Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 23STCV00635, Date: 2024-11-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV00635    Hearing Date: November 13, 2024    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs is granted in the total reduced amount of $26,551.85. Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is granted in the reduced amount of $23,820. Plaintiff’s request for costs is granted in the reduced amount of $2,613.08.

BACKGROUND

This is a lemon law action brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Plaintiff Yosef Chaim Nourollah accepted Defendant General Motor’s Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer of compromise for $76,027.78 plus attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs by motion wherein Plaintiff would be the prevailing party.

Plaintiff moves for an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs against Defendant in the total amount of $47,554.35, reflecting $42,322.50 in fees incurred working on the case, $2,500 for time spent contesting this motion, and $2,731.85 in costs.

LEGAL STANDARD

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs as a matter of right. Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subds. (a)(4), (b). Attorney’s fees are also recoverable as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10). The moving party bears the burden of establishing entitlement to attorney fees. Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.

Civil Code section 1794(d) provides that a buyer who prevails in an action under that section, “shall be allowed by the court to recover as a part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and the prosecution of such action.”

Courts begin this inquiry “with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) From there, the “lodestar figure may then be adjusted [according to a multiplier enhancement] based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” Ibid. Relevant multiplier factors include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.

The Court has broad discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award, which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-1394.

ANALYSIS

I. Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff’s requested fee recovery is based on 68.4 hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent litigating this case, not including an additional 5 hours requested for time spent reviewing the opposition and working on the reply.

The requested hours breakdown as follows:

Jacob Kashani, 20.4 hours at $650/$675 per hour for a total of $13,522.50

Derrick Chu, 39.4 hours at $600 per hour for a total of $23,640

Julian Moore, 13.6 hours at $600 per hour for a total of $8,160

Total fees requested: $45,322.5. Declaration of Julian Moore, Exs. 2,3.

Hourly Rate

Given the routine nature of the tasks performed in this lemon law case, the requested hourly rates are unreasonable. Based on prevailing rates in lemon law cases in Los Angeles County, the Court concludes that an hourly rate of $600 is appropriate for attorney Kashani, and $400 is appropriate for attorneys Chu and Moore.

Reasonableness of Billed Hours

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel billed unreasonable and unnecessary time for pre-representation work, template-based work, block billing, unnecessary motions, and anticipated fees. Additionally, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s counsel inflated time spent on certain tasks.

A prevailing party’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682. “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 240 Cal.App.4th 459, 488 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Pre-litigation hours

Defendant cites Dominguez v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 160 Cal. App. 4th 53 (Dominguez) for the proposition that “Song Beverly does not mandate that a manufacturer must reimburse a consumer who engages an attorney to represent him or her in successfully obtaining a repurchase or replacement before litigation is commenced.” Opp. at p. 8:8-11. However, Dominguez is readily distinguishable. There, the court held that a consumer was not entitled to attorney fees for pre-litigation activity where the manufacturer made a pre-litigation offer to repurchase the vehicle at the purchase price. Dominguez, supra,160 Cal. App. 4th at p. 60. Here, Defendant made no such pre-litigation offer. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonably incurred pre-litigation costs.

The Court finds that the 2.5 hours spent reviewing potential client documents, meeting with Plaintiff, drafting the retainer agreement, and drafting the demand letter were reasonable. However, the 1.7 hours of pre-litigation client communication are excessive, and the Court reduces them to 1 hour.

Templated Documents

Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s counsel’s requested fee, arguing that the record does not support that the reported hours were actually or reasonably billed. Defendant argues that the reported hours are unreasonable, considering Plaintiff’s counsel’s heavy use of templates that require little revision.

Attorney Kashani billed 1.3 hours in preparing the discovery requests. Based on the routine and templated nature of this work, the Court finds this excessive and reduces the hours billed to 1. Kashani billed 2.4 hours reviewing the discovery responses. Based on the routine nature of these responses, the Court reduces the hours billed to 2. Kashani billed for 0.8 hours for drafting notices of deposition. These notices required only minor changes to existing templates and should not have taken more than half an hour. Therefore, the Court reduces the time billed to 0.5 hours.

Defendant objects to the 20.6 hours Attorney Chu billed for drafting, reviewing, and revising templated trial documents, including the statement of the case, trial brief, witness list, proposed special verdict form, jury instructions, proposed trial list, and exhibit list. Kashani Decl., Ex. 5, pp. 4-5. The Court finds this amount of time unreasonable when only minor edits to existing templates were required. Therefore, the Court reduces the number of hours billed to 16.

Ex Parte

Defendant argues the fees for Plaintiff’s ex parte application to continue the Final Status Conference and Trial Date were not reasonably incurred. The Court agrees. Plaintiff should have pursued the deposition of Defendant’s Person Most Knowledgeable earlier and may not recover fees based on his failure to do so.

Final Status Conference

The requested bill includes a combined 5 hours for Chu and Kashani’s time at the final status conference. Because there was no need for two attorneys to be present, the Court deducts 2.5 hours at Kashani’s rate.

Motion in Limine

Defendant argues that the 2.9 hours attorney Chu spent reviewing Defendant’s motion in limine was unreasonable. The Court agrees and reduces the hours billed for this task to 1.5.

Attorney Fee Motion

The Court notes that Plaintiff failed to include the hours billed working on the fee motion in the billing records in the declaration filed with the motion. Kashani Decl., Ex. 5. These records were instead provided with the reply in the declaration of Julian Moore. Moore Decl., Ex. 5. Because Defendant did not have an opportunity to challenge these records in its opposition, the Court considered them with greater scrutiny. Julian Moore billed for a total of 8.6 hours for work in preparing this motion. The Court finds this unreasonable, as this was a routine motion for attorney’s fees under a stipulation that Plaintiff was the prevailing party. Accordingly, the Court reduces the hours to 4.

Moore billed an additional 5 hours reviewing the opposition and preparing the reply and reply declaration. This is also excessive in light of the routine nature of those documents. Therefore, Court reduces the amount of time to 3 hours.

The Court, therefore, grants reasonable attorney fees as follows:

Kashani, 15.3 hours at $600 for a total of $9,180

Chu, 29.6 hours at $400 for a total of $11,840

Moore, 7 hours at $400 for a total of $2,800

Total attorney’s fees of $23,820

II. Costs

Plaintiff requests $2,731.85 in costs.

Defendant objects to the inclusion of $118.77 in filing fees for the ex parte application. For the reason given above, the Court agrees and taxes those costs.

Defendant argues that it should not be required to reimburse Plaintiff’s counsel for $1,767.58 in process-server fees associated with Plaintiff’s third-party discovery. Opp. at p. 10:22-24. However, as explained in the Reply, these costs were not for third-party discovery, but trial subpoenas to bring repair personnel to testify regarding repair attempts and authenticate documentary evidence. Reply at p. 7 2-4. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is an appropriate cost.

Finally, Defendant objects to the $20 in parking costs claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel. While travel expenses are not typically allowable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, this is only the case unless expressly authorized by law. Civil Code 1794 allows recovery of fees and costs reasonably incurred by buyers in connection with litigation in lemon law cases. Civ. Code, section 1794, subd. (d); Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 138.) Here, the parking fees were for court parking to attend a final status conference. Moore Decl., at p. 13. Given the broad language of Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), the Court finds the parking fees for court parking are reasonably incurred in connection with litigation.

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for costs in the reduced amount of $2,613.08.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is granted in the reduced amount of $26,551.85.