Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 23STCV20363, Date: 2025-01-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV20363    Hearing Date: January 21, 2025    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Cross-Complainaints’ Motion for Summary Adjudication

Cross-Complainaints’ Motion for Summary Adjudication is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Joseph Cohen and Janet Cohen (“Plaintiffs or “Cross-Defendants”) filed this action against Mendy Ezagui and Mayta Malamud (“Defendants” or “Cross-Complainants”), alleging that Defendants breached the lease agreement they had with Plaintiffs by failing to pay rent for the years 2020, 2021, and 2022 for the property located at 1115 S. Sherbourne (“Property”). Defendants’ Cross-Complaint alleges claims related to habitability issues with the Property.

Cross-Complainants filed a First-Amended Cross-Complaint, adding a cause of action for declaratory relief.

Cross-Complainants filed a Motion for Summary Adjudication. Plaintiff filed an Opposition.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Cross-Complainants request the Court take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Complaint and the First-Amended Cross-Complaint for Damages (FACC). The Court grants judicial notice of these documents under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d) as court records.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action … if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto …. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action….” Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. Id., subd. (f)(2).) Therefore, a defendant moving for summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).

A party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no triable issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. § 437c, subd. (c). A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that ‘each element of’ the ‘cause of action’ in question has been ‘proved,’ and hence that ‘there is no defense’ thereto.” Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850. “Once the plaintiff … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The defendant … shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” § 437c, subd. (p)(1).

“The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850. A triable issue of material fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. Ibid. “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 463, 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).

ANALYSIS

Cross-Complainants move for summary adjudication of the eighth cause of action in the First-Amended Cross-Complaint, seeking declaratory relief as the parties' respective rights and obligations under the Lease, specifically regarding the attorney’s fees available under the Lease.

I. Declaratory Relief

“Declaratory relief generally operates prospectively to declare future rights, rather than to redress past wrongs.” Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909. The elements required to state a claim for declaratory relief on a contract include (1) a legally binding contract that is “a proper subject of declaratory relief” and (2) “an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to [the Cross-Complainant's] rights or obligations.” Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1582; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.

Here, it is uncontested that there is a contract between the parties and that there is an actual controversy relating to their rights and obligations under the contract to provide attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in litigation between them. Accordingly, this issue is appropriately before the Court as a matter of declaratory relief.

II. Attorney Fee Cap

Cross-Complainants argue that the terms of the Lease limit any potential attorney fees and costs to no more than $1,000. Cross-Defendants argue that the Lease does not contain such a cap.

“The goal of contractual interpretation is to determine and give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.” Safeco Ins. Co. v. Robert S. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 758, 763 (citing Civ. Code § 1636; Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mutual Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 854). “That intent is to be inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract.” Pardee Construction Co. v. Insurance Co. of the West (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1352. “The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.” Cal. Civil Code § 1638. “The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.” Civ. Code, § 1641. “If possible, the court should give effect to every provision. An interpretation which renders part of the instrument to be surplusage should be avoided.” Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 (citaitons omitted).  

It is undisputed that Paragraph 40 of the Lease states, “In any action or proceeding arising out of this Agreement, the prevailing party between Landlord and Tenant shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs, collectively not to exceed $1,000 (or $__________), except as provided in paragraph 39A.” Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement at 2.

Paragraph 39A of the Lease states, “Consistent with paragraphs B and C below, Landlord and Tenant agree to mediate any dispute or claim arising between them out of this Agreement, or any resulting transaction, before resorting to court action. Mediation fees, if any, shall be divided equally among the parties involved. If, for any dispute or claim to which this paragraph applies, any party commences an action without first attempting to resolve the matter through mediation, or refuses to mediate after a request has been made, then that party shall not be entitled to recover attorney fees, even if they would otherwise be available to that party in any such action.” Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement at 3.

The plain reading of the Lease is that there are no circumstances in which it authorizes any party to recover more than $1,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. Cross-Defendants attempt to make much out of the blank space for an alternative cap to be placed, “(or $__________),” arguing that it indicates the parties intended no cap to apply. This argument is without merit. The plain meaning of that blank line, set off by parenthesis, is that the parties can substitute an alternative cap if they choose to do so. That the parties left the line blank when executing the lease indicates not that they intended for no cap on attorney’s fees and costs but that they intended the $1,000 cap to apply. To hold otherwise would violate the rule against surplusage by rendering the inclusion of the $1,000 default cap meaningless. Accordingly, under the terms of the Lease, neither party can recover more than $1,000 in attorney fees and costs.

III. Mediation

Cross-Defendants argue that Cross-Complainants cannot recover attorney fees because they refused to participate in mediation. Opp. at pp. 3:25-28, 4:1-8. The uncontroverted evidence is that Cross-Defendants refused to participate in mediation before filing their Cross-Complaint. Kintzele Decl. ¶ 4. Moreover, Cross-Complainants do not address this argument in their Reply. Accordingly, under the plain terms of paragraph 39A of the Lease, Cross-Complainants cannot recover attorney fees under the Lease.

CONCLUSION

Cross-Complainaints’ Motion for Summary Adjudication is granted. The terms of the Lease limit attorney fees and costs to no more than $1,000.