast bumping;

·         Lack of effective warnings and emergency procedures in the event of mast bumping;

·         Lack of an adequate main rotor low speed warning;

·         Failure to report failures, malfunctions, and defects;

·         Inadequate quality assurance system;

·         Failure to design a rotor system with an adequate margin of safety; and

·         A defectively and dangerously designed flight instruction curriculum that includes CFI and student pilot entry into, and recovery from, a dangerous flight condition known at Vortex Ring State.

On July 15, 2022, and July 19, 2022 Defendant filed cross-complaints in each case against Willis and Trout, alleging causes of action for: (1) equitable indemnity; (2) comparative indemnity; (3) equitable apportionment of fault; (4) contribution; and (5) declaratory relief. The cross- complaint seeks to determine the parties’ relative liability for any damages.

On April 25, 2024, Department 1 deemed this case and 22TRCV00428 related.

Defendant filed this motion to consolidate this case with 22TRCV00428.

Plaintiff Wallis opposes. While Defendant’s reply discusses an opposition it received from Trout, no such opposition appears on the docket for either case, and thus it appears Trout filed no opposition. This tentative therefore addresses only the arguments set forth in the Willis opposition.  

Request for Judicial Notice

Both parties’ request for judicial notice of Wallis’ complaint, Trout’s complaint in 22TRCV00428, and Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the cross-complaint in this case, and the cross-complaint in Trout’s case is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452(d).) The court does not take judicial notice of the truth within the documents. Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the National Transportation Safety Board’s Final Report, and Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of excerpts from National Transportation Safety Board factual report is also GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452(c).)

Legal Standard

“When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1048, subd. (a); see Spector v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 839, 844 (finding that two actions that present “essentially the same, or overlapping, issues . . . should be consolidated and disposed of as a single proceeding.”))¿ Thus, under Section 1048 and applicable case law, there are two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment. ¿ (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1148 [“Consolidation under Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 is permissive, and it is for the trial court to determine whether the consolidation is for all purposes or for trial only.”]) 

The purpose of consolidation is “to promote trial convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both actions.”  (Cal. Law and Motion Authorities § 14:4, citing McClure, on Behalf of Caruthers v. Donovan (1949) 33 Cal.2d 717, 722-23.) 

Consolidation, however, is not a matter of right; it rests solely within the sound discretion of the trial judge. (Fisher v. Nash Bldg. Co.¿(1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 397, 402.)¿ Actions may be thoroughly “related” in the sense of having common questions of law or fact, and still not be “consolidated,” if the trial court, in the sound exercise of its discretion, chooses not to do so.¿ (Askew v. Askew¿(1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 964.)¿ It is not abuse of discretion to deny motion for consolidation of actions where parties in each action are different or issues are different.¿ (See¿Muller v. Robinson¿(1959) 174 Cal App 2d 511, 515.)¿ On the other hand, actions may be consolidated in the discretion of the trial court whenever it can be done without prejudice to a substantial right.¿ (Carpenson¿v.¿Najarian¿(1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 856, 862.)¿ 

A Notice of Motion to consolidate cases must (1) include a list of all named parties in each case, the names of those who have appeared, and the names of their respective attorneys of record; (2) include the captions of all the cases sought to be consolidated; and (3) be filed in each case sought to be consolidated.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.350(a)(1).)   

Analysis

Here, Defendant moves for a court order consolidating this action 22TRCV00428 for all purposes, arguing that (1) both actions arise out of the same March 25, 2022 helicopter accident near Rowlett, Texas; (2) both actions involve identical affirmative claims, defenses, and cross-claims; (3) both lawsuits involve common questions of law and fact; (4) many of the same witnesses will testify in both actions, and much of the same evidence is anticipated to be presented at trial; and (5) consolidating the matters may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay, will serve the interests of economy and convenience, will avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments, will reduce the costs and delays resulting from multiple trials, and will conserve judicial resources.

Willis argues against consolidation, arguing that the cases involve different plaintiffs with very different roles, and that the only thing the two cases have in common is the accident. Willis contends the cases involve different questions of law and fact. Willis argues that consolidation for trial will produce confusion, not efficiency, as the jurors would be forced to keep two sets of liability theories, two sets of damages and two sets of instructions separate, which they must do in consolidated trials. Wallis also claims that complete consolidation is unavailable because the parties are not the same in both actions. Wallis further claims that consolidation would require her to take contradictory positions at trial -- she must “lionize Lora Trout in showing that the design defect left her helpless, but may have to vilify her to rebut Robinson’s claims in the Trout case.” Willis argues the parties “would be forced into contradictory arguments based upon conflicting testimony, or at least upon conflicting inferences arising from the evidence.” (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, In and For City and County of San Francisco¿(1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 431.)

The Court finds in favor of consolidation. Both cases arise from the March 25, 2022 N514CD helicopter accident near Rowlett, Texas in which Lora Trout and Tyrone Wallis were killed. Plaintiffs in both cases allege the same exact causes of action for negligence and strict products liability based on the manufacture and design of the N514CD. Both complaints reference “separation of the tail rotor section, tail boom strikes, mast-bumping, loss of control, and sudden catastrophic break up during normal flight.” (RJN, Ex. 2, ¶ 37; see also RJN, Ex. 3, ¶ 50 [“sudden and catastrophic break up inflight during normal flight]” (¶ 50(a)); “mast bumping, loss of control, and lack of continuity” (¶ 50(c))].) Thus, nearly identical issues of fact and law exist. While Willis claims that there are differences because Trout’s allegations also focus on defects in instructor training, the defects with the helicopter predominate both Plaintiffs’ claim. That Trout also has an alternative theory of liability does not militate in favor of keeping the cases separate.

Moreover, each case is filed against the very same defendant and will require the use of the same evidence. Consolidation is proper to avoid unnecessary duplication of evidence and the danger of inconsistent adjudications. The purpose of consolidation is to enhance trial court efficiency by avoiding unnecessary duplication of evidence and the danger of inconsistent adjudications.  (See Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978-979.) On the one hand, Plaintiffs Wallis and Trout allege that Defendant is liable for the subject accident; on the other hand, Robinson alleges it is one or both decedents whose conduct may have contributed to or caused the accident. (Nam Decl., ¶ 9.) Additionally, in both cases, Defendant filed a cross-complaint relying upon the other case and seeking to apportion liability. For this reason, evidence from both cases will need to be utilized in the other case to avoid conflicting judgments. Lastly, although there are some differences in the theories alleged, this will not produce jury confusion because there are many common and duplicative theories. Separating damages is not so complicated that it will lead to jury confusion. Nor does the Court find that producing two separate sets of damages evidence will be unduly time consuming.

The court notes that Wallis provides no legal authority for the assertion that complete consolidation is unavailable because the parties are not the same in both actions and the court is unaware of any.

Further, Plaintiffs Wallis and Trout both allege that Defendant is the sole cause of liability. None of the complaints allege that the other Plaintiff had any fault. As such, Wallis does not need to lionize Lora Trout, nor take a contradictory position.

Conclusion

The motion to consolidate this case with 22TRCV00428 for all purposes is GRANTED.