Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 24STCV22527, Date: 2025-05-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV22527    Hearing Date: May 8, 2025    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike

Defendant’s anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Shawn Parker and Maisha Parker (Plaintiffs) filed this action against Unite Here Local 11 (Defendant), alleging that Defendant’s members’ conduct while picketing the Maya Hotel disrupted Plaintiffs’ wedding.

The causes of action are: (1) Negligence; (2) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Tortious Interference With Contractual Relations; and (4) Intrusion Into Private Affairs.

Defendant filed a Special Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Court rules on Defendant’s evidentiary objections as follows

1.     Declaration of Keith Tate at p. 2 ¶ 1. Sustained. Lacks foundation/personal knowledge. See Evid. Code, §§ 403, 702.

2.     Declaration of Keith Tate at p. 2 ¶ 3. Sustained. Lacks foundation/personal knowledge. See Evid. Code, §§ 403, 702.

3.     Declaration of Karen Clopton. Sustained. Irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. See Evid. Code §§ 210, 352.

LEGAL STANDARD

“If a defendant brings a special motion under the anti-SLAPP statute [CCP § 425.16] to strike a cause of action, the trial court evaluates that motion using a two-step process: The first examines the nature of the conduct that underlies the plaintiff’s allegations to determine whether the conduct is protected by section 425.16; the second assesses the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.” Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 759 (citation omitted).

“The defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. A ‘claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.’ To determine whether a claim arises from protected activity, courts must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’ Courts then must evaluate whether the defendant has shown any of these actions fall within one or more of the four categories of ‘act[s]’ protected by the anti-SLAPP statute” Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 (citations omitted).

“In the first step of the analysis, the trial court determines whether the cause of action ‘arises from’ an ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue.’ The first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis ‘turns on two subsidiary questions: (1) What conduct does the challenged cause of action “arise[] from”; and (2) is that conduct “protected activity” under the anti-SLAPP statute?’” Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th. at p.760 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether a defendant sustained its initial burden of proof, the court relies on the pleadings and declarations or affidavits.” Brill Media Co., LLC v. TCW Group, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 324, 329 (disapproved on other grounds by Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 C4th 12, 25, fn. 3).

“The Supreme Court has clarified that ‘arising from’ means ‘based on.’ This element of the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis is sometimes referred to as the ‘nexus’ requirement. Conduct constitutes ‘protected activity,’ if it falls within one of the categories set out in section 425.16, subdivision (e). Section 425.16, subdivision (e), in turn, applies to (1) ‘any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law’; (2) ‘in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law’; (3) ‘in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest’; or (4) ‘any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.’ The defendant bringing the anti-SLAPP motion to strike must make a prima facie showing that the allegations that form the basis of the plaintiff’s claims arise from conduct that falls under one of these  categories.” Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th. at p.760 (citations omitted).

“If the defendant prevails in this step of the analysis, the trial court must then assess the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. The Supreme Court has described this second step of the SLAPP analysis as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ The plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating that its claim has ‘at least ‘minimal merit.’’ If the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that his or her claim has at least minimal merit, then the trial court should deem the cause of action a SLAPP and should strike it.” Ibid (citations omitted).

At this “second stage of an anti-SLAPP hearing, the court may consider affidavits, declarations, and their equivalents if it is reasonably possible the proffered evidence set out in those statements will be admissible at trial. Conversely, if the evidence relied upon cannot be admitted at trial, because it is categorically barred or undisputed factual circumstances show inadmissibility, the court may not consider it in the face of an objection. If an evidentiary objection is made, the plaintiff may attempt to cure the asserted defect or demonstrate the defect is curable.” Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 949.

The trial court properly considers the evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant, but it may not weigh the credibility or comparative strength of the evidence and must instead simply determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence would, if believed by the trier of fact, be sufficient to result in a judgment for plaintiff. McGarry v. Univ. of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 108-09. The court “accept[s] as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluate[s] the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.’” Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 326 (citations omitted). Further, whether or not the evidence is in conflict, in the context of a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, if the plaintiff has presented a sufficient pleading and has presented evidence showing that a prima facie case will be established at trial, the plaintiff is entitled to proceed. Moore v. Shaw (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 193. Only a minimal showing of merit is required. Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1421.

ANALYSIS

I. Protected Activity

A. Alleged Conduct

Defendant argues that each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action arose from Defendant’s protected act of picketing.

“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062. “[In] ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” Id. at p. 1063.

“[M]ixed claims, which are based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, are subject to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis because a plaintiff cannot shield ‘particular allegations of protected activity, themselves sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief, from a motion to strike by intermingling them with unprotected acts.’” Golden Gate Land Holdings, LLC v. Direct Action Everywhere (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 82, 92 (Golden Gate) (quoting Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010).

“[A]lthough acts of violence or acts amounting to physical intimidation will be enjoined, peaceful picketing is constitutionally protected as an incident of free speech.” United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 566, 574.

Plaintiffs allege that “a wedding guest at the subject premises offered Defendant Unite Union food while the wedding was happening in order prevent the protestors from bothering and disrupting the Parker’s wedding.” Compl. ¶ 16. They further allege that “up until one hour prior to the wedding, the Maya Hotel Manager and Event Coordinator asked the Unite Union strikers to desist and decrease noise to prevent disturbing the pending Parker wedding.” Compl. ¶ 16. “The nonsensical protestors refused and stated that ‘we will go over to the wedding and shut it down.’” Compl. ¶ 18. “In the hours immediately preceding the wedding … a small group of Defendant Unite Union protestors purposefully began to gather near the wedding area, attempting to walk-thru the ceremony from several different access points.” Compl. ¶ 20. “Defendant Unite Union protestors gathered at the fence and began beating drums and making noise to delay and disrupt the sacred wedding service.” Compl. ¶ 21. “Defendant United Union spewed disrespectful words and statements to guests including, ‘fuck your wedding’ and soon after the United Union members began to push down the fence.” Compl. ¶ 21.

These allegations encompass both protected activity, namely, picketing at the wedding, and unprotected activity, specifically attempting to push down the fence. Therefore, whether Plaintiffs’ claims arise from protected activity must be individually analyzed.

1. Negligence

To state a claim for negligence, plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of a legal duty of care, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) proximate cause resulting in an injury. McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant breached its duty of care when “b. [Defendant] recklessly made state[ment] to take down the wedding as well as aggressively pushing down a gate to enter a private wedding within the subject premises and [¶] c. [Defendant] was careless and reckless with the intent to portray as victims despite being told to retract from a private event thus Defendant Unite Union is liable for the disturbing actions while after the atrocious actions Defendant Unite Union attempted to self-victimize from its own unscrupulous actions which ultimately causing severe damages to Mr. and Mrs. Parker within its subject premises.” Compl. 34.

Each of these claims includes some protected activity. First, Defendant’s alleged statement that it will “shut it down” is presumptively protected speech, absent a showing of illegality. While pushing down a gate is not a protected activity, because it is mixed with allegations of protected activity, the mixed claim is subject to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. See Golden Gate 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 92. Second, Defendant’s alleged “intent to portray as victims despite being told to retract from a private event” refers to Defendant’s protected right to protest, and to refuse to leave simply because it was asked to. Therefore, the negligence cause of action arose from protected activity.

2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Plaintiffs incorporate the negligence claims by reference and allege they experienced mental distress and monetary damages as a result of Defendant’s “negligent conduct.” Compl. ¶¶ 45, 49. Therefore, for the same reasons given above, Plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claim also arises from protected activity.

3. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations

“To prevail on a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of that contract; (3) the defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1148. “‘[T]he interference tort applies to interference with existing noncontractual relations which hold the promise of future economic advantage.’” Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. (2017) (Roy) 2 Cal.5th 505, 512 (quoting Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 507, 524).

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant induced a breach or disruption of Plaintiffs’ contractual relationship with the Maya hotel by “plan[ing] a disruption.” Compl. ¶ 57. They further allege Defendant “made statements and actions that the protesters stating ‘we will go over to the wedding and shut it down;’ the protesters refused to take a break during the wedding and due to refusal, a gate was placed to divide between protesters and the wedding but again Defendant and protestors sought and did disrupt the wedding of hotel guests by pushing the gate during the setup….” Compl. ¶ 58. “Defendant … actually caused absolute disruption by instigating unwarranted interference and disturbance due to the reasonable separation for the wedding….” Compl. ¶ 59. “Defendant … definitely and improperly intruded upon a private wedding at the subject premises.” Compl. ¶ 60.

As with the negligence claims, Plaintiffs’ allegations of intentional interference with contractual relations mix Defendant’s protected protest activity with unprotected attempts to break down the gate. Therefore, these claims are likewise subject to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

 4. Intrusion Into Private Affairs

“[T]he action for intrusion has two elements: (1) intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 231. “To prove actionable intrusion, the plaintiff must show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff. The tort is proven only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data source.” Id. at p. 232.

Plaintiffs allege Defendant “definitely operated in a highly offensive manner after being told of the wedding and seeing the wedding being started at the subject premises.” Compl. ¶ 66. “Defendant … and its protesters decided to act waywardly and obstinately toward the Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ wedding which is simply demeaning, purely abhorrent, disrespectful, reckless, uncaring and abundantly outlandish.” Compl. 67. “Defendant … and its protesters’ acts of aggressively inciting violence and obstinance knowing there a private event is monstrous and shameful for any human being to do with the subject premises on said date.” Compl. ¶ 68.

Because Plaintiffs incorporated all prior factual allegations, the Court reads the allegation that Defendant “operated in a highly offensive manner” to include the earlier allegations of beating drums, making noise, and uttering disrespectful words or statements. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23, 62, 66. Those actions, while potentially offensive to Plaintiffs, are protected activity. Likewise, the allegation that Defendant acted “waywardly and obstinately” includes protected activity. Compl. 67. Finally, whether Defendant’s expressive conduct amounted to incitement goes to whether it is illegal.

B. Illegality

Plaintiffs do not dispute that labor picketing is generally protected but argue that the conduct challenged here exceeds constitutional bounds because it was unlawful. Opp. at p. 7:6-8. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s members and affiliates ignored requests to lower noise during a private ceremony, physically encroached on and disrupted a private wedding, incited violence by provoking guests, and engaged in reckless conduct resulting in a breach of the peace. Opp. at p. 7:12-16.

In support of their argument, Plaintiffs cite Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 320, which held “where a defendant brings a motion to strike under section 425.16 based on a claim that the plaintiff’s action arises from activity by the defendant in furtherance of the defendant’s exercise of protected speech or petition rights, but either the defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or petition activity was illegal as a matter of law, the defendant is precluded from using the anti-SLAPP statute to strike the plaintiff’s action.”

“[The California Supreme Court] made it clear in Flatley that conduct must be illegal as a matter of law to defeat a defendant’s showing of protected activity. The defendant must concede the point, or the evidence conclusively demonstrate it, for a claim of illegality to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion at the first step.” City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 424.

Defendant does not concede that the protest included any illegal activity, nor does the evidence conclusively determine any illegal activity. Therefore, whether Defendant exceeded the scope of constitutionally protected speech must be determined in the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. See Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 299, 317 (quoting Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1365) (“‘the defendant does not have to “establish its actions are constitutionally protected under the First Amendment as a matter of law. If this were so the second clause of subdivision (b) of section 425.16 would be superfluous because by definition the plaintiff could not prevail on its claim.”’”).

C. Public Issue

Next, the Court must determine if Defendant’s picketing activities constituted acts in connection with a public issue.

“As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes … (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).

“To determine the scope of section 425.16(e)(4)’s protection, [courts] first ‘ask what “public issue or … issue of public interest”‘ is implicated by the challenged activity. Second, [courts] look to the ‘functional relationship’ between the challenged activity and the ‘public conversation’ about that issue, and ask whether the activity ’“contribute[s]’” to public discussion of the issue.” Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1249 (quoting FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149). “FilmOn’s first step is satisfied so long as the challenged speech or conduct, considered in light of its context, may reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute. Only when an expressive activity, viewed in context, cannot reasonably be understood as implicating a public issue does an anti-SLAPP motion fail at FilmOn’s first step.” Id. at pp. 1253-1254.

Where “the same contextual considerations that [demonstrate] that the protest implicated public issues also [demonstrate] that the protest furthered public discussion of them … it may be more efficient to look to the whole context from which the conduct underlying the lawsuit arises, rather than attempting to parse which considerations fall under which of FilmOn’s two steps.” Id. at p. 1256.

Here, Defendant engaged in labor picketing adjacent to the Hotel’s outdoor event space on a public sidewalk that runs between the Hotel property and the Bay. Grimaldo Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8. Therefore, the picketing occurred in a public forum. See Prigmore v. City of Redding (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1335. (“[P]ublic sidewalks are … in the category of traditional public forums.”).

Defendant’s contracts with approximately sixty hotel employers in Southern California, which together employ about 15,000 workers, expired at the end of June 2023. Peterson Decl. ¶ 4. On June 8, 2023, union members voted to authorize a strike after the hotels did not agree to increase wages to keep pace with the cost of living. Peterson Decl. ¶ 4. In July 2023, Defendant’s members began a series of strikes and picket lines at these hotels, including Hotel Maya. Peterson Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5. Workers at Hotel Maya went on strike from August 4, 2023, to August 7, 2023. Peterson Decl. ¶ 5. These efforts were widely covered in local and national newspapers. Peterson Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. A-G.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Defendant’s picketing of the Hotel Maya implicated the public issue of hotel worker compensation and furthered the public discussion of that issue. See Monterey Plaza Hotel v. Hotel Employees Local 483 (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064 (holding defendants met their “burden of establishing a prima facie showing that plaintiff’s complaint arose from their free speech activity where … [the] statement was made during a major labor dispute in the community”). Thus, Defendant’s conduct is covered under both Code of Civil Procedure section 452.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4).

Defendant has met its burden of showing that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit arises from Defendant’s exercise of free speech or petition rights as defined in Civil Procedure section 452.16, subdivision (e).

II. Probability of Prevailing

Next, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to establish a probability of prevailing on their claims.

“‘To satisfy [the anti-SLAPP] prong-two showing, the plaintiff must present credible evidence that satisfies the standard of proof required by the substantive law of the cause of action the anti-SLAPP motion challenges.’ Where the law requires proof by a higher standard for a cause of action, such as clear and convincing evidence, a court must evaluate the plaintiff’s evidentiary showing bearing in mind the higher standard of proof.” Macy’s, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 39 (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 985, 991. “[Labor Code] Section 1138 is one such a law.” Ibid. “No … association or organization, participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of this state for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of those acts.” Lab. Code, § 1138.

“An organizer of a political protest cannot be held personally liable for acts committed by other protesters unless he or she authorized, directed or ratified specific tortious activity, incited lawless action, or gave specific instructions to carry out violent acts or threats.” Lam v. Ngo (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 832, 837.

A. Negligence and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The Court considers the first two causes of action together because “[n]egligent infliction of emotional distress ‘is not an independent tort, but the tort of negligence,’ to which ‘traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply.’” Downey v. City of Riverside (2024) 16 Cal.5th 539, 547 (Downey) (quoting Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072) (Burgess) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Duty of Care

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising its agents. Opp. at p. 8:9.

“Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person….” Civ. Code, § 1714.

Defendant argues that “unions have no legal duty to terminate or quell their members’ lawful picketing activity upon request from the employer’s customers.” Mot. at p. 15: 1-4. While that is true, it does not mean that unions have no duty of care in organizing protests. Unions have a duty of ordinary care in organizing picketing activity.

2. Breach

Plaintiffs fail to provide evidence showing that Defendant violated its duty of reasonable care in organizing the protest.

First, Plaintiffs do not provide any evidence to support their allegation that Defendant breached its duty by stating that it would “go over to the wedding and shut it down.” Compl. ¶¶ 18, 58.

Second, Plaintiffs fail to provide evidence that the union members attempted to push down the gate to enter the wedding. In fact, Plaintiffs provide the declaration of Jawana McFadden, who testified that it was the hotel staff who initially pushed the gate back, and the strikers resisted.

McFadden testifies, “With the groom patiently standing on the stage, and all you could see in the backdrop were union hotel strikers with picket signs. This is not what any couple would want as a memory of their union! The wedding guests expressed concerns to the security and hotel staff, who proceeded to shift the gate back (out of view). The hotel strikers outnumbered the staff moving the gate and proceeded to push the gate closer. Wedding guests then went to assist in repositioning the gate. Commotion ensued, when the hotel union strikers resisted all reason, aggressed against the security, and the wedding guests.” McFadden Decl. at p. 3.

Third, Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Defendant sanctioned any acts of violence or that Defendant had any reason to foresee that such violence would occur.

3. Causation

Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Defendant’s alleged breach of its duty of ordinary care caused the alleged injuries.

4. Damages

Moreover, even if Plaintiffs offered evidence showing Defendant was negligent, Plaintiffs could not recover damages. “Plaintiff cannot recover economic damages resulting from negligence without a physical injury to a person or property.” State Lands Com. v. Plains Pipeline, L.P. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 582, 588. While negligent infliction of emotional distress is a species of negligence that allows for compensation even when the plaintiff did not suffer physical harm, it does not apply here. Downey, supra,16 Cal.5th at p. 547. “The law of negligent infliction of emotional distress in California is typically analyzed, as it was in this case, by reference to two ‘theories’ of recovery: the ‘bystander’ theory and the ‘direct victim’ theory.” Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1071.

Courts have limited direct victim recovery to (1) the negligent mishandling of corpses ; (2) the negligent misdiagnosis of a disease that could potentially harm another; and (3) the negligent breach of a duty arising out of a preexisting relationship. See Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 879; Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 923; Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1074.

Under a “bystander” theory, a plaintiff may recover damages when they witness physical harm to a relative. See Downey, supra,16 Cal.5th at p. 543 (“California courts have recognized a plaintiff’s right to recover in negligence for serious emotional distress suffered as a result of witnessing injuries inflicted on a close relative.”).

Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts consistent with either theory of negligent infliction of economic distress damages.

Accordingly, the Court holds Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of its negligence claims.

B. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations

Plaintiffs fail to plead and offer any admissible evidence for the existence of a valid contract between them and the Maya Hotel. Plaintiffs likewise fail to offer evidence of Defendant’s knowledge of such a contract.

Even if Plaintiffs could show Defendant’s protected protest activity had the effect of interfering with Plaintiffs’ contractual relations, such activity cannot be burdened by state tort liability. Cf. Lam v. Ngo (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 832, 836 (“Peaceful picketing of a business for political reasons cannot be burdened by state tort liability, even if it has the effect of interfering with prospective economic advantage.”); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 886, 918 (state may not “award compensation for the consequences of nonviolent, protected activity”).

Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to provide any evidence showing that Defendant authorized, directed, or ratified any of its members to engage in violent or otherwise unlawful behavior.

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of its tortious interference with contractual relations cause of action.

 4. Intrusion Into Private Affairs

Plaintiffs provide no authority to support their assertion that an outdoor wedding venue next to a public sidewalk entitles them to a reasonable expectation of privacy. The only case cited by Plaintiffs, Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies (1999) 20 Cal.4th 907, 910, concerns the covert video recording of a coworker, and has no applicability to these facts.

Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to allege or provide evidence showing that Defendant’s members actually entered the wedding area, as opposed to simply attempting to do so. Moreover, they do not provide any evidence showing that Defendant authorized, directed, or ratified any of its members to enter the wedding area.

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of its intrusion into private affairs cause of action.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike is granted.