Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 22STCV37608, Date: 2024-01-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV37608 Hearing Date: January 10, 2024 Dept: 55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Defendant Los Angeles Unified School
District’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
The motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.
On 12/01/22, Plaintiff John Doe J.R. (“Plaintiff”)
filed a Complaint against Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”) and
Darryl Lott alleging that this is a revival action filed pursuant to California
Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 (“Section 340.1”), for damages arising
from childhood sexual abuse while under the custody and care of defendants at
George Washington Preparatory High School around 2005 or 2006. Plaintiff
alleges that, pursuant to Government Code Section 905(m) (“Section 905(m)”),
this action brought under Section 340.1 is exempt from the claims presentation
requirement in the Government Claims Act. (Complaint, ¶ 29). Plaintiff alleges the
following causes of action against LAUSD: third cause of action for negligent
hiring, supervision, and retention of unfit employee per Government Code §§
815.2 and 820; fourth cause of action for failure to report suspected child
abuse per Government Code §§ 815.2, 815.6 and 820; and fifth cause of action
for negligent supervision of a minor per Government Code §§ 815.2 and 820.
LAUSD filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
against the third through fifth causes of action on the grounds that Plaintiff
has failed to present a Government Claim to LAUSD under the Government Claims
Act, and AB 218, which amended Section 905(m), is inapplicable because it is
unconstitutional as it creates an illegal gift of public funds. LAUSD also
argues that Section 340.1 violates LAUSD’s right of due process. Plaintiff
opposes the motion.
Judicial Notice
The Court sustains LAUSD’s objections to the documents
attached to Plaintiff’s RJN because they are not relevant. The Court therefore
denies Plaintiff’s RJN. The Court grants LAUSD’s RJN.
Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings
1. Whether
Section 905(m) Violates Article XVI, Section 6 of the California Constitution.
For a party to prevail on a constitutional challenge
at the pleading stage, the moving party must show from the text itself that the
enactment of the statute on its face poses an unambiguous conflict with
applicable constitutional prohibitions. Under this standard, all presumptions
favor the validity of a statute and mere doubt is insufficient to justify a
judicial declaration of invalidity. If the validity of the measure is fairly
debatable, the demurrer must be overruled. City of Los Angeles v. Superior
Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 10-11; Nisei Farmers League v. Labor &
Workforce Development Agency (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 997, 1012.
Subject to exceptions set forth in Section 905, a
plaintiff suing a public entity must present a timely written claim for damages
to the entity. Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 415, 420. Prior to AB 218, Section 905(m) exempted claims of
childhood sexual abuse occurring on or after January 1, 2009, from the claims
presentation requirements. Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5 903,
914. With the enactment of AB 218, effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature
removed the language in Section 905(m) that limited the exception to claims
that occurred after 2009 and added subdivision (p), which made this change retroactive.
See Gov’t Code § 905(m), (p). The Legislature thus retroactively
eliminated the claims presentation requirement for new claims of sexual abuse
that occurred before 2009. AB 218 amended Section 340.1 to, inter alia,
create a revival window for lapsed claims and that provides relief from the
claims presentation requirement in Section 905. See Code Civ. Proc. §
340.1(q).
LAUSD contends that this change to Section 905(m) creates
liability for public entities like LAUSD where none previously existed, which,
it claims, violates California’s constitutional prohibition against gifts of
public funds (Cal. Const. Art. XVI §6). In pertinent part, California
Constitution Article XVI §6 states: “The Legislature shall have no power … to
make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing
of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever.”
In the cases relied upon by LAUSD, when the incidents
at issue occurred there was no liability against the public entity for the conduct
in question, and thus a legislative statute retroactively creating liability on
the part of the entity was considered an impermissible gift. See Heron
v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507 (no liability for negligence of a car driver
in public service at time of accident); Powell v Phelan (1903) 138 Cal.
271 (no legal obligation to pay jurors at time of plaintiff’s jury service); Chapman
v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690 (no liability at time of plaintiff’s coal
loss); Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17 (no liability for
contract claim at time of plaintiff’s performance); Bourn v. Hart (1892)
93 Cal. 321 (no liability for guard’s personal injury claim at time of injury)
Here, in
contrast, prior to Section 905(m), LAUSD still could have been liable for the
alleged sexual abuse at the time it occurred in 2005 and 2006, had the
plaintiff presented a government claim. The Legislature’s enactment of Section
905(m) in AB 218 thus did not create liability for a tort where none previously
existed, it simply eliminated a step for parties seeking to file claims based
on alleged liability for torts that had occurred. Indeed, LAUSD does not
articulate how a statute requiring a public entity to defend a tort claim it
thought had lapsed constitutes an unlawful gift of public money, when the same
defense employed in a new case based on recent allegations would not.
Further, “expenditures of public funds or property
which involve a benefit to private persons are not gifts within the meaning of
the constitutional prohibition, if those funds are expended for a public
purpose.” Schettler v. County of Santa Clara (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 990,
1003. Accord Page v. MiraCosta
Community College Dist. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 471, 495 (public funds used for a public purpose are
not a gift within the meaning of constitutional prohibition). The Court disagrees
with LAUSD’s contention that no public purpose exists with respect to AB 218. The
California Supreme Court has recognized Section 340.1 as a statute “the
Legislature intended to be construed broadly to effectuate the central goal of
Section 340.1 as a whole; to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual
abuse to hold to account individuals and entities responsible for their
injuries.” Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 536; see
also Liebig v. Superior Ct. (1980) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 834 (“In this
case the important state interest espoused by section 340.1 is the increased
availability of tort relief to plaintiffs who had been the victims of sexual
abuse while a minor”.) The Legislature determined these are valid public
purposes and the Court cannot say the Legislature lacked a reasonable basis to
do so.
The Court therefore denies LAUSD’s constitutional
challenge of AB 218 because it does not find that the revival statutes amount
to a gift of public funds in violation of the California Constitution. Indeed, several
courts of appeal have addressed constitutionality issues with respect to
Section 340.1, beyond the instant issue of gifted public funds and Section
905(m), and have rejected such challenges. See Coats, 46
Cal.App.5th at 427, 428; Deutsch v. Masonic Homes of California, Inc.,
164 Cal.App. 4th 748, 760 (2008); Roman Cath. Bishop of Oakland v. Superior
Ct. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1155, 1161.
2. Whether
Section 340.1 Violates Defendant LAUSD’s Due Process Rights
Next, LAUSD argues that, because Plaintiff’s claims
against it are grounded in statute, AB 218’s amendment to Section 340.1
violated LAUSD’s due process rights under the California Constitution. (Motion
at pp. 17, 18-19, relying on Chambers v. Gallagher (1918) 177 Cal. 704.)
LAUSD’s insistence that Chambers mandates dismissal of this case is
unconvincing. As acknowledged in People v. Frazier (1999) 21 Cal.4th
737, no other revival statute since Chambers was decided more than a
hundred years ago has been declared unconstitutional on the basis that it
violates the defendant’s due process rights. (Id. at pg. 776, fn. 32.)
While LAUSD attempts to distinguish this case from those cited in Frazier
on the basis that it deals with a statutory claim, not a common law one, LAUSD
does not explain the importance of this distinction and the Court sees none. Therefore,
the Court declines to adopt this reasoning to declare Section 340.1
unconstitutional.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies LAUSD’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings in its entirety.