NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:  Hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney's Fees

 

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney's Fees is granted, in a reduced sum, not as prayed.

 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Duy Quoc Bui and Anh Tu Nguyen brought this lemon law action against Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Defendant”) alleging: 1) Violation Of Song-Beverly Act – Breach Of Express Warranty; 2) Violation Of Song-Beverly Act – Breach Of Implied Warranty: 3) Violation Of The Song- Beverly Act Section 1793.2(B); and  4) Violation Of The Song- Beverly Act Section 1796.5.

On 5/14/24, the parties filed a notice of settlement.

Plaintiffs now seek attorney fees. Defendant opposes the motion.

 

 

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), provides, “Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.”

“A party may not recover attorney fees unless expressly authorized by statute or contract.” Code Civ. Proc., § 1021. Civil Code §1794(d) provides that a buyer who prevails in an action under that section “shall be allowed by the court to recover as a part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and the prosecution of such action.”

The moving party bears the burden of establishing entitlement to attorney fees. Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320. 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS

I. Whether Plaintiffs are the Prevailing Party

The Act does not define the term “prevailing party.” Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d). Most courts take a “pragmatic” approach to assessing whether a buyer has prevailed under the Act. See e.g., Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1264 (Wohlgemuth); MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1047. Under this analysis, the trial court determines which party succeeded on a practical level, by considering the extent to which each party realized its litigation objectives. Wohlgemuth, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1264.

In MacQuiddy, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048, the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was not a prevailing party under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). Although the plaintiff secured repurchase of his vehicle for $¿68,000, the manufacturer never contested liability for this amount and admitted liability in its answer to the complaint. This amount was never litigated. The only issue the plaintiff litigated was the civil penalty amount, and the trial court ruled against the plaintiff. The MacQuiddy court found that the plaintiff was not a prevailing party because he did not achieve his main litigation objective of obtaining a civil penalty. Ibid.

Here, Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle for a purchase price of $356,020.26. Saeedian Decl. ¶ 19. The parties agreed to settle the case by way of Plaintiffs’ acceptance of Defendant’s 998 Offer to Compromise (“998 Offer”), which stated that Defendant would repurchase the vehicle for $363,000.00. Saeedian Decl. ¶¶ 25-26. The 998 Offer did not resolve whether Plaintiffs are a prevailing party but allowed Plaintiffs to elect between $5,000 in attorney’s fees or seeking reasonable attorney’s fees in the court.  Hooper Decl., at p. 192, Ex. L ¶ 5.

Defendant argues that it had indicated to Plaintiff Bui prior to litigation that it was willing to repurchase the vehicle and then Plaintiffs sought damages in this lawsuit over any repurchase payment based on Defendant's delay. Defendant reasons that Plaintiffs ultimately accepted a settlement for repurchase of the vehicle in the 998 Ofer that did not include those damages and thus Plaintiffs failed to accomplish their litigation objectives.  Opposition at p. 6. 

However, unlike MacQuiddy, Defendant did not concede liability throughout the litigation. In MacQuiddy, “monetary judgment was for an amount never disputed and on an issue never litigated because it was conceded …[and] … Mercedes-Benz immediately admitted liability for failure to replace or repurchase the car and offered to do so, the amount of restitution was not contested, and the entire trial concerned the civil penalty” Id. at 1049. Defendant shows no evidence that the settlement amount in the 998 Offer is what it would have paid to Plaintiffs absent litigation. If Defendant always intended to repurchase the car for the settlement amount, it could have limited attorney’s fees by making a section 988 settlement offer at the beginning of litigation, it did not.

Because the parties disputed whether Defendant would repurchase the vehicle and at what amount, Plaintiffs achieved their implicit litigation objective of requiring Defendant to repurchase the vehicle at a favorable price.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party. 

 

II. Whether Plaintiffs Requested Attorney Fees are Reasonable

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.’” Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 (quoting Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131–1132). The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 (discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award).

Plaintiffs have submitted a declaration showing that its attorneys incurred a total of 33 billable hours, including time spent working on Plaintiff’s case on this motion, and an estimated additional 5.5 hours to review the Opposition, draft a Reply, and prepare for and attend the hearing. Declaration of Michael Saeedian (“Saeedian Decl.), at ¶ 28. 

The requested hours break down as follows:

Michael Saeedian 3.9 hours at $695 per hour for a total of $2,710.50

Adina Ostoia 9.8 hours at $695 for a total of $6,811.00

Christopher Urner 6.9 hours at $525 per hour for a total of $3,622.50

Jorge L. Acosta (attorney hours) 6.7 hours at $350 per hour for a total of $2,345.00

Jorge L. Acosta (law clerk hours) 11.1 hours at a rate of $250 for a total of $2,775.00

Stefany Montoya 0.1 hours at a rate of $350 for a total of $35.00

The total requested attorney’s fee is $18,299.00. See Saeedian Decl., at ¶ 28.

Additionally, Plaintiffs request costs in the amount of 927.90.

Defendant argues that the Court should use its discretion to reduce the fees requested by Plaintiffs to no more than $5,945.50. See Declaration of Donna Hooper (“Hooper Decl.,), Ex A. Defendant, however, does not challenge Plaintiff’s demand for costs.

Hourly rates

The hourly rates for attorneys Saeedian and Ostoia are unreasonable given the routine nature of the tasks performed in this Lemon Law case. The Court concludes that an hourly rate of $425 for both of these attorneys is a reasonable hourly rate. The Court similarly concludes that the hourly rate for attorney Urner should be reduced to $375. The hourly rates for attorneys Acosta and Montoya are reasonable.

Billing Entries

Defendant argues that the claimed fees improperly include time spent working on the retainer agreement, reviewing objection-only responses, duplicative or clerical tasks, and assorted tasks that were “[e]xcessive, unnecessary and duplicative.  Defendant also argues that the time spent preparing the Complaint and discovery responses should be reduced because they were based on templates and required little original work. 

The Court also finds that the number of hours billed is unreasonable. While there is nothing inherently wrong with using templates to complete tasks more quickly, time savings should be reflected in the billable hours. As their name suggests, the attorneys of The Lemon Pros, LLP specialize in lemon law cases and regularly litigate such cases. See Saeedian Decl. at ¶¶ 5-8. Many of the documents drafted were simple and required only minor edits to existing templates. Hooper Decl., ¶¶ 10,19, Exhibit A.

The Court reduces Acosta’s time preparing the retainer agreement and tasks related to the retainer agreement by 1 hour because the time billed is excessive for such a routine task.

The time billed by Urner to prepare the template complaint is reduced by 1 hour; the form complaint does not require much time to finalize. Similarly, the Court reduces his time by another 4 hours for estimated time spent on the reply. The time billed by Ostoia to prepare template discovery requests and objection only responses in a routine Lemon Law case is wildly excessive. The Court reduces her hours on these tasks by 4.5 hours.

The Court therefore grants reasonable attorney fees as follows:

Michael Saeedian 3.9 hours at $425 per hour for a total of $1,657.50

Adina Ostoia 5.3 hours at $425 for a total of $2,252.50

Christopher Urner 1.9 hours at $375 per hour for a total of $712.50

Jorge L. Acosta (attorney hours) 5.7 hours at $350 per hour for a total of $1,995

Jorge L. Acosta (law clerk hours) 11.1 hours at a rate of $250 for a total of $2,775

Stefany Montoya 0.1 hours at a rate of $350 for a total of $35.00

Total Fees Granted: $9,427.50

 

Because Defendants did not file a motion to tax the costs in Plaintiff’s memorandum of costs, the Court awards the entirety of the costs totaling $927.90.

 

 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs in the reduced amount of $10,355.40.