Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 24STCV07438, Date: 2024-10-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV07438 Hearing Date: October 17, 2024 Dept: 55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on The Claremont Colleges, Inc.’s Motion to Strike (not anti-SLAPP) – without Demurrer.
Defendants'
Motion to Strike is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Carmen Gonzalez
brought this action against defendants The
Claremont Colleges, Inc., Claremont Mckenna College, Claremont Mckenna College
Holdings, LLC, Allied Universal Security Services Universal Protection Service
LPP, Dakota Chimeng Yang, and doe defendants 1 to 50, alleging that
Yang is responsible for an automobile collision with Plaintiff.
The causes of action are:
(1) Motor Vehicle Negligence, Negligent Entrustment,
Negligent Hiring, Negligent Undertaking, Negligent Retention, Negligent
Supervision, and Negligent Training; and
(2) Negligence Per Se.
The motion now before the Court is The Claremont Colleges, Inc., Claremont Mckenna College, and Claremont
Mackenna Holdings, LLC’s (Defendants) Motion
to Strike. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Defendants filed a reply.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendants’ request that the Court take judicial notice of
the operative Complaint is granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its
discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading. Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).
The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.
Id., § 436 subd. (b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the
pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed
in conformity with laws. Id. § 436. The grounds for moving to strike
must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. Id.
§ 437.
Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable
possibility of successful amendment. Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 761, 768 (“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is
capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”). The burden is on the
complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.
ANALYSIS
Defendants move to strike from the Complaint Plaintiff’s
request for punitive damages.
To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a
complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage
statute, Civil Code Section 3294. College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721. These statutory elements include allegations that
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. Civ. Code §
3294, subd. (a). “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to
cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the
defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others.” Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(1).
“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of
punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must
be pled by a plaintiff. In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion
to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike
as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. In ruling on a
motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” Clauson v.
Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255. (citations omitted). “The
mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant
an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of
oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to
support such a claim.” Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d
159, 166 (fn. omitted) (citations omitted). Punitive damages may be assessed
against an employer where the employer authorized or ratified a malicious act. College
Hospital Inc., supra,8 Cal.4th at. p 723.
For nonintentional torts, punitive damages may be assessed “when
the conduct constitutes conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”
Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 158; “[A] conscious
disregard of the safety of others may [thus] constitute malice within the
meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. To justify an award of punitive
damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was
aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully
and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.’” Hasson v. Ford Motor
Co., supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 402, (quoting Taylor v. Superior Court
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896 (Taylor). To establish malice, “it is not
sufficient to show only that the defendant’s conduct was negligent, grossly
negligent or even reckless.” Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor
Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.
When the defendant is a corporation, “the oppression, fraud,
or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer,
director, or managing agent of the corporation.” Wilson v. Southern
California Edison Company (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164; see Civ.
Code § 3294(b). Managing agents are “corporate employees who exercise
substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate
[decision-making] so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate
policy.” White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 566-67.
The act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may
constitute an act of malice if performed under circumstances that disclose a
conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences. See Taylor,
supra, 24 Cal. 3d at p. 895-896; Sumpter v. Matteson (2008) 158
Cal.App.4th 928, 936 (Sumpter). In Sumpter, the court concluded
that punitive damages were permissible but not required, where the defendant ingested
drugs right before leaving the house, drove a vehicle at excessive speed, and entered
the intersection despite knowing the light was red. Sumpter, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th
at p. 936.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Yang knowingly chose to drive
while under the influence of drugs and alcohol, knowing that oncoming traffic
had the right of way, made a left turn against either a solid green light or a
red light, and failed to yield to Plaintiff. Complaint at ¶¶ 15, 16. As in Sumpter,
these facts are sufficient for a jury to permissibly find that Yang consciously
disregarded the probable dangerous consequences of his actions.
However, whether Plaintiff may recover punitive damages from
Yang is not the issue here. To properly plead punitive damages against
Defendants, Plaintiff’s Complaint must meet the punitive damage requirements
for a corporate employer.
To properly plead punitive damages against Defendants,
Plaintiff must allege that an officer, director, or managing agent of the
corporation had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed
him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or
authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct or was personally guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice. See Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Yang's actions
“were authorized, ordered, and directed by the respective Defendants corporate
or business employers, officers, directors and/or managing agents,” that they
“had advance knowledge of, authorized, and participated in [them]” and
“ratified…condoned and approved [them].”
Complaint at ¶ 5.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts
meeting the requirements for punitive damages of a corporate employer because
the Complaint contains only conclusory allegations that defendants collectively
engaged in misconduct and does not identify a specific officer, director, or
managing agent of the Claremont College who allegedly authorized or ratified
Yang’s conduct.
The Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations are
sufficiently pleaded to support an award of punitive damages against
Defendants. First, while Defendants refer to these allegations as conclusory, “[t]he
distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate facts is not at all clear
and involves at most a matter of degree.” Burks v. Poppy Const. Co.
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 463, 473. Second, Plaintiff’s use of the word “respective”
makes clear that she alleges that each entity defendant engaged in such authorization
and ratification, including Claremont College. See Complaint at ¶
5. Finally, Defendant fails to provide
any authority for the proposition that, at the pleading stage, Plaintiff must
specifically name which corporate officer, director, or managing agent authorized
or ratified the malicious conduct.
If, as alleged, Defendants’ corporate officer, director, or
managing agent authorized or ratified Yang’s decision to knowingly operate a
vehicle under the influence and make a left turn under a solid green or red
light, a jury may permissibly find them liable for punitive damages. Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion to strike is denied.
CONCLUSION
The Defendants' Motion to Strike is denied.