NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Cross-Defendants’ Demurrer - without Motion to Strike

 

Cross-Defendants’ Demurrer - without Motion to Strike is sustained in part and overruled in part.

                                                                                                                                       

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Jerry Griess, Bakman Pacific, LLC, Burlington Pacifici LLC, Berendo Pacific LLC, Chase Pacific LLC, Redondo Pacific LLC, East Pacific LLC, and Pledmont Pacific LLC (Plaintiffs) filed this action against Craig Chalfant (Defendant) seeking a declaratory judgment that Plaintiffs have fulfilled all their obligations under a settlement agreement with Defendant.

Defendant (Cross-Complainant) filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint (FACC) against Plaintiffs, Brett Cyprus, Gail Cyprus, and Spaulding Pacific, LLC (Cross-Defendants) alleging (1) multiple fraud-related actions; (2) multiple elder abuse actions; (3) Breach of Contact; (4) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (5) Tenant and Housing Law Violations; (6) Civil Extortion; (7) Unfair Competition Law violation; (8) Emotional Distress – multiple actions; (9) Civil Conspiracy; (10) Abuse of Process; and (11) Declaratory Relief.

The motion now before the Court is Cross-Defendants’ Demurrer - without Motion to Strike

 

 

 

LEGAL STANDARD

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 720-21. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994. “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not on the evidence or facts alleged.” E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315. As such, courts assume the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. Ibid. However, it does not accept as true deductions, contentions, or conclusions of law or fact. Stonehouse Homes LLC v. City of Sierra Madre (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 531, 538.

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”). The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318

 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Cross-Complainant’s request for judicial notice is denied.

 

ANALYSIS

Meet and Confer

Cross-Complainant argues that Cross-Defendants failed to meet and confer, and therefore, the Court should strike the demurrer.

The Court finds that Cross-Defendants have satisfied their obligation to attempt to meet and confer. Regardless, failure to meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. Code Civ. Proc., §430.41(a)(4). Accordingly, the Court will consider the merits of the demurrer.

I.  Length of FACC

Cross-Defendants argue that the FACC is vague, uncertain, and unintelligible on all counts because it is overly long and contains irrelevant material.

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part, “A complaint or cross-complaint shall contain … [a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.”

Failure to use concise language is not grounds for sustaining a demurrer. See Moropoulos v. C. H. & O. B. Fuller Co. (1921) 186 Cal. 679, 686 (noting complaint had been written without “putting it in concise language, and with the addition of much surplusage.”). “The rule that the complaint must contain a statement of the facts in ordinary and concise language is completely ignored. Nevertheless, if, intermingled with such matters, there are averments of ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, it was error to sustain the demurrer without leave.” M. G. Chamberlain & Co. v. Simpson (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 263, 267 (citation omitted). “A complaint will be held to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action if, upon a consideration of all of the facts stated, it appears that the plaintiff is entitled to any relief, even though the facts may not be clearly stated or may be intermingled with irrelevant facts or the plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under the facts alleged.” Marin v. Jacuzzi (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552.

“Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond. A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695 (cleaned up).

The Cross-Complaint is over 500 pages long and contains many repetitive allegations. However, that alone is not a valid basis for sustaining a demurrer. Defendants argue that the Supreme Court has said, "[a] complaint should be kept to a reasonable length.” Committee On Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 217, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227. However, the context of that statement was that greater detail was not necessary to meet the specificity requirement for fraud claims. Ibid (“A complaint which set out each advertisement verbatim, and specified the time, place, and medium, might seem to represent perfect compliance with the specificity requirement, but as a practical matter, it would provide less effective notice and be less useful in framing the issues than would a shorter, more generalized version.”) Cross-Defendants provide no authority for the proposition that a court may sustain a demurrer merely because the complaint is not concise. Nor do they identify with any specificity, the source of uncertainty within the complaint, other than its length. Accordingly, the Court overrules the special demurrer for uncertainty based on the length of the complaint.

 

II. Litigation Privilege

Cross-Defendants argue that the litigation privilege bars each of the causes of action because they are based upon statements made as part of a settlement negation. 

“[T]he litigation privilege, set forth in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) … holds as privileged statements made in any ‘judicial proceeding.’” Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 834, 843. Statements relating to settlement fall within the privilege, “including those made during settlement negotiations.” Ibid. “[T]he absolute litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), bars derivative tort actions and applies to all torts other than malicious prosecution, including fraud, negligence and negligent misrepresentation.” Kuehn v. Kuehn (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 824, 834 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s fraud claims are based on the following alleged statement made in a letter by Greiss’s former attorney, Andrew R. Kisli, during settlement negations: “Please note that because you are no longer a resident manager, you no longer have a right to reside in your current rental unit. Should you refuse to accept this settlement, you must agree in writing to pay the current market rent in the City of Los Angeles for a 1 bedroom apartment, $1924 per month. Should you fail to do so, Mr. Griess will file an unlawful detainer action to obtain a Court Order requiring you to vacate the premises.” FACC ¶ 23.

Cross-Claimant alleges in the FACC that these were false statements of law, which fraudulently induced him to sign the settlement agreement. FACC ¶ 25. Because it is apparent on the face of the FACC that the allegedly fraudulent statement was made as part of a settlement negation, Cross-Claimant’s claims for fraud are barred by the litigation privilege. Likewise, based on the same facts, the civil extortion claim is barred by the litigation privilege. See Flickinger v. Finwall (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 822, 84 (holding the litigation privilege bars a claim of civil extortion). However, while referenced in some of the other causes of action, the privileged communication is not obviously the sole basis for the remaining claims. Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer based on litigation privilege is sustained without leave to amend as to all fraud claims (causes of action 1-8) and the civil extortion claim (cause of action 23) and overruled as to all other claims.

III. Uncertainty

Cross-Defendants argue that the FACC is uncertain because it contains contradictory facts.

While plaintiffs are permitted to plead inconsistent legal theories, they are not permitted to plead inconsistent facts. See Steiner v. Rowley (1950) 35 Cal.2d 713, 719 (contradictory or antagonistic facts are not allowed); See also Berman v. Bromberg (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 945 (“In the absence of inconsistent factual allegations any inconsistency between plaintiff's legal theories is immaterial.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true allegations contrary to factual allegations in former pleading in the same case. Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 343.

Cross-Defendants argue that the FACC is contradictory because Cross-Complainant argues that the settlement agreement does not exist because it is unenforceable due to misrepresentation or fraud, but also argues that Cross-Defendants breached the settlement agreement. The Court disagrees. This is a permissible pleading of inconsistent theories, not antagonistic facts. While they may not simultaneously recover on both theories,
“a plaintiff may plead inconsistent claims that allege both the existence of an enforceable agreement and the absence of an enforceable agreement.” Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1389.

IV. Elder Abuse (Counts 9-11)

Cross-Defendants argue that Cross-Complainant fails to plead the elements of violating Welfare and Institutions Code section 15600, etc.

“The Elder Abuse Act defines ‘abuse’ as ‘[p]hysical abuse, neglect, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering,’ ‘deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering,’ or ‘[f]inancial abuse, as defined in Section 15610.30.’” Arace v. Medico Investments, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 977, 982 (quoting Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.07, subd. (a)).

Cross-Defendants argue that Cross-Claimant failed to plead the required elements of financial elder abuse.

The elements of a financial elder abuse claim are (1) defendants took the elder’s property; (2) that the elder was 65 years of age or older at the time of the conduct; (3) defendants took/hid/appropriated/obtained the elder’s property for either a wrongful use or with the intent to defraud; (4) that the elder was harmed; and (5) that defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing the elder’s harm. CACI 3100.

Cross-Claimant fails to identify any property that Cross-Defendants took from him. To the extent that the alleged property taken is the rights he surrendered by signing the settlement agreement, the litigation privilege barred the claim. FACC ¶ 496. Accordingly, the demurrer to the ninth cause of action for elder fraud is sustained with leave to amend.

Next, Cross-Defendants argue that as Cross-Claimant's landlord, they were not his caregivers and are not liable for neglect.

Neglect is defined in relevant apart as “The negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an elder or a dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise.” Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.57, subd. (a)(1).

Cross-Claimant fails to plead any facts showing that Cross-Defendants were his caregivers. His assertions that the role of a landlord is analogous to that of a caregiver are legal conclusions that the Court is not required to accept as true. Accordingly, the Court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend as to the tenth cause of action for neglect of an elder.

For the reasons stated above, the Court likewise sustains the demurrer to the eleventh count for conspiracy to commit elder abuse with leave to amend.

 

 

V. Breach of Contract

Additionally, Cross-Defendants argue that Cross-Complainant fails to properly plead any of his contract claims properly.

To properly plead breach of contract, “[i]f the action is based on an alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written instrument must be attached and incorporated by reference." Otworth v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal. App. 3d 452, 459. Alternatively, "in an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language." Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 189, 198-199.

Cross-Claimant failed to state the terms of the contract, attach a copy of the contract to the complaint, or state the contract's operative terms. FACC at pp. 390-394. Therefore, he fails to properly plead any breach of contract claim. Likewise, he fails to properly plead a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which provides that “that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.” Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 589 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend as to causes of action twelve, thirteen, and fourteen.

VI. Tenant and Housing Claims (Counts 15-19)

Next, Cross-Defendants argue that Cross-Complainant fails to properly plead any tenant and housing claims. The Court agrees.

A. Statutory Claims

First, Cross-Defendants argue that these causes of action do not meet heightened pleading standards applicable to statutory claims. Statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity. Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.

Cross-Claimant provides a list of statutes Cross-Defendants allegedly violated but fails to allege sufficient specifics. He does not provide any dates associated with the alleged unlawful rent increases, failure to provide mandatory rent registration notices, failure to keep an onsite manager or any facts supporting his allegation of lease modification. FACC ¶¶ 1090-95. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend as to the fifteenth cause of action for violation of tenant protection statutes.

B. Implied Warranty of Habitability

Cross-Complainant also fails to state a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.

The elements of a breach of implied warranty of habitability claim "are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises' habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages." Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297, 173

The Cross-Complainant fails to allege that he notified the landlord of the defective condition, and if so, on what date. Accordingly, the sixteenth cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

C. Tenant Harassment

Cross-Complainant fails to state a cause of action for tenant harassment.

“Tenant Harassment shall be defined as a landlord’s knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific tenant or tenants that causes detriment and harm, and that serves no lawful purpose, including… Failing to perform and timely complete necessary repairs and maintenance required by Federal, State, County, or local housing, health, or safety laws…Attempting to coerce the tenant to vacate with offer(s) of payments.” L.A. Municipal Code § 45.33.

While Cross-Complainant alleges failures to complete necessary repairs, he does not state when he told Cross-Defendants about the need for repair or when repairs were done, if ever. FACC ¶ 1162; 1159. Additionally, his claim that the settlement agreement constitutes an attempt to coerce the tenant to vacate with offers of payments is barred by the litigation privilege. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend as to count seventeen.

D. Breach of Quiet Enjoyment

Cross-Complainant likewise fails to allege a claim for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.

The elements of a claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment are: (1) a lease agreement between plaintiff and defendant; (2) absence of language contrary to the implied covenant that tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession; (3) act or omission of the landlord, or anyone claiming under the landlord, which "substantially interfere[s] with a tenant[']s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy"; and (4) an applicable remedy. See Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588-591.

As with the breach of contract claim, Cross-Claimant fails to attach a copy of the lease or plead its operative terms. Accordingly, the demurrer to the eighteenth count for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is sustained with leave to amend.

E. Wrongful Eviction

Cross-Complainant fails to plead facts sufficient to allege a claim for wrongful eviction.

“An essential element of a wrongful eviction claim is that the tenant has vacated the premises.” Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 900 (citation omitted).

As pleaded, Cross-Complainant has not vacated the premises. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend as to the claim for wrongful eviction.

VII. Nuisance

Cross-Defendants list the nuisance claim among those they demur to but provide no argument. Motion at p. 25:13-26:9. Accordingly, the Court overrules the demurrer as to the nuisance claim.

VIII. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Likewise, Cross-Defendants list the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim among those they demur to but provide no argument. Accordingly, the Court overrules the demurrer as to the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. Demurrer at p. 25:13-26:9.

IX Intentional Infliction of emotional distress.

Cross-Defendants argue that the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress fails to state a cause of action because Cross-Complainant directs this cause of action at every single cross-defendant without allegations that each of them partook in any of the alleged conduct.

Cross-Complainant alleges that Griess is “responsible for the actions and decisions of the limited liability companies listed as cross-defendants.” FACC ¶ 3. However, this is a legal conclusion, not entitled to a presumption of truth. Additionally, Cross-Complainant states that “‘Jerry’ shall be inclusive of all cross-defendants.” Ibid. He further alleges that Griess, Brett Cyprus, and Gail Cyprus were “at all relevant times” owners of the named LLCs involved in this matter. FACC ¶¶ 4-5. Further, Cross-Complaint alleges that these companies are nothing but the alter egos of the three individual Cross-Defendants. FACC ¶¶ 58-65.

“The ‘single enterprise,’ or alter ego, doctrine is an equitable doctrine: ‘A corporate identity may be disregarded—the “corporate veil” pierced—where an abuse of the corporate privilege justifies holding the equitable ownership of a corporation liable for the actions of the corporation.” Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1341 (citation omitted). “In California, two conditions must be met before the alter ego doctrine will be invoked. First, there must be such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that the separate personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist. Second, there must be an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone.” Ibid. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Alter ego liability is not limited to the parent corporations and subsidiaries but can also apply to affiliated companies. Ibid.

In applying the doctrine, courts consider the following factors: (1) the commingling of funds and assets of the two entities, (2) identical equitable ownership in the two entities, use of the same offices and employees, (3) disregard of corporate formalities, (4) identical directors and officers, and (5) use of one as a mere shell or conduit for the affairs of the other. Cam-Carson, LLC v. Carson Reclamation Authority (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 535, 549-550. Courts look to the totality of the circumstances, and no one factor is dispositive. Whether a party is liable under an alter ego theory is normally a question of fact. Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799, 811.

Cross-Complainant alleges that the LLCs were all owned by the same three people, that when Cross-Defendants employed him, he received his salary from different LLCs interchangeably, that money was transferred across LLCs for non-entity specific functions, management decisions were uniformly applied across the LLCs, and a uniform lease agreement that had the various LLCS listed with checkboxes. FACC ¶¶ 58-65. The Court finds that Cross-Complainant has adequately alleged facts supporting his argument that each LLC is an alter ego for the three owners and the other LLCs. Accordingly, the demurrer as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for failure to identify which of the Cross-Defendants engaged in the alleged malicious conduct is overruled.

 

X. Unfair Competition

Cross-Defendant demurs to the third cause of action, violation of Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq., (the “UCL”), arguing Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to support the cause of action.

“California Business and Professions Code Sections 17000, et seq., and 17200, et seq., states [sic] that unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair fraudulent business practices.” Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 618-19. “By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business act or practice, the UCL ‘borrows’ rules set out in other laws and makes violations of those rules independently actionable. However, a practice may violate the UCL even if it is not prohibited by another statute.” Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com. v. Insomniac, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 803, 835 (citation omitted). To prevail on a UCL claim, there must be “some connection between the wrongdoing and the harm.” In re Firearm Cases (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 959, 979.

While Cross-Complainant lists a pattern of misconduct done to others, the only unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent act he alleges Cross-Defendants did to him concerns the settlement agreement, which is protected by the litigation privilege. FACC ¶ 1350. Additionally, Cross-Complainant’s alleged damages are a loss of “financial stability and housing security.” FACC ¶ 1351. However, he acknowledges that he was paid $25,000 under the settlement agreement, does not plead that he paid the higher rent, and acknowledges that he never vacated the premises. FACC ¶ 27. Thus, he fails to state any cognizable injury. Therefore, the demurrer to the twenty-fourth cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

XI. Civil Conspiracy

“Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.” Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 510-511. “Standing alone, a conspiracy does no harm and engenders no tort liability. It must be activated by the commission of an actual tort.” Ibid.

While Cross-Claimant may be able to argue civil conspiracy to establish liability between Cross-Defendants for other claims, it is not itself a cause of action. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained as to the civil conspiracy cause of action without leave to amend.

XII. Abuse of Process

“The common law tort of abuse of process arises when one uses the court's process for a purpose other than that for which the process was designed. To succeed in an action for abuse of process, a litigant must establish that the defendant (1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process, and (2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.” JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1522 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “‘Abuse of process is not just another name for malicious prosecution.… Malicious prosecution and abuse of process are distinct. The former concerns a meritless lawsuit (and all the damage it inflicted). The latter concerns the misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit (regardless of whether there was probable cause to commence that lawsuit in the first place).’” S.A. v. Maiden (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 41-42 (quoting Bidna v. Rosen (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 27, 40).

Cross-Complainant alleges that Plaintiffs brought their declaratory relief action for the improper purpose of his wrongful eviction. This speaks only to the Plaintiffs’ reason for bringing the suit, not to their conduct in litigating it. Accordingly, the demurrer to the abuse of process action is sustained with leave to amend.

XII. Declaratory Relief

Cross-Defendants argue that the claim for declaratory relief is moot, because Cross-Claimant has repudiated the settlement agreement.

To qualify for declaratory relief, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party. Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546. Where “[a plaintiff] has a fully matured cause of action for money, he must seek damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim.” Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 910.

Cross-Claimant seeks “a judicial declaration regarding [his] rights, status, and other legal relations under the rent control ordinance and his employment agreement.” FACC ¶ 1409. While he makes several additional requests for relief that are not appropriately categorized as declaratory, he has appropriately alleged that there is a dispute about whether the rent control ordinance protects him. Moreover, because he has not alleged he has paid any of the increased rent, on the face of the pleadings, Cross-Complainant does not have a present claim for money damages but a controversy as to his rights going forward. Accordingly, the demurrer to the declaratory relief cause of action is overruled.

 

CONCLUSION

Cross-Defendants’ Demurrer - without Motion to Strike is sustained in part and denied in part. The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to the causes of action for fraud, civil extortion, and civil conspiracy (causes of action 1-8, 23, and 25). The demurrer is overruled as to the nuisance, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and declaratory relief claims (causes of action 20, 21, 22, and 27). The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend as to all other claims. Cross-Defendant to give notice. Cross-Complainant has thirty days to amend.

The Court strongly urges Cross-Complainant to shorten his amended cross-complaint. It is not necessary to include precedent or legal argument in the complaint. All that is required are “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language … [and] [a] demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled. If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be stated.” Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a) (emphasis added). The facts need only be stated once and can be incorporated into all subsequent causes of action without repeating them.