Judge Alison Mackenzie, Case Number: 24STCV05088, Date: 2024-10-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 24STCV05088, Date: 2024-10-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV05088 Hearing Date: October 18, 2024 Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sydney Eilbacher brings this action against Defendants Spex Sea Bird Ltd. and Lindbald Expeditions, LLC (“Defendants”), alleging violations of the Jones Act and general maritime law.

The motion now before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

LEGAL STANDARD

“In California, the procedure for enforcing a forum selection clause is a motion to stay or dismiss for forum non conveniens pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 410.30 and 418.10.” Berg v. MTC Electronics Technologies (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 349, 358 (Berg).) “[A] motion based on a forum selection clause is a special type of forum non conveniens motion. The factors that apply generally to a forum non conveniens motion do not control in a case involving a mandatory forum selection clause.” Ibid.

On a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens pursuant to a mandatory forum selection clause, the only issues for the court's consideration are (1) whether the forum selection clause is indeed mandatory, as opposed to permissive; (2) whether the forum selection clause covers the claims in the case; and (3) whether the forum selection clause is “unreasonable.” Id. at pp. 358-359.)

Regarding reasonableness, “[m]ere inconvenience or additional expense is not the test.” Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 491, 496. Instead, a forum selection clause is unreasonable if “the forum selected would be unavailable or unable to accomplish substantial justice.” CQL Original Products, Inc. v. National Hockey League Players' Assn. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1354. In making this determination, the choice of forum “must have some rational basis in light of the facts underlying the transaction.” Ibid.

Under federal law, “When parties have contracted in advance to litigate disputes in a particular forum, courts should not unnecessarily disrupt the parties’ settled expectations…. In all but the most unusual cases, therefore, ‘the interest of justice’ is served by holding parties to their bargain.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court (2013) 571 U.S. 49, 66. (Atl. Marine).

ANALYSIS

It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s employment agreement with Defendants includes a forum selection clause stating, “The exclusive venue for any disagreement relating to your employment or this Agreement shall be in the federal or state courts in King County, Washington. This Agreement and the employment relationship shall be interpreted and enforced according to the general and statutory Maritime Law of the United States as interpreted in the Western District of Washington which shall not be supplemented by state or local law.” Declaration of Bille McCaslin, Ex. A.

Applicable law

As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether the forum selection clause's enforceability is governed by state or federal law.

“State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in Jones Act, … and general maritime law cases. State courts apply federal substantive law in deciding such cases.” Gault v. Modern Continental/Roadway Constr. Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 991, 997.

“Article III of the United States Constitution gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over all admiralty and maritime matters, but 28 United States Code section 1333(1) grants state courts concurrent jurisdiction under the so-called ‘saving to suitors clause.’ This clause provides for in personam remedies which ‘means that an injured party may have claims arising from a single accident under both federal maritime and state common or statutory law. State remedies under the savings to suitors clause may be pursued in state court or, if there is a basis for federal jurisdiction, in federal court. A maritime claim brought in the common law state courts is governed by federal maritime law, however.’ This is sometimes referred to as the reverse-Erie doctrine.” Price v. Connolly-Pacific Co. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1213-1214 (quoting Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 563.

Federal law governs the enforceability of a forum-selection clause in cases at admiralty. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute (1991) 499 U.S. 585, 590.

“The Erie doctrine (Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U.S. 64) requires that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction over a state law claim must apply state substantive law in resolving a dispute. However, the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called reverse-Erie doctrine which requires that substantive remedies afforded by the states conform to governing federal maritime standards.” Id. at 1214, fn. 1. (citing Hutchins v. Juneau Tanker Corp. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 493, 499.)

The Court finds persuasive the reasoning of the Erie analysis in Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc. (9th Cir. 1988) 858 F.2d 509, 513, which held “the federal procedural issues raised by forum selection clauses significantly outweigh the state interests, and the federal rule … controls enforcement of forum clauses in diversity cases.” This decision is further supported by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions clarifying the strong federal preference for enforcing forum selection clauses, which increases the risk of forum shopping. See, e.g., Atl. Marine, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 66.

Jones Act

Plaintiff argues that the forum selection clause is unenforceable because the Jones Act incorporates the special venue provision of the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA), which preempts contractual forum selection clauses.

The Jones Act provides “a seaman injured in the course of employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal representative of the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section.” Courts interpreting FELA, which governs “recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee” have held it prohibits forum selection clauses in employment contracts between railway workers and their employers. See Boyd v. Grand T. W. R. Co., (1949) 338 U.S. 263, 266. This interpretation is based on section five of FELA, which provides that “[a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by [FELA], shall to that extent be void . . .” and section six, a venue provision, provides that “an action may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action.” 45 U.S.C. §§ 55, 56.

While the Jones Act incorporates some FELA provisions, the Supreme Court cautions “[the] “provision providing that a seaman should have the same right of action as would a railroad employee does not mean that the very words of the FELA must be lifted bodily from their context and applied mechanically to the specific facts of maritime events.” Cox v. Roth (1955) 348 U.S. 207, 209. Though there is no binding authority on this issue, the overwhelming consensus among federal district courts is that the Jones Act does not incorporate the FELA venue provision. See, e.g., Matthews v. Tidewater Crewing, Ltd. (E.D.La. Apr. 25, 2023, No. 21-1530) 2023 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 238526, at *9; Brister v. ACBL River Operations LLC (E.D.La. Feb. 7, 2018, No. 17-6035) 2018 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 19719.; Riley v. Trident Seafoods Corp. (D.Minn. Jan. 9, 2012, No. 11-2500 (MJD/AJB)) 2012 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 9002.; Utoafili v. Trident Seafoods Corp. (N.D.Cal. Oct. 19, 2009, No. 09-2575 SC) 2009 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 127109. Moreover, Plaintiff cites no case holding that the Jones Act incorporates FELA’s special venue provision.

Before 2008, the Jones Act had its own venue provision. However, in January 2008, Congress deleted the venue provision from the Jones Act. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 110 P.L. 181, § 3521, 122 Stat. 3, 596 (2008) (“2008 Amendment”). Plaintiff argues that by deleting the Jones Act venue provision, Congress intended to incorporate the FELA venue provision and related case law. However, the Court finds persuasive the discussion of legislative history in Utoafili, which explains that the deletion was simply a codification of existing case law not intended to make any substantive change. Utoafili v. Trident Seafoods Corp. (N.D.Cal. Oct. 19, 2009, No. 09-2575 SC) 2009 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 127109, at *15; see also H. Rept. 110-437 - UPDATE AND IMPROVE THE CODIFICATION OF TITLE 46, UNITED STATES CODE (House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary report explaining the intent of the 2008 amendment). Considering this legislative history, the Court agrees with the federal district court consensus that the FELA’s venue provisions do not apply to Jones Act cases.

The Court finds that a mandatory forum selection clause governs these claims. Because Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that this is a “most unusual case[]” warranting departure from the strong federal policy of enforcing forum selection clauses, the motion to dismiss is granted. Atl. Marine, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 66.

Moreover, the Court would reach the same conclusion applying California’s law on forum selection clause enforceability because there is no evidence that the clause is unreasonable or that the selected forum is unavailable. On the contrary, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff filed a parallel complaint in the Superior Court of the State of Washington for the County of King. Declaration of Nathan J. Beard, Ex. G.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted.