Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 24STCV13832, Date: 2024-12-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV13832    Hearing Date: December 19, 2024    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Uber's Motion to Quash Service of Summons

Uber's Motion to Quash Service of Summons is granted.  

BACKGROUND

On June 3, 2024, Plaintiff Morgan Rose filed this action against Sarah Gonzalez and Doe defendants 1 to 50, alleging a single cause of action for negligence related to personal injuries he suffered in a motor vehicle accident on June 1, 2022.

On October 18, 2024, Plaintiff amended the Complaint, substituting Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) as the true name of Doe 1.

Uber filed a Motion to Quash Service of Summons. The plaintiff opposes the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Section 474 allows a plaintiff who is ignorant of a defendant's identity to commence suit—before the statute of limitations runs—by using a fictitious name for that defendant and then amending her complaint when the defendant's true name is discovered.” Hahn v. New York Air Brake LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 895, 897-898 (Hahn). “If the statute's requirements are satisfied, the amendment relates back and the substituted defendant is considered to have been a party from the action's start.” Id. at p. 898.

“Improper service of a defendant under section 474 may be attacked by a motion to quash. ‘If the terms of … section 474 have not been complied with, the purported defendant has not been named as such in the complaint. A service upon one not named in a complaint does not confer jurisdiction to proceed upon the complaint against him, and a motion to quash is proper.’” McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 375 (quoting Maier Brewing Co. v. Flora Crane Service, Inc. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 873, 875). Such a motion is not limited to the facts alleged in the complaint, and may include evidence showing that the plaintiff knew the defendant’s identity when they filed the complaint. See id. at p. 373 (noting defendant presented evidence in support of its motion to quash, showing plaintiff was not ignorant of the facts on which his claims against defendant were based when he filed his initial petition).

“The phrase ‘when the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant’ in Code of Civil Procedure section 474 has not been interpreted literally. The plaintiff is deemed ‘ignorant of the name’ if he knew the identity of the person but was ignorant of facts giving him a cause of action against the person, or knew the name and all the facts but was unaware that the law gave him a cause of action against the fictitiously named defendant and discovered that right by reason of decisions rendered after commencement of the action.” Barnes v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 199, 205 (citations omitted).

“The test is whether, at the time the complaint was filed, the plaintiff ‘was ignorant of the facts giving [her] a cause of action against the person.’ The focus is on the facts that the plaintiff knew, not on whether the plaintiff subjectively knew she had a cause of action based on those facts. While the plaintiff's ignorance must be genuine, and the plaintiff cannot claim ignorance simply because she did not know all the details of the person's involvement, the plaintiff is not barred from invoking section 474 merely because she suspected the person of wrongdoing based on an incomplete set of facts.” Hahn, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 899-900 (quoting Marasco v. Wadsworth (1978) 21 Cal.3d 82, 88) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

Uber argues that the applicable statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s cause of action and does not relate back because Plaintiff was aware of Uber’s identity when he filed the Complaint.

The statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1. Because Plaintiff amended the Complaint, naming Uber more than two years after the injury, his claim is barred unless it relates back to the initial Complaint.

In Larson v. Barnett (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 282 (Larson), the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and sued the named driver and the unknown vehicle owner as a Doe defendant. The court held that the Doe amendment related back because while plaintiffs “at all times knew [the Doe defendant’s] true name … [they] did not know [he] was the owner of the car involved at the time of the accident.” Larson 101 Cal.App.2d at p. 288.

Here, Uber argues, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Plaintiff knew Uber’s identity when the accident occurred insofar as he knew that he arranged the ride-share using the Uber app. Mot. at p. 5:6-12; Pare Decl., Ex. B; Opp. at p. 3:15-16. Instead, Plaintiff argues that he did not learn the facts giving rise to Uber’s liability until after he filed the Complaint. Opp. at p. 3. 17-19. Specifically, he argues, “[t]he defendant driver, Sarah Gonzalez refused to provide her drivers license at the scene of the accident and only provided her name. After much investigation, the vehicle owner’s information was attained, and Defendant was served.” Opp. at p. 3:21-24.

In the Court’s reading, the implication is that Plaintiff obtained information that Uber is the owner of the vehicle, or that Uber’s liability is otherwise derivative of the owner’s liability, as opposed to that of the driver. However, implication alone is not sufficient. Unlike in Larson, Plaintiff offers no evidence that Uber owned the vehicle. See Larson, supra, 101 Cal.App.2d at pp. 284-288. In the absence of any evidence that Uber’s liability arises from the subsequently discovered ownership of the vehicle, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of section 474. Accordingly, the motion to quash is granted with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

Uber's Motion to Quash Service of Summons is granted with prejudice.