Judge Alison Mackenzie, Case Number: 23STCV12006, Date: 2023-12-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 23STCV12006, Date: 2023-12-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV12006 Hearing Date: December 13, 2023 Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Motion of Defendant for Judgment on the Pleadings.

The motion is denied.

Both parties’ requests for judicial notice of other trial court rulings are denied. E.g., Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 726, 738 (trial court rulings are not binding precedent); Drummond v. Desmarais (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 439, 448 (rulings in other trial court cases are irrelevant absent some additional showing like the elements of claim or issue preclusion).

On 6/23/23, “S.W.” (“Plaintiff”) filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (“Defendant”), alleging that this is a revival action filed pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 (“Section 340.1”), for damages arising from childhood sexual abuse while under the custody and care of defendants at George Washington Carver Middle School, in “approximately 1976.” (FAC, ¶¶ 1-31). Plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to California Government Code Section 905(m) (“Section 905(m)”), this action brought under Section 340.1 is exempt from the claims presentation requirement in the California Government Claims Act. (Id., ¶ 61.) Defendant filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiff’s FAC fails because Assembly Bill 218 (“AB 218”), which amended Section 340.1 and Section 905(m), violates the California Constitution’s prohibition against the gift of public funds found in Article XVI, section 6 of the Constitution. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Subject to exceptions set forth in Section 905, “[b]efore suing a public entity, the plaintiff must present a timely written claim for damages to the entity.” Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist. (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 201, 208. Prior to AB 218, Section 905(m) exempted claims of childhood sexual abuse occurring on or after January 1, 2009, from the claims presentation requirements. Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5 903, 914. With the enactment of AB 218, effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature removed the language in Section 905(m) that limited the exception to claims that occurred after 2009 and added subdivision (p), which made this change retroactive. See Gov’t Code § 905(m), (p). The Legislature thus retroactively eliminated the claims presentation requirement for new claims of sexual abuse that occurred before 2009. AB 218 amended Section 340.1 to, inter alia, create a revival window for lapsed claims and that provides relief from the claims presentation requirement in Section 905. See Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1(q).

Defendant contends that these changes mean public entities like Defendant no longer have immunity from claims of childhood sexual abuse occurring before 2009, and resurrecting such claims is an unconstitutional gift of public funds.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff, however, that AB 218’s amendments to Section 340.1 and Section 905 are constitutional. Courts presume that a statute is constitutional, and all presumptions and intendments will favor its validity, unless unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably is evident. In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal. App. 5th 144, 156. California opinions have addressed issue types of unconstitutionality as to Section 340.1, beyond the instant issue of gifted public funds, and have rejected the challenges. For example, cases have held that legislation may constitutionally revive lapsed civil limitations periods to restore common law remedies that existed at the time of alleged misconduct. Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 427, 428 (“In Assembly Bill 218, the Legislature made clear its intent to revive causes of action previously barred by government claims presentation requirements.”). “It is apparent from the history of amendments to these statutes … that the Legislature has consistently worked to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to seek compensation from the responsible parties, on several occasions in direct response to restrictive judicial opinions.” Ibid. at 430.

Further, “expenditures of public funds or property which involve a benefit to private persons are not gifts within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition, if those funds are expended for a public purpose.” Schettler v. County of Santa Clara (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 990, 1003. Accord Page v. MiraCosta Community College Dist. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 471, 495 (public funds used for a public purpose are not a gift within the meaning of constitutional prohibition). The Legislature primarily determines what constitutes a public purpose and “its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.” County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.2d 730, 745-46.

The parties’ respective case citations and the Court’s independent research, support the Court’s conclusion that the Legislature may lawfully enact a statute providing for retroactive application of a longer Statute of Limitations, and for dispensing with the government claims requirement, where based upon expressed public purposes. Here, legislative intent is very clear as to multiple public purposes for removing the timely government claims requirement, including promoting treatment for lifelong injuries and deterring future sexual abuse, as has been well-briefed in the opposition (opp., pp. 5-10). The Legislature determined these are valid public purposes and the Court cannot say the Legislature lacked a reasonable basis to do so. The motion for judgment on the pleadings therefore is denied.