Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 24STCV08159, Date: 2025-01-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV08159    Hearing Date: January 17, 2025    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

 

Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is granted in the reduced amount of $41,107.93.

 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Abdul Kader Chowdhury Prince filed this Song Beverly action against BMW of North America, LLC (BMW), Finchey Corporation of California, and Bob Smith VC Calabassas LLC (Defendants). The parties agreed to a settlement.

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Attorney Fees requesting fees, costs, and expenses totaling $138,688.43. Defendant BMW filed an Opposition.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs as a matter of right. Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subds. (a)(4), (b). Attorney’s fees are also recoverable as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10). The moving party bears the burden of establishing entitlement to attorney fees. Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.

Courts begin this inquiry “with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) From there, the “lodestar figure may then be adjusted [according to a multiplier enhancement] based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” Ibid. Relevant multiplier factors include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.

The Court has broad discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award, which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-1394.

 

ANALYSIS

I. Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff requests $61,740.00 in attorney’s fees. Mot. at p. 2.

Under Civ. Code § 1794(d), "[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under [the Song-Beverly Act], the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action."

In the present case, there is no dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action and is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. Thus, the only question to be determined by this motion is the award amount.

 

Plaintiff’s requested attorney fees break down as follows:

Eli Banayan: 71.9 hours at $600 per hour for a total of $42,960.00

Koorosh Banayan: 5 hours at $900 per hour for a total of $4500.00

Yasha Ahoubim: 17.1 hours at $500 per hour for a total of $8,550.00

Aaron Cohen: 9.4 hours at $500 per hour for a total of $4,700.00

Lodestar: $60,890.00[1]

Lodestar Multiplier Requested: $73,068.00[2]

 

1. Reasonableness of Hourly rates

Based on the Court's knowledge of the local legal market and the low degree of difficulty in this case, the hourly rates requested are not reasonable. Therefore, the Court will award attorney’s fees at the reduced rate of $550 per hour for Koorosh Banayan, $400 per hour for Eli Banayan, and $375 for Yasha Ahoubim and Aaron Cohen.

 

2. Reasonableness of Hours Billed

Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s counsel’s requested fee, arguing that the record does not support that the reported hours were actually or reasonably billed.

A prevailing party's verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682. “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 240 Cal.App.4th 459, 488 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court agrees that some of the contested hours are excessive for this routine lemon law case and reduces the hours as follows.

·         3.2 hours Eli Banayan billed to prepare a templated complaint reduced to 0.5 hours.

·         Eli Banayan billed a combined 6 hours preparing discovery sets one and two. Because these initial discovery requests are substantially the same in every lemon law case, the Court reduces time on these tasks to 3 hours.

·         Eli Banayan billed 2.8 hours drafting a meet and confer letter. As this is a straightforward document prepared in every case of this type, the Court reduces the hours billed to 1.0.

Additionally, the Court reduces the requested $2,000 for drafting the motion and reply and attending the hearing to $1,800.

Accordingly, the Court awards attorney’s fees in the amount of $40,247.50, which breaks down as follows:

Eli Banayan: 64.4 hours at $400 per hour for a total of $25,760.00

Koorosh Banayan: 5 hours at $550 per hour for a total of $2,750.00

Yasha Ahoubim: 17.1 hours at $375 per hour for a total of $6,412.50

Aaron Cohen: 9.4 hours at $375 per hour for a total of $3,525.00

$1,800 for preparing the fee motion and reply and attending the hearing

 

3. Lodestar Multiplier

“[T]he lodestar-multiplier method, calculates the fee ‘by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate. Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative “multiplier” to take into account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.” Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 489 (internal quotation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff misstates how courts perform lodestar multiplier calculations. As Plaintiff describes it in his motion, the lodestar is calculated by multiplying hours worked times rate charged, that lodestar is multiplied by the multiplier, and then the product is added to the original lodestar. Mot. at p. 2:7-11. This is incorrect. When a court exercises its discretion to apply a multiplier, the baseline lodestar is multiplied by the multiplier, yielding the final attorney fee award. See e.g., Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 31 (“[The plaintiff] filed a motion for attorney fees, seeking $351,055.26 in lodestar fees (the number of attorney hours worked times the attorneys' hourly rates), plus a lodestar multiplier of 1.5, or an additional $175,527.63, for total requested fees of $526,582.89.”). Because of this confusion, Plaintiff mistakenly states he is requesting a multiplier of 1.2 when, in fact, he is requesting a multiplier of 2.2. In this case, the Court declines to award a modifier, as this is a straightforward lemon law case, and its contingent nature is already factored into the hourly rate.

II. Costs

Plaintiff requests $860.43 in costs and expenses. Defendant does not contest these costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court awards full costs and expenses.

 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is granted in the reduced amount of $41,107.93.



[1] Plaintiff calculates a lodestar of $61,740.00. However, by the Court’s count, Ahoubim and Cohen billed a combined 26.5 hours, not 28.2 as calculated by Plaintiff. Mot. at p. 5:15. Additionally, Eli Banayan billed 71.9 hours, not 71.6, as stated in Plaintiff’s motion. Mot. at p. These two errors explain the $850 discrepancy between Plaintiff’s billing records and motion.

 

[2] Adjusted from the $74,088.00 requested in the motion. See fn. 1.