Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 23STCV12007, Date: 2023-12-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV12007    Hearing Date: March 15, 2024    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Demurrer by Defendant Caesarstone USA, Inc. to Plaintiffs’ Complaint; Motion Thereof to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint; Specially Appearing Stylenquaza LLC’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs JAIME BLANCO MACIEL and HELEN ORTIZ-BLANCO filed suit against over 50 defendants for injuries sustained by Plaintiff JAIME BLANCO MACIEL by inhaling dust from working with defendants’ products containing crystalline silica. The causes of action are: 1) Negligence; 2) Strict Liability – Warning Defect; 3) Strict Liability – Design Defect; 4) Fraudulent Concealment; 5) Breach of Implied Warranties; and 6) Loss of Consortium.

This tentative ruling addresses motions filed by two of the defendants. First, Defendant CAESARSTONE USA, INC. (“Caesarstone”) demurrers to each claim of the Complaint and moves to strike allegations regarding punitive damages. Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer and motion.

Second, Defendant STYLENQUAZA LLC (“Stylenquaza”) moves to quash service of the summons and Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.  

DEMURRER

Caesarstone contends that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Concealment fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a valid cause of action and is uncertain.  Additionally, Caesarstone argues that Plaintiff’s general allegations do not suffice as to the First Cause of Action for Negligence, as to elements of causation of the alleged injury. Lastly, Caesarstone asserts that Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that Caesarstone failed to warn as to the Second Cause of Action for Strict Liability – Failure to Warn. In rebuttal, Plaintiffs counter that there is a liberal pleading standard for toxic tort cases, and the Complaint sufficiently alleges (1) causation at paragraphs 65 and 73, (2) failure to warn at paragraphs 390 through 394, and (3) fraudulent concealment based upon Complaint excerpts set forth at opposition pages 8 through 14.

The Court notes that it has overruled similar demurrers.  As to the instant matter, the elements of negligence are properly alleged with general allegations, because the pled facts of negligence and injury do in fact naturally give rise to an inference of causation. Specifically, the Complaint alleged that workers using Defendants’ (including Caesarstone) stone products would be exposed to toxic properties creating the hazard of silicosis. E.g., Complaint ¶¶ 76-80, 418-419 435, and 443-445.

Also, the elements of concealment are sufficiently alleged, based on (1) facts accessible only to a defendant knowing they were not known to or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff or, indirectly, his employer who could pass on the information to the employee, in order to carry out the intent to fraudulently induce Plaintiff to work with their products, and (2) duties imposed by statute or other law. E.g., Complaint ¶¶ 441 (“Defendants were under a legal duty to disclose by labels to Plaintiff, JAIME BLANCO MACIEL and by Safety Data Sheets to his employers both the toxic and fibrogenic properties of their products and use instructions to that were adequate to prevent silicosis.”), and 446 (“Notwithstanding their knowledge of the toxic and fibrogenic hazards of their stone products, at all material times hereto, Defendants concealed said toxic hazards from Plaintiff, JAIME BLANCO MACIEL, so that he would use Defendants' stone products in his work.”). 

Also, the elements of concealment, negligence and failure to warn, are sufficiently alleged generally against all defendants, in accordance with governing case law.

Further, Caesarstone’s emphasized reliance on Lazar v. Super. Ct. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 63, is misplaced, because that distinguishably addressed fraudulent inducement of employment, and not fraudulent concealment as to products liability claims. E.g., Demurrer, 10:7 and 10:21.

In sum, negligence and concealment are sufficiently alleged as required in products liability cases such as this.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Caesarstone errs in seeking specific facts in support of punitive damages. “In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”  Clauson v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255. [Emphasis added.]  Fraudulent acts of concealment may support awards of punitive damages.  Werschkull v. United Cal. Bank (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 981, 1004.

In a product-liability action, punitive damages may be awarded where a defendant placed a product on the market in conscious disregard of the safety of others, defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of its conduct and but deliberately failed to avoid the consequences.  Ehrhardt v. Brunswick, Inc. (1986) 186 Cal. App. 3d 734, 741. “Marketing a product that is known to be defective and dangerous to consumers supports an inference of malice for purposes of punitive damages.” Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 140 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 1230.  “The interpretation of the word ‘malice’ as used in section 3294 to encompass conduct evincing callous and conscious disregard of public safety by those who manufacture and market mass produced articles is consonant with and furthers the objectives of punitive damages.” Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981) 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 810 (involved automotive defect),  disapproved on other grounds by  Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp. (2018) 6 Cal. 5th 21, 36.  A jury could find that a defendant acted recklessly and in wanton disregard of “possible” harm to others in marketing, promoting, selling and maintaining a product on the market, with knowledge of a toxic effect, where inadequate warnings were given.  Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (1967) 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 715 (“In December 1961 the FDA compelled appellant to issue a drastic warning letter notifying the medical profession of known cases of cataract in humans from use of the drug. Appellant nevertheless continued with plans vigorously to promote its sale.”).  Cf. also  Johnson & Johnson v. Sup. Ct. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 (re punitive damages, triable issue existed whether defendant failed to warn specifically enough in its labeling, with conscious disregard of the safety of consumers, of a known risk of rare but severe allergic reaction).

As analyzed above, along with specific references to Complaint paragraphs, concealment and product placement, in conscious disregard of safety and consequences, are adequately alleged, and those support punitive damages.  Thus, the motion is denied as to punitive damages.

MOTION TO QUASH

            Legal Standard

When a defendant files a motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction, “the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Aquila, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 556, 568. Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific. Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 434, 445.

General jurisdiction exists when the defendant has “substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with California.” DVI, Inc. v. Superior Ct. (2002) 104 Cal. App. 4th 1080, 1099. Specific jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s “minimum contacts” with California shows that the defendant purposefully directed its acts to the state, “that the cause of action [is] related to or arise or result from the acts or contacts in the forum, and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the forum would be reasonable.” Muckle v. Superior Ct. (2002) 102 Cal. App. 4th 218, 227–28.

            Analysis

As Stylenquaza notes in its reply, Plaintiffs do not make an argument for general jurisdiction over Stylenquaza. Plaintiffs instead describe evidence they believe support exercising specific jurisdiction over Stylenquaza. Plaintiffs alternatively request the opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery to determine exactly what sales, distribution, and economic activity Stylenquaza has had in California and whether the 22 artificial stone slabs that Stylenquaza shipped to Pental in California were shipped to locations that supplied the product to Plaintiff Maciel’s employer that he fabricated and caused his illness. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to depose Stylenquaza’s PMQ and its manager/owner An Nguyen. While Stylenquaza contends that the current evidentiary record establishes that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it, Stylenquaza is not opposed to continuing the hearing until after the deposition of Stylenquaza’s PMQ on 3/20/24.

“A trial court has the discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow the plaintiff to conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues.” HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 1160, 1173. A “plaintiff is generally entitled to conduct discovery with regard to a jurisdictional issue before a court rules on a motion to quash,” but it lies within the sound discretion of the judge. Goehring v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 62 Cal. App. 4th 894, 911. “In order to prevail on a motion for a continuance for jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal. App. 4th 100, 127. Plaintiffs have articulated the topics they want to explore via deposition testimony, though they have not articulated why such information could not be discovered via written discovery. But given that Stylenquaza does not oppose a short continuance, the Court will acquiesce in Plaintiffs’ request for a continuance to conduct jurisdictional discovery, but only for the purpose of deposing Stylenquaza’s PMQ on 3/20/24.

Conclusion

Caesarstone’s demurrer is overruled and its motion to strike is denied. Caesarstone has twenty days to answer.

Stylenquaza’s motion to quash is continued so that Plaintiffs may take the deposition of Stylenquaza’s PMQ on 3/20/24. The Court will continue the hearing in consultation with counsel at the hearing. Plaintiffs may file and serve supplemental opposing papers at least 14 days before the continued hearing date. Stylenquaza may file and serve supplemental reply papers at least 7 days before that date. The Court will rule on Stylenquaza’s evidentiary objections at the continued hearing.