Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 23STCV19611, Date: 2024-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV19611    Hearing Date: January 30, 2024    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:  Motion of Defendants to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

The motion is denied.

Twenty days to answer.

Background

Plaintiff BRAVHART, L.P. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against LOS FELIZ INVESTORS, LLC; ZWICK CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; and LATERRA DEVELOPMENT, LLC (“Defendants”), alleging that Defendants’ construction of an apartment complex next door to Plaintiff’s property caused damage to Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff alleges three causes of action: (1) Negligence, (2) Nuisance, and (3) Trespass. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages for the nuisance and trespass causes of action.

Defendants filed a motion to strike the punitive damages allegations from the Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Legal Standard

A court properly grants a motion to strike punitive damages when the complaint fails to set forth the elements in the general punitive damage statute in Civil Code § 3294. Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 53, 63. These elements consist of allegations that the defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice.” Civil Code § 3294. Relevant here, Civil Code § 3294(c) defines “malice” as conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Oppression is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel an unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id.)

A plaintiff must plead these elements with “ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief.” Clauson v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255. In considering a motion to strike, a court must read the allegations in the complaint “as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Id.) Thus, a complaint that describes conduct from which a conscious disregard for parties’ rights may be inferred is sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages.  SKF Farms v. Sup. Ct. (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 907. In contrast, merely conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. See Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal. App. 3d 864, 872. Alleging that persons acted “with the permission and consent” of all defendants including corporate defendants is sufficient to plead corporate employer liability for punitive damages. O’Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. (1977) 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 806.

 Analysis  

A cause of action for trespass supports an award of punitive damages. Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1055.  A plaintiff may recover punitive damages for a nuisance claim that is an intentional tort. Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 920 (punitive damages recoverable where plaintiff alleged in nuisance claim that defendant “had actual knowledge of defective conditions” and alleged that defendant acted with knowledge of the consequences of damage caused to plaintiff).  

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants tied-back and/or shored within the subsurface of Plaintiff’s property even though Defendants had first requested use and/or access to Plaintiff’s property for such work and Plaintiff had not provided consent for the work. (Compl., ¶¶ 9-10.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants’ construction, including the tie-back or shoring, caused physical damage to Plaintiff’s property, and blocked or impeded the ingress and egress to Plaintiff’s property and the street parking. (Id., ¶¶ 11, 14, 16, 17.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct created, or allowed to be created, dangerous conditions on Plaintiff’s property that caused Plaintiff’s harm, and that Defendants acted intentionally, unreasonably, and/or were negligent and/or reckless. (Id., ¶¶ 19-20, 23, 28, 30.)

These allegations adequately plead an intentional tort, i.e., that Defendants had knowledge that Plaintiff did not consent to the work Defendants wanted to do that would impact Plaintiff’s property and they did the work anyways. Plaintiff therefore is entitled to seek punitive damages for both its nuisance and its trespass claims.

The Complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to support Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff alleges that with the actions cited above, Defendants “individually or in concert, acted with an intent and/or reckless/conscious disregard of the rights of [Plaintiff] (with such action(s) being grossly negligent, malicious, and/or oppressive.” (Id., ¶¶ 20, 31.) The inference from the allegations in the Complaint, taken as a whole, is that Defendants knew Plaintiff had not consented to the tie-back or shoring, and/or access to Plaintiff’s property, and Defendants intentionally, unreasonably, negligently and/or recklessly went ahead and undertook these actions knowing they would cause damage to Plaintiff, and that such damage occurred. These allegations suffice to show, at the pleading stage, that Defendants acted with conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights as required to plead a claim for punitive damages. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegation that each of the Defendants participated in this conduct individually or in concert with one another is sufficient, at the pleading stage, to plead punitive damages against the corporate Defendants.

The Court therefore denies the motion to strike.