Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 23STCV08670, Date: 2024-01-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV08670 Hearing Date: January 24, 2024 Dept: 55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Demurrer of Defendant Group X Rosemead
Properties, LP to Plaintiffs’ Unverified Complaint for Damages; Motion to Strike.
The demurrer is sustained in part without leave to
amend (as to the Sixth Cause of Action for Private Nuisance) and is otherwise
overruled.
The motion to strike is denied.
Twenty days to answer.
Background
In this action, Plaintiffs GUADALUPE ARREOLA, LESLIE
ARREOLA, GETSEMANIE ORTIZ, MELANIE DUARTE, JOSE HERNANDEZ, ARMANDO GARCIA (“Plaintiffs”) seek damages against
Defendant GROUP X ROSEMEAD PROPERTIES, LP (“Defendant”), the owner and manager of
the apartment building where Plaintiffs reside, based on alleged uninhabitable
conditions in the building. The causes of action are: 1) Breach Of Implied
Warranty Of Habitability; 2) Breach Of Statutory Warranty Of Habitability; 3)
Breach Of The Covenant Of Quiet Enjoyment; 4) Negligence; 5) Violation Of Civil
Code Section 1942.4; 6) Private Nuisance; And, 7) Violation Of Civil Code Section 789.3.
Defendant filed a demurrer to each of the causes of
action except the Fourth Cause of Action for negligence. Defendant also filed a
motion to strike the attorneys’ fees allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiffs oppose
the demurrer, except as to the Sixth Cause of Action for private nuisance. Plaintiffs
also oppose the motion to strike.
DEMURRER
Issue-- First Cause of
Action for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability and Second Cause of
Action for Breach of the Statutory Warranty of Habitability
The elements for the habitability causes of action
are:
Quevedo v. Braga (1977) 72 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 7-8, overruled on other grounds by Knight v. Hallsthammar (1981) 29
Cal. 3d 46, 53, 55. See also Erlach v. Sierra
Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal. App. 4th 1281, 1298 (applying Civ. C. §1942.4, and holding “there
is a statutory cause of action available to the residential tenant where the
premises are untenantable and other circumstances exist.”); Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Grp., Inc.
(2016) 3 Cal. App. 5th 1155, 1169
(“[T]he warranty of habitability claim can take many forms,...”); Guttman v. Chiazor (2017) 15 Cal. App.
5th Supp. 57, 61 (“[U]nder the common
law, a landlord has an implied duty to render residential premises
habitable,…”); CC §1942.4 (statutory
version of the claim).
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ habitability claims fail
because they do not allege (1) a lease contract, (2) uninhabitable conditions present
at the time Defendants leased the premises and which were not apparent upon
reasonable inspection, (3) when Defendant received notice from each Plaintiff
with a reasonable time to correct the issues, and (4) facts regarding each of the
statutes alleged violated by the uninhabitable conditions.
Defendant’s contentions have no merit. The claims are
not for breach of contract, and thus Plaintiffs do not need to allege the existence
of a lease contract. Even if these were claims for breach of contract, the
Complaint sufficiently alleges the existence of leases and the terms (Complaint,
¶ 2 (“the basic terms are that Plaintiffs agreed to pay rent and abide by
lawful tenant obligations in exchange for Defendant allowing possession of the
unit in the apartment building and abide by lawful landlord obligations.”)).
Plaintiffs adequately plead defective conditions
unknown to them at time of occupancy, and not apparent on reasonable inspection,
based on defects existing at all relevant times, and inherently hard to notice,
such as hidden electrical wiring, plumbing pipes and mildew, all inside of
walls (e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 8, 9 and10).
Plaintiffs sufficiently allege they gave notice to
Defendant within a reasonable time after the discovering the conditions (e.g.,
Complaint, ¶10 (“Plaintiffs notified Defendant of the uninhabitable conditions,
or the conditions were obvious to Defendant upon reasonable inspection, but
Defendant failed to respond or adequately respond in a reasonable amount of
time.)).
Finally, Plaintiffs allege the uninhabitable
conditions violate various specific statutes, but those statutory section need not be alleged as a stand-alone,
statutory cause of action, because the habitability claims are not labeled as
such, and demurrers do not lie as to only portions of claims.
The demurrer is overruled as to the First and Second
Causes of Action.
Issue-- Third Cause of
Action for Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
The elements for a cause of action for breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment are:
1. A
lease agreement between the parties;
2.
Absence of language contrary to the implied covenant that tenant shall have
quiet enjoyment and possession;
3.
Act or omission of the landlord, or anyone claiming under the landlord, which
substantially interferes with a tenant’s right to use and enjoy the premises
for purposes contemplated; and
4.
An applicable remedy
a. tenant remains in possession and was
damaged; or
b. tenant surrendered possession and is relieved
of obligation to pay rent.
See
Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates
(2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588 - 91. See
also Marchese v. Standard Realty & Dev. Co. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 142, 148 (“The tenant
need not vacate the property before bringing an action for breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment.”)
Defendant asserts that (1) Plaintiffs should allege
that there has been an actual or constructive eviction, pursuant to Nativi
v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 261, 292 (Dem.,
15-16) and (2) Plaintiffs must allege the lease terms. But constructive
eviction need not be alleged, and Defendant’s cited Nativi case did not actually
hold that constructive eviction always must be alleged. See Nativi, 223 Cal. App. 4th
at 293 (“Breach can take many forms, including actual or constructive
eviction.”). In any event, constructive
eviction is alleged in paragraph 24 of the Complaint. The Court already addressed
the issue of pleading contract elements above with regard to the First and
Second Causes of Action. The demurrer is overruled as to the Third Cause of
Action.
Issue-- Fifth Cause of
Action for Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.4
Civil Code Section 1942.4 states, in material part:
(a) A landlord of a
dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase,
or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of
Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if all of the following conditions
exist prior to the landlord’s demand or notice:
(1) The dwelling
substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in
Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or
is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the
Health and Safety Code because conditions listed in that section exist to an
extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of
the public or the occupants of the dwelling.
(2) A public officer or
employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after
inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in
writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard
conditions.
(3) The conditions have
existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the
notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause. For
purposes of this subdivision, service shall be complete at the time of deposit
in the United States mail.
(4) The conditions were
not caused by an act or omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of
Section 1929 or 1941.2.
Defendant contends that the Complaint fails to allege,
as to each violation and each Plaintiff, that (1) a public officer notified the
landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of an obligation to abate a
nuisance of repair substandard conditions, and (2) the conditions went unabated
for 35 days (Dem., 8:15-17).
For statutory claims, parties must plead facts
demonstrating a right to recover under the particular statute. G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147
Cal.App.3d 256, 273. Complainants need only allege a prima facie violation of a
statute and need not address the statutory exceptions. See
Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 355, 362 (“because the complaint
alleges a prima facie violation of section 631, subdivision (a), it is
defendant’s burden on this demurrer to show on the face of the pleadings that
she comes within the exception of subdivision (b) of the statute.”).
Here, there is no requirement to allege the statutory
elements as to each violation or Plaintiff because the statute does not require
that, and a demurrer does not lie as to only part of a cause of action.
Moreover, all statutory elements are adequately alleged or inferred, including
(1) written notice by a public employee and (2) conditions have not been abated
35 days after service of the notice (e.g.,
Complaint, ¶¶ 31 (“Defendant violated Civil Code section 1942.4 by not
correcting conditions cited by government housing enforcement agencies within
35 days of issuance of the citation….” ),
and 32 (“The public entity
violations include but are not limited to….”)).
The demurrer is overruled as to the Fifth Cause of
Action.
Issue-- Sixth Cause of
Action for Private Nuisance
Plaintiff agrees to dismiss the Sixth Cause of Action
for private nuisance. The Court therefore sustains the demurrer to this claim
with prejudice.
Issue-- Seventh Cause of
Action for Violation of Civil Code Section 789.3
Civil Code Section 789.3 states the following, in
material part:
(a)
A landlord shall not with intent to terminate the occupancy under any lease or
other tenancy or estate at will, however created, of property used by a tenant
as his residence willfully cause, directly or indirectly, the interruption or
termination of any utility service furnished the tenant, including, but not
limited to, water, heat, light, electricity, gas, telephone, elevator, or
refrigeration, whether or not the utility service is under the control of the
landlord.
Defendant contends that the Complaint fails to address
the lease contract and to specify which Plaintiff resided in which apartment (Dem.,
p. 20). The Court has already addressed
contract pleading with regards to the First and Second Causes of Action. And, as
stated above with regard to the Fifth Cause of Action, there is no requirement
to specify which Plaintiff resided in which apartment, because that is not
required to state a cause of action under the statute, demurrers to not lie as
to parts of claims and uncertainty is a disfavored ground for a demurrer, and landlords presumptively
know about leases and names of tenants living in each apartment, and if not can
obtain such information via discovery. The demurrer to the Seventh Cause of
Action is overruled.
MOTION TO STRIKE
Issue—Attorneys’
Fees Pleading
The motion to strike is missing from the official
court docket and records. Nevertheless,
plaintiffs apparently received the motion because they filed an opposition as
to it. The reply makes clear that the
motion seeks to strike the attorneys’ fee allegations on the grounds that Plaintiffs
failed to specifically allege facts as to all the statutory elements and thus such
fees are unavailable under Civil Code section 1942.4 and Civil Code, Section
789.3.
There is no minimum pleading standard for attorneys’
fees. Unsupported
attorneys’ fees allegations need not be stricken pursuant to a motion to
strike, since later discovery may reveal a basis for their recovery. Camenisch v. Sup.
Ct. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th
1689, 1699. “There is no requirement
that a party plead that it is seeking attorney fees, and there is no
requirement that the ground for a fee award be specified in the
pleadings.” Yassin v. Solis (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 524, 533. There is no admission by Plaintiffs that the
Complaint lacks any potential basis for attorneys’ fees. Thus, there is no basis to grant a motion to
strike allegations regarding attorneys’ fees here. Even assuming, arguendo,
that the statutory claims must have been sufficiently pled in support of fees,
the Court has ruled that they are, in analyzing the demurrer. The Court denies
the motion to strike.