Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 23STCV04990, Date: 2024-05-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV04990 Hearing Date: May 28, 2024 Dept: 55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion to Compel Defendant’s Further Responses to Special
Interrogatories (Set One). Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant’s Further
Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set One).
BACKGROUND
This is a Lemon Law case brought by HOPE VINITSKY (“Plaintiff”)
against GENERAL MOTORS, LLC (“Defendant”) in regard to Plaintiff’s 2020
Chevrolet Bolt EV (“Subject Vehicle”). Plaintiff alleges that she traveled to
Culver City Chevrolet, met with the salesperson and asked him to show her a
Bolt. She alleges that she was satisfied by the representations made by the
salesperson and the manufacturer through publications that the vehicle’s range
on a charge was 259 miles. However, the Subject Vehicle allegedly had defects
including with the EV battery module, insufficient distance on a charge,
potential high voltage battery fire and front seatbelt pretensioner. After
Plaintiff’s repeated presentations of the Subject Vehicle to authorized repair
facilities, the manufacturer was unable to conform the vehicle to its express
warranties and it remains defective. The causes of action are: (1) Fraud
Concealment and Misrepresentation, (2) Negligent Misrepresentation, (3) Business
& Professions Code §17200, (4) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of
Express Warranty, (5) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of Implied
Warranty, and (6) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Civil Code §1793.2(B).
Plaintiff brings motions requesting further responses
to special interrogatories and document requests. Defendant opposes the motions.
LEGAL STANDARD
Where respondents object or respond inadequately to
discovery requests, a motion lies to compel further responses, as to which
respondent has the burden to justify the objections. Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300(a) (motion to compel
further responses lies “[o]n receipt of a response to interrogatories….”); and
2031.310(a) (motion to compel further responses lies “[o]n receipt of a
response to an inspection demand….”).
“‘Discovery statutes vest a wide discretion in the
trial court, and exercise of that discretion will be disturbed only when it can
be said there has been an abuse of discretion.” Cadiz Land Co. v. Rail Cycle
(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 74, 117.
A discovery motion should not be denied automatically
based upon the reason that the moving parties failed to meet and confer in good
faith. Obregon v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 434. But see Townsend
v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1439 (motion must be denied
where lack of meet and confer). “‘A determination of whether an attempt at
informal resolution is adequate . . . involves the exercise of discretion.’” Stewart
v. Colonial W. Agency (2001) 87 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 1016.
ANALYSIS
1. Special
Interrogatories
After Plaintiff initially filed the motions to compel,
the parties held an IDC with the Court on 3/28/24. Plaintiff subsequently
amended her motion to seek further responses just for special interrogatory numbers
39 and 43. Special Interrogatory No. 39 asks Defendant to identify the individual(s)
who has responsibility of ensuring Defendant’s compliance with determining whether
a car should be repurchased or replaced under the Song-Beverly Act. Special
Interrogatory No. 43 asks Defendant to identify the individuals responsible for
Defendant’s decision whether to repurchase or replace the Subject Vehicle.
Defendant asserted boilerplate objections to the
interrogatories (overbroad, vague, ambiguous, irrelevant, seeks confidential information
and attorney-client information). Defendant did not provide a response to No.
39 and for No. 43 Defendant responded by directing Plaintiff to certain
documents in its production. Defendants contend
that its response to No. 39 is code-compliant but offers up no defense of its
boilerplate objections that are not well-taken. While Defendant states that it produced
documents that contain the information sought, that is not reflected in the
responses as set forth in the parties’ separate statements. Even if Defendant
had set forth such a response, it is not well taken for the reasons set forth
below with respect to No. 43.
Defendant also contends it provided code-compliant
responses, and that specific identification and reference to documents responsive
to these interrogatories is permitted by Code of Civil Procedure, section
2030.230.
To respond validly to interrogatories by reference to
documents, a party must be responding to an answer that requires a compilation,
abstract, audit or summary of records, and the party must specify the documents
from which the answer may be derived. Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.230; Fuss v. Superior
Court (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 807, 815-817. When answering interrogatories by
reference to documents, a party must show that an existing summary is
unavailable, and specify, and make reasonably available for inspection, all the
records from which the information can be ascertained, and a “broad statement
that the information is available from a mass of documents is insufficient.” Deyo
v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 784-785, superseded by statute on
another ground as stated in Guzman v. General Motors Corp. (1984) 154
Cal.App.3d 438, 444.
“A party is permitted to use multiple methods of
obtaining discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under one
method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery
under another method.” Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 733, 739.
“If an interrogatory asks the responding party to
identify a document, an adequate response must include a description of the
document.” Best Products, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th
1181, 1190. “Any documents or category of documents produced in response to a
demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall be identified with
the specific request number to which the documents respond.” Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.280(a).
Based upon the applicable law, the Court concludes
that Defendant improperly answered No. 43 by generally referencing document
responses outside of the discovery responses themselves. Specifically, Defendant
failed to show sufficiently that answering would involve a compilation,
abstract, audit or summary of records and that Defendant has specified where in
what documents the answers could be derived. The Court discussed these
interrogatories with counsel at the IDC and encouraged the parties to meet and
confer. Given that Defendant’s opposition fails to even mention the IDC
process, it appears to the Court that Defendant essentially ignored the Court’s
guidance at the IDC. This is unfortunate because the point of the IDC process
is to prevent costly and unnecessary motion practice and Defendant’s conduct undermines
that purpose.
Therefore, the Court grants the motion to compel as to
the special interrogatories remaining in dispute.
2. Document
Requests
Plaintiff filed this motion to compel further
responses as to request for production numbers 16, 17, 20, 24, 28-29, 37-64,
67-70, 73-74 and 77-86. The requests include topics including the issue of
Defendant’s knowledge of a defective battery and inability to fix it. Defendant
contends that the requests are overly broad and lack specific facts showing
good cause to produce the documents. The Court gave Plaintiff guidance on the document
requests at the IDC. Plaintiff did not file an amended notice of motion after
the IDC regarding the document requests and did not file a reply. For this
reason, the Court is unclear as to whether Plaintiff still intends to move on
these document requests. In an abundance of caution, the Court has considered
the motion as set forth below.
Lemon
Law Relevance/Overbreadth
Plaintiff and Defendant disagree about whether
discovery as to other vehicles is permissible, as is common for discovery
matters involving Lemon Law.
As for whether documentation from other vehicle
purchases, beyond Plaintiff’s, is discoverable, there is no governing
California case cited on point. “A legal proposition asserted without apposite
authority necessarily fails.” People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th
628, 643.
Plaintiffs rely on opinions that did not involve any
issue about the scope of discovery in automobile defect cases. See, e.g., Doppes
v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 996 (“the trial court
had to impose terminating sanctions once it was learned during trial that
Bentley still had failed to comply with discovery orders and directives and
Bentley’s misuse of the discovery process was even worse than previously
known.”); and Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138,
154 (“Ford asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Ford’s
in limine motions to exclude evidence of other vehicles and of the nonwarranty
repair. We have already concluded the court did not abuse its discretion….”).
Here, the Court finds that, except for number 77, the
subject document request numbers all are overly broad by including other
customers and a span of several years (2017-2022), rather than addressing
Plaintiff’s vehicle and transaction. But request number 77 properly states: “All
DOCUMENTS from YOUR technical hotline that refer, relate to or concern
communications between YOU and YOUR authorized repair facilities regarding
diagnosis and/or repairs involving the SUBJECT VEHICLE at any time.”
Based upon overbreadth, the Court denies the motion,
except as to document request number 77 that addresses Plaintiff’s own vehicle
and is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Other
Discovery Objections
Trade
Secrets
Defendant repeated the trade-secrets objection as to No.
77. Evidence Code section 1061, subdivision (b)(1) requires parties to submit
an affidavit based on personal knowledge listing qualifications to opine,
identifying alleged trade secrets and documents disclosing trade secrets. Stadish
v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 1130, 1144-45.
Further, judges must act to protect trade secrets by
reasonable means including protective orders, in camera hearings, sealing
records and restricting disclosure. Civ. Code § 3426.5; Hypertouch, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1527, 1555, fn. 16.
Here, defense counsel’s declaration fails to lay
sufficient foundation of personal knowledge about the client’s manufacturing to
qualify an attorney to evidence automotive trade secrets. See Claudia
Gavrilescu declaration, ¶¶ 11-14. Therefore, the Court does not now sustain the
trade secret objection for No. 77.
Attorney-Client
Privilege
Defendant repeated the attorney-client privilege
objection as to No. 77.
Where a party serves a timely discovery response
stating attorney-client or work-product objections, without a privilege log or
facts justifying the objections, the appropriate procedure is to grant a motion
to compel further responses having particularized identification of documents
as to which the privilege is asserted, and the justifying facts. E.g., People
ex rel. Lockyer v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1073-1075
(“no obligation to produce a privilege log at all, unless ordered to do so by
the court upon a motion by a party seeking such a document.”). Failures to
provide a privilege log or factual bases are not grounds for finding waivers of
the objections. Korea Data Systems Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 51
Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516-1517.
Here, the Court finds that the opposing documents fail
to provide sufficient information to enable the Court to ascertain that the
discovery responses would involve attorney-client privileges.
Therefore, the Court overrules the privilege objection.
Oppression
and Burden
Defendant repeated the burden objection as to No. 77.
Objecting parties must file evidence detailing the
amount of work involved, in order to support objections based upon oppression
and burden. E.g., West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56
Cal.2d 407, 417. For instance, an opinion reasoned that a trial court, in its
discretion, reasonably rejected a “burden” discovery objection stating that
responding would require “‘tens of thousands of man hours,’” under
circumstances where the information was reasonably calculated to lead to
discoverable information. See Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society
of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 594.
Here, defense counsel’s declaration fails to describe
how much work and time would be involved in responding to the document
requests. Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant failed to meet the
burden to support the objections based upon burden.
CONCLUSION
The Court grants the motion to compel further
responses as to special interrogatories remaining in dispute.
The Court grants the motion to compel further
documents as to request number 77 and otherwise denies it.
By 4:30 p.m. on June 28, 2024, Defendant shall serve
verified, full and complete responses, in compliance with the Civil Discovery
Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.010 et seq.), as to special interrogatories 39 and
43 and document request 77, without objections except those supported by a
sufficient privilege log or supported by sufficient proof, as to trade secrets
and privileged information, and produce all requested documents except those
withheld pursuant to those objections.