Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 23STCV28830, Date: 2024-04-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV28830    Hearing Date: April 26, 2024    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Demurrer of Defendant Doniger / Burroughs as to Plaintiff’s First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action.

BACKGROUND

WILLIAM WESTWOOD (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against SCOTT BURROUGHS and DONIGER BURROUGHS (“Defendants”), alleging that they, as Plaintiff’s attorneys, failed to act with reasonable diligence in pursuing Plaintiff’s claims of copyright infringement, before the statute of limitations expired. The causes of action are (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith, (3) Professional Negligence, and (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty- Constructive Fraud.

Defendant DONIGER / BURROUGHS (“Defendant”) demurs to each of the claims in the Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant seeks judicial notice of two email strings between the parties, two filings from a federal court case, and the parties’ engagement agreement. “‘[J]udicial notice of matters upon demurrer will be dispositive only in those instances where there is not or cannot be a factual dispute concerning that which is sought to be judicially noticed.’” Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 365.  A trial court errs in taking judicial notice of facts in documents, where they are in dispute.  Herrera v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375. “The declaration of an adverse party is not a proper subject for judicial notice.” Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior Court (2005) 133 Cal. App. 4th 1185, 1192 (declaration was reasonably subject to dispute, because parties could question accuracy of records and searches). Letters are not properly the subject of judicial notice, where the contents do not fall within the lists in Evidence Code sections 451 and 452. Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Cal. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 836. Defendant seeks judicial notice of the emails to establish certain facts as true for purposes of the demurrer, which is impermissible. The Court denies the request for judicial notice of the emails.

Defendant seeks judicial notice of the engagement agreement. But generally, judicial notice of contracts is improper.  Freemont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp.  (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 114-15.  The Court denies Defendant’s request.

With respect to the court filings, while courts can take judicial notice of the existence of such documents, courts cannot take judicial notice of hearsay statements asserted in court filings. Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768. The existence of the federal court filings is of no consequence to deciding this demurrer and thus the Cour exercises its discretion to deny judicial notice of the filings. E.g., Barratt Amer., Inc. v. City of San Diego (2004) 117 Cal. App. 4th 809, 812, fn. 2 (court denied judicial notice as being irrelevant to demurrer).

 

 

LEGAL STANDARD

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally, reasonably and in context.  MKB Management, Inc. v. Melikian (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 796, 802. “[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695 (internal quotation omitted).

ANALYSIS

1.      Statute of Limitations – All Causes of Action

Defendant contends that each of the claims in the Complaint are time-barred. “A demurrer on the ground of the bar of the statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily barred.... It must appear clearly and affirmatively that, upon the face of the complaint, the right of action is necessarily barred.... This will not be the case unless the complaint alleges every fact which the defendant would be required to prove if he were to plead the bar of the applicable statute of limitation as an affirmative defense.” Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 881 (internal quotation omitted). “[T]o prevail on a demurrer based on the statute of limitations, a defendant must establish the entire cause of action is untimely.” Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 274.

Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.6(a) states that the limitations period to file an action for legal malpractice is one year after actual or constructive discovery, or four years after occurrence of the wrongful act or omission, whichever is first. Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Price (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 559, 566. As to each cause of action where the gravamen is legal malpractice, the statute of limitations of Code Civ. Proc., section 340.6 is applicable. Leasequip, Inc. v. Dapeer (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 394, 401. In legal malpractice cases, tolling of Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.6 occurs where, under an objective standard, conduct showed an ongoing attorney-client relationship. Nielsen v. Beck (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1049-1052

Defendant contends that Plaintiff knew the facts for his claims no later than 3/17/22, when the alleged injury occurred, but he filed the Complaint untimely on 11/27/23. Defendant contends that accrual of the statute of limitations is admitted at paragraphs 12 and 18 of the Complaint as well as the date of obtaining new counsel. E.g., Demurrer, 5:12-27. The Court disagrees. The Complaint does not reveal when the statute of limitations on legal malpractice claims accrued. To the contrary, the Complaint alleges: “Unbeknown to Plaintiff, his claim of copyright infringement had to be filed not later than March 16, 2022 or it was subject to forfeiture by time bar. Plaintiff did not know this; and Burroughs did not disclose it.” See Complaint, ¶¶ 12 and 18. Additionally, the Complaint alleges a variety of types of legal malpractice, beyond just an allegedly blown statute of limitations on the copyright infringement claims, without indicating the times of Plaintiff’s knowledge of accrual. See Complaint, ¶ 20. Further, the Complaint, at paragraph 18, does not specify when Defendant ceased to be in the attorney-client relationship, but merely states that, on 4/29/22, “Plaintiff sought other counsel…” The declaration and exhibits filed with the demurrer, which mirror the exhibits in the request for judicial notice, are not authorized for consideration. Even considering exhibit 5, its content does not admit when Defendant’s work for Plaintiff completely ended the attorney-client relationship that could have tolled the statute of limitations.

Thus, the statute of limitations is not revealed as to any entire cause of action. Because it is not revealed, the Court need not reach the question of Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend, partly based upon delayed discovery in first learning in May 2023 of the expired statute of limitations as to an action. See Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 5.

Therefore, the Court rejects the demurrer’s reliance on the statute of limitations.

2.      Sufficiency of Allegations- Professional Negligence, Breach of Contract, and Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s professional negligence claim fails because Plaintiff provided Defendant with misrepresentations about the date Plaintiff discovered the alleged copyright infringement, and such false information cannot support a negligence claim. Demurrer, pp 7-8.  Similarly, Defendant argues that the same facts contractually insulate Defendant from liability on the breach of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims. Demurrer, pp 9-11.

“[D]efendants cannot set forth allegations of fact in their demurrers which, if true, would defeat plaintiff’s complaint.” Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1144.

An opinion summarizes claims of negligence and fiduciary duty as to legal malpractice, as follows:

“ ‘Actionable legal malpractice is compounded of the same basic elements as other kinds of actionable negligence: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damage. The elements of a cause of action for professional negligence are: (1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence and diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional negligence.’ [Citation.]” ( Loube v. Loube (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 421, 429, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 906.) “To establish a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a fiduciary relationship, breach of that duty and damages.”

Shopoff & Cavallo LLP v. Hyon (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1508-1509.

Here, the Complaint says nothing about Plaintiff misrepresenting the date of discovery, and the demurrer is not permitted to exceed the allegations or matters that are subject to judicial notice.  Additionally, Plaintiff counters Defendant’s exhibit 5 for judicial notice, by saying he had provided documents indicating that he learned of just one of the infringements in 2019. Opposition, 1:11-12.

Further, the Complaint alleges damages caused by loss of a meritorious copyright claim, notwithstanding the demurrer statements of facts indicating no damages. Demurrer, ¶ 24. In that regard, Plaintiff argues that the underlying case settlement did not negate the claim of lost damages, since it was only one of the cases and Plaintiff still lost tens of thousands of dollars in damages. Opposition, 6:26-27.

The Court rejects the demurrer ground as to the claims for professional negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant.

3.      Sufficiency of Allegations- Fiduciary Duty and Constructive Fraud

Defendant asserts that there are no allegations about intent to breach a fiduciary duty or to deceive or to cause reliance or causation. Demurrer, 11:27-27. “[A]ttorneys have a fiduciary obligation to disclose material facts to their clients, an obligation that includes disclosure of acts of malpractice....” Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP (2007) 42 Cal.4th 503, 514.

Here, the Complaint incorporates by reference all prior factual allegations. Complaint, ¶ 32.  Thus, it sufficiently alleges that Plaintiff relied upon Defendant’s nondisclosure of the date of expiration of the statute of limitations and that Defendant intended to coverup its misconduct. Complaint, ¶¶ 12, 18, 19 and 34.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer as to fiduciary duty and constructive fraud.

CONCLUSION

The Court overrules the demurrer. Twenty days to answer.