Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 24STCV13929, Date: 2024-09-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV13929    Hearing Date: September 4, 2024    Dept: 55

Tentative for Art Colony Property, LLC vs. Christina Romero, et al.

24STCV13929

Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Background

Plaintiff Art Colony Property, LLC filed an unlawful detainer case against Christina Romero and Michael Callas, seeking to recover possession of the property located at 2349 S. Santa Fe Avenue, Unit E in Los Angeles (the “Property”). Plaintiff alleges that it had Defendants served, via posting and mailing, a Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit (“Notice”) demanding $43,800 in unpaid rent for the months of June 2023 through May 2024.

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings based on an allegedly defective notice. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Legal Standard

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings where “[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.”  (CCP § 438(c)(1)(B)(ii).) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.]”  (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.)  “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.”  (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (Citations Omitted).)  The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321–322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)  

Analysis

Defendants’ only argument in the MJOP is that the Notice is defective because it precludes the tenant from paying by mail.

CCP § 1161(2) provides that a tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer:

When he or she continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, without the permission of his or her landlord, or the successor in estate of his or her landlord, if applicable, after default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the lease or agreement under which the property is held, and three days' notice, excluding Saturdays and Sundays and other judicial holidays, in writing, requiring its payment, stating the amount which is due, the name, telephone number, and address of the person to whom the rent payment shall be made, and, if payment may be made personally, the usual days and hours that person will be available to receive the payment (provided that, if the address does not allow for personal delivery, then it shall be conclusively presumed that upon the mailing of any rent or notice to the owner by the tenant to the name and address provided, the notice or rent is deemed received by the owner on the date posted, if the tenant can show proof of mailing to the name and address provided by the owner), or the number of an account in a financial institution into which the rental payment may be made, and the name and street address of the institution (provided that the institution is located within five miles of the rental property), or if an electronic funds transfer procedure has been previously established, that payment may be made pursuant to that procedure, or possession of the property, shall have been served upon him or her and if there is a subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, also upon the subtenant.

The notice may be served at any time within one year after the rent becomes due…

“Due to the summary nature of such an action, a [notice to pay rent or quit] is valid only if the landlord strictly complies with the provisions of section 1161, subdivision 2.” (Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip Communications, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1038.)

Here the Notice states the amount due, the name, phone number, and address for an in-person payment to be made: 2901 E. Olympic Boulevard; Los Angeles, CA 90023. The Notice states that in-person payments can be made during specified days and hours at the 2901 E. Olympic Boulevard address. The Notice also states that there is a 24-hour rent dropbox available at 2401 South Santa Fe Avenue in Los Angeles.  

Defendants argue that because the Notice lists the E. Olympic Boulevard address as a place for in-person payments, it is defective because it does not separately state that rental payments may be mailed to that address and the 24-hour dropbox lists yet another address. “Under the clear language of the statute, the decision to allow personal payment of the rent, in addition to allowing payment by mail by the tenant, is up to the landlord.” (Hsieh v. Pederson (2018) 23 Cal. App. 5th Supp. 1, 6.) The inclusion of the hours and days that in-person payments can be made at the E. Olympic Boulevard address does not preclude payment by mail to that address. The notice contains a street address and there is no language in the Notice requiring in-person payments rather than mail, and thus no basis to conclude that the Notice required in-person payments. The Notice therefore complies with Section 1161(2).

Conclusion

The MJOP is denied.