Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 23STCV30751, Date: 2024-07-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV30751 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Hearing on Demurrer – with Motion to Strike
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Aisha Jeter, Daniel Ernan Jacob Jeter, and
Elijah David Massey (by and through his guardian ad litem) sued defendants 6325
8th Avenue, LLC and Malin Asset Management, Inc. on December 18, 2023 for (1)
negligence, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3) breach of the
implied warranty of habitability, (4) tortious breach of same, (5) private
nuisance, (6) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, (7) violation of Civil
Code section 1942.4, (8) unfair business practices, and (9) premises liability.
As alleged in the complaint, Defendants own or manage
a residential rental property located at 6325 8th Ave., Los Angeles 90043 (“the
Property”). Plaintiffs have rented Apartment 5 on the Property (“the Unit”)
since September 23, 2020. At all times during Plaintiffs’ tenancy, their Unit
has suffered from vermin infestation, dampness, moisture, and mold, defective
plumbing, defective smoke detectors, unsealed windows, and crumbling walls,
floors, etc. Plaintiffs complained to Defendants’ agents, but Defendants
refused to correct the poor conditions.
Defendants filed a demurrer to the second cause of
action as to all Plaintiffs and to the third, fourth, and sixth causes of
action to Plaintiff Elijah Massey. Defendants also move to strike the punitive
damages allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer and motion
to strike.
LEGAL STANDARD
Demurrer
Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the
defect by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257,
262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young
v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.)
When considering a demurrer, a court reads the
allegations stated in the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and
“treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but
not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Serrano v.
Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Put differently: for purposes of
demurrer, the court treats all facts alleged – but only the facts alleged
– in the complaint as true. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School District
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the
complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of
action.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
/ / /
Motion
to Strike
“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section
435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in
its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Id. § 436 (a).)
Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the
claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim.
(Id., § 431.10.) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any
pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court
rule, or an order of the court.” (Id. § 436 (b).) Motions to strike are
used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by
demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See Code Civ. Proc.
§§ 435, 436, and 437.)
MEETING & CONFERENCE
Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.41 and 435.5
require a party demurring or moving to strike to meet and confer before filing.
Defendants’ counsel submitted a declaration establishing the sections are satisfied.
(Day Decl., ¶ 4.)
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
ANALYSIS
Demurrer
Defendants demur to four causes of action on two
grounds.
First, Defendants demur the second cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, as alleged by all plaintiffs,
arguing Plaintiffs fail to allege extreme or outrageous conduct.
Second, as to the third, fourth, and sixth causes of
action, as to plaintiff Massey only, Plaintiffs argue Massey, a minor, was not
a party to the lease contract and cannot state claims based on that contract.
1. Second Cause of Action
for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To prevail on a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead and prove
(1) defendant’s outrageous conduct; (2) defendant’s intent to cause distress or
reckless disregard for its likelihood; (3) plaintiff’s severe or extreme
emotional distress; and (4) causation. (See Huntingdon
Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.)
“ ‘Conduct, to be “ ‘outrageous’ ” must be so
extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized
society.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Similarly, “[s]evere emotional distress means ‘ “emotional
distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable
[person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” ’ ” (Hughes
v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.)
The facts in Plaintiffs’
complaint do not describe conduct that exceeds all bounds of what might
ordinarily be tolerated. In fact, the sorts of wrongs Plaintiffs allege are
(regrettably) relatively commonplace. A tenant may recover against her
landlord for intentional infliction of emotional distress in extreme cases,
such as direct threats of violence against tenants (Newby v. Alto Riviera
Apartments (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 288) or knowing permission for severe
habitability problems to persist across many buildings and units (McNairy v.
C.K. Realty (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504). But the facts alleged in
Plaintiffs’ complaint do not rise to such an outrageous level.
Defendant’s demurrer to
the second cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.
2.
Third, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action for Breaches of Warranty and Covenant
Defendants also argue Elijah David Massey, a minor,
cannot state claims based on Defendants’ lease agreement with his parents.
Defendants rely on Family Code section 6701, which
states in pertinent part: “A minor cannot ... (b) Make a contract relating to
real property or any interest therein.”
Plaintiffs argue (1) the Family Code permits a minor
to contract for necessaries, like housing; (2) Massey’s parents have the
capacity to contract on his behalf; and/or (3) Massey is a third-party
beneficiary to the parties’ lease.
Plaintiffs’ arguments are unpersuasive.
Plaintiffs cite Family Code section 6712, permitting a
minor to contract for necessaries. They argue that because a contract for
necessaries can’t be disaffirmed – and, Plaintiffs imply, the parties’ lease is
a contract for necessaries – Massey can still enforce it.
But section 6712 only applies to contracts “otherwise
valid”. (Fam. Code, § 6712.) Section 6701, cited by Defendants, makes a minor’s
contract for a possessory interest in real property invalid. (Fam. Code, §
6701; see also Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 502, 514
[citing same].) Section 6712 does not save the contract, because it is not
otherwise valid.
Plaintiffs otherwise appeal to the purpose of the
relevant Family Code provisions. But a court does not delve into the purpose
and intent of a statute unless its terms are unclear. (See
Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Lopez (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1396-1397
[“begin with plain language”].)
The terms of sections 6701 and 6712 are clear, and
they do not permit Massey to sign a rental agreement with Defendants.
Second, although Massey’s parents may have the
capacity to contract on Massey’s behalf, the complaint contains no indication
that they did so. The FAC repeatedly states “Plaintiffs” entered into the
parties’ lease. Without clarification, that amounts to an allegation that
Massey, a minor, contracted directly with Defendants. As discussed above, such
a contract would be unenforceable.
For similar reasons, Plaintiffs’ complaint does not
allege Massey was a third-party beneficiary of the contract. It alleges he was
a party to the contract directly. Based on that allegation, he cannot state the
three claims in question.
The demurrer is sustained. The Court permits
Plaintiffs leave to amend to clarify Massey’s rights on the contract, if any.
Motion
to Strike
The demurrer having been sustained with leave to
amend, the motion to strike is denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ demurrer is sustained in its entirety,
with thirty days’ leave to amend.
Defendants’ motion to strike is denied as moot.