Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 23STCV11531, Date: 2024-04-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV11531 Hearing Date: April 12, 2024 Dept: 55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: DEFENDANT LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT’S DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
BACKGROUND
H.M. (Plaintiff) filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (“LAUSD”) and Does 2-25 (LAUSD and Does collectively referred to herein as “Defendants”) alleging that this is a revival action filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 (“Section 340.1”), for damages arising from childhood sexual abuse while under the custody and care of Defendants at Edison Middle School in approximately 1984. Plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to Government Code Section 905(m) “Section 905(m)”), this action brought under Section 340.1 is exempt from the claim presentation requirement in the Government Claims Act. (Compl., ¶ 62.)
Plaintiff alleges two causes of action against LAUSD: Negligence (First Cause of Action); and Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision (Third Cause of Action). LAUSD demurrers to the FAC on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff fails to adequately plead the claims; (2) Plaintiff has failed to present a Government Claim to LAUSD under the Government Claims Act, and AB 218, which amended Section 905(m), is inapplicable because it unconstitutionally creates an illegal gift of public funds; and (3) Plaintiff filed the pleading outside the statute of limitations. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court grants LAUSD’s RJN of legislative history. The Court likewise grants Plaintiff’s RJN of legislative history.
The Court denies Plaintiff’s RJN regarding other trial court rulings.
LEGAL STANDARD
“‘[A] demurrer based on an affirmative defense will be sustained only where the face of the complaint discloses that the action is necessarily barred by the defense.’” McKenney v. Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 78-79.
“'A demurrer on the ground of the bar of the statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily barred'.... It must appear clearly and affirmatively that, upon the face of the complaint, the right of action is necessarily barred.... This will not be the case unless the complaint alleges every fact which the defendant would be required to prove if he were to plead the bar of the applicable statute of limitation as an affirmative defense." Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 881.
ANALYSIS
1. The FAC Adequately Alleges Revival Claims
LAUSD contends that the FAC does not meet the pleading requirements for alleging a claim for childhood sexual abuse under the revival statute of Section 340.1. For purposes of asserting revival claims under Section 340.1, plaintiffs must allege that defendants had actual knowledge or notice of the perpetrator’s past unlawful sexual conduct with minors, which triggered defendants’ duty to take preventive measures to avoid such future acts. Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 548-52. The FAC meets this standard. The FAC adequately pleads that, “Plaintiff reported the sexual abuse and assault to Grisel Garland, a teacher at SCHOOL [LAUSD].” FAC, ¶ 34. The pleading also sufficiently alleges that LAUSD had knowledge of the perpetrator’s serious threat. E.g., FAC, ¶ 43.
2. Section 905(m) Is Constitutional and thus Exempts Plaintiff’s Claims from Claims Presentation Requirement
For a party to prevail on a constitutional challenge at the pleading stage, the moving party must show from the text itself that the enactment of the statute on its face poses an unambiguous conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions. Judges are to presume that a statute is constitutional, and all presumptions and intendments will favor its validity, unless unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably is evident. In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal. App. 5th 144, 156.
Subject to exceptions set forth in Section 905, a plaintiff suing a public entity must present a timely written claim for damages to the entity. Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 420. Prior to AB 218, Section 905(m) exempted claims of childhood sexual abuse occurring on or after January 1, 2009, from the claims presentation requirements. Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5 903, 914. With the enactment of AB 218, effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature removed the language in Section 905(m) that limited the exception to claims that occurred after 2009 and added subdivision (p), which made this change retroactive. Gov’t Code § 905(m), (p). The Legislature thus retroactively eliminated the claims presentation requirement for new claims of sexual abuse that occurred before 2009. AB 218 amended Section 340.1 to, inter alia, create a revival window for lapsed claims and that provides relief from the claims presentation requirement in Section 905. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1(q).
LAUSD contends that this change to Section 905(m) creates liability for public entities like LAUSD where none previously existed, which, it claims, violates California’s constitutional prohibition against gifts of public funds (Cal. Const. Art. XVI §6). In pertinent part, California Constitution Article XVI §6 states: “The Legislature shall have no power … to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever.”
In the cases relied upon by LAUSD, when the incidents at issue occurred there was no liability against the public entity for the conduct in question, and thus a legislative statute retroactively creating liability on the part of the entity was considered an impermissible gift. Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507 (no liability for negligence of a car driver in public service at time of accident); Powell v Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271 (no legal obligation to pay jurors at time of plaintiff’s jury service); Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690 (no liability at time of plaintiff’s coal loss); Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17 (no liability for contract claim at time of plaintiff’s performance); Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321 (no liability for guard’s personal injury claim at time of injury)
Here, in contrast, prior to Section 905(m), LAUSD still could have been liable for the alleged sexual abuse at the time it occurred in 1984, had the Plaintiff presented a government claim. The Legislature’s enactment of Section 905(m) in AB 218 thus did not create liability for a tort where none previously existed, it simply eliminated a step for parties seeking to file claims based on alleged liability for torts that had occurred. Indeed, LAUSD does not articulate how a statute requiring a public entity to defend a tort claim it thought had lapsed constitutes an unlawful gift of public money, when the same defense employed in a new case based on recent allegations would not.
Further, “expenditures of public funds or property which involve a benefit to private persons are not gifts within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition, if those funds are expended for a public purpose.” Schettler v. County of Santa Clara (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 990, 1003. Accord Page v. MiraCosta Community College Dist. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 471, 495 (public funds used for a public purpose are not a gift within the meaning of constitutional prohibition). The Court disagrees with LAUSD’s contention that no public purpose exists with respect to AB 218. The California Supreme Court has recognized Section 340.1 as a statute “the Legislature intended to be construed broadly to effectuate the central goal of Section 340.1 as a whole; to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to hold to account individuals and entities responsible for their injuries.” Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 536; see also Liebig v. Superior Ct. (1980) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 834 (“In this case the important state interest espoused by section 340.1 is the increased availability of tort relief to plaintiffs who had been the victims of sexual abuse while a minor”.) The Legislature determined these are valid public purposes and the Court cannot say the Legislature lacked a reasonable basis to do so.
The Court therefore denies LAUSD’s constitutional challenge of AB 218 because it does not find that the revival statutes amount to a gift of public funds in violation of the California Constitution. Indeed, several courts of appeal have addressed constitutionality issues with respect to Section 340.1, beyond the instant issue of gifted public funds and Section 905(m) and have rejected such challenges. See Coats, 46 Cal.App.5th at 427, 428; Deutsch v. Masonic Homes of California, Inc., 164 Cal. App. 4th 748, 760 (2008); Roman Cath. Bishop of Oakland v. Superior Ct. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1155, 1161.
3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Timely Under the Statute of Limitations
LAUSD contends that Plaintiff filed this case on 6/22/23, which is after the purported revival period deadline of 1/1/23. The Court notes LAUSD’s date is incorrect because Plaintiff filed the case on 5/22/23 and the FAC on 9/25/23.
Section 340.1(q)’s three-year revival period for claims that were barred as of 1/1/20 “is part of a statute of limitations.” Roe v. Doe (2023) 98 Cal. App. 5th 965, 973. California Rules of Court, appendix I, emergency rule 9, effective 4/6/20 and amended 3/11/22, provides: “‘Notwithstanding any other law, the statutes of limitations … for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days are tolled from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020.’” Ibid., at p. 970. The deadline specified under Section 340.1 is 1/1/23. There was tolling for 178 days, under the Emergency Rule. Plaintiff therefore timely filed the Complaint on 5/22/23.
CONCLUSION
The demurrer is overruled. Twenty days to answer.