Judge Alison Mackenzie, Case Number: 23STCV03903, Date: 2024-05-20 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 23STCV03903, Date: 2024-05-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV03903 Hearing Date: May 20, 2024 Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Defendants Los Feliz Bliss, LLC’s and DFT, Inc. dba Cannon Management’s Motion to Bifurcate Declaratory Relief Cause of Action in Amended Cross-Complaint for Trial.

BACKGROUND

ARIEL HIRSCH (“Plaintiff”) filed this case against her landlord LOS FELIZ BLISS, LLC (“LFB”) and others for alleged violations of the Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance (“TAHO”) and the Los Angeles Municipal Code with respect to the apartment rented by Plaintiff. LFB’s cross-complaint against Plaintiff and her brother ALEX HIRSCH (“Alex Hirsch”) alleges that they entered into unauthorized agreements regarding the apartment and that Plaintiff owes unpaid rent. The claims in LFB’s First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FACC”) are (1) Declaratory Relief, (2) Breach of Contract, and (3) Common Count.

LFB requests an order bifurcating, for court trial, the Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief of the FACC. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court may order a separate trial of any cause of action to promote convenience, to avoid prejudice, and to expedite the trial. Code Civ. Proc., § 1048(b). Likewise, “Code of Civil Procedure section 598 allows a party to seek an order before trial ‘that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case,' where ‘the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby ….'" Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal App.4th 62, 90. “In general, ‘[w]hether there shall be a severance and separate trials on issues in a single action is a matter within the discretion of the trial court . . . .’ " Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 911.

ANALYSIS

LFB seeks to bifurcate its declaratory relief claim to be tried first as a bench trial. LFB’s argument is two-fold. First, LFB contends that its declaratory relief claim is equitable in nature and thus properly decided in a bench trial. Second, LFB contends that if the Court were to decide in LFB’s favor on the declaratory relief claim at the bench trial then Plaintiff’s TAHO claim will be moot and thus bifurcation of the declaratory relief claim promotes judicial economy and efficiency.

A right to a jury trial exists as to declaratory relief if the issues raised are legal and not equitable in nature, and where the gist of the claim involves the resolution of factual issues pertaining to contractual rights there is a right to a jury. Entin v. Superior Court (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 770, 781-782. “Notwithstanding that an action for declaratory relief is characterized as an action in equity, there is a right to a jury trial of material triable issues of fact concerning an inchoate breach of contract claim.” Cal. Casualty Ind. Exch. v. Frerichs (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1450.

“Where … there are equitable and legal remedies sought in the same action, the parties are entitled to have a jury determine the legal issues unless the trial court’s initial determination of the equitable issues is also dispositive of the legal issues, leaving nothing to be tried by a jury.” Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 864, 871. Judges’ findings made in a first trial phase addressing equitable issues are binding on juries in the second phase, and, likewise, issues adjudicated by juries are binding in later phases of trial, and are not re-litigated. Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146, 157.

Here, the FACC seeks declaratory relief as to the validity of an addendum to the lease. FACC, ¶ 19. Indeed, the gist of LFB’s declaratory relief claim is the legitimacy of the addendum and whether, based on that addendum, Plaintiff is an authorized tenant and/or owes back rent to LFB. Id. ¶¶ 11-16, 19. The Court finds that Plaintiff has a right to a jury trial because the claim for declaratory relief involves contractual rights that are also alleged in the FAC, including the lease addendum. The Court therefore rejects LFB’s contention that its declaratory relief claim is bench trial issue.

Moreover, great inefficiency would result in having separate trial phases on overlapping issues. The facts surrounding the lease addendum presented in a separate trial on the declaratory relief claim would overlap substantially with the evidence presented for LFB’s claims for breach of contract and common count, and Plaintiff’s claims in the FAC. The motion lacks any evidence to show that LFB likely could prevail in a first phase of trial, whereas the opposition has convincing proof attached indicating that LFB likely would not prevail such as to render moot the remainder of trial. Thus, there is no indication of efficiency to be gained from bifurcation.

CONCLUSION

The Court therefore exercises its discretion to deny the motion to bifurcate.