Judge Alison Mackenzie, Case Number: 24STCV22621, Date: 2025-03-04 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 24STCV22621, Date: 2025-03-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV22621 Hearing Date: March 4, 2025 Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Defendants' Motion to Strike

Defendants' Motion to Strike is granted with leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

Urania De Los Angeles Crespin Garcia, Nallely Yaizat Crespin, Amy Lesly Crespin, and Jose Denis Urias Mendez (Plaintiffs) filed this habitability action against 13515 Doty Avenue, LLC Thomas M. Murray, individually and as trustee of the individually and as Trustee for the Murray Family Trust dated May 17, 1985, and Pamela L. Murray, individually and asTrustee for the Murray Family Trust dated May 17, 1985 (Defendants). Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to remediate uninhabitable conditions involving cockroach and rodent infestations, water leaks, chronic mold, and various physical defects.

The causes of action are: (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability; (2) Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability; (3) Negligence; (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (5) Private Nuisance; (6) Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.4; (7) Violation of Los Angeles County Code, Section 8.52.130; and (8) Violations of Business and Professions Code, Section 17200.

Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ requests for Punitive Damages and Attorney’s Fees. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. Id., § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with the law. Id. § 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. Id. § 437.

ANALYSIS

I. Punitive Damages

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to support their claims for punitive and exemplary damages.

To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code Section 3294. College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721 (College Hospital). These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).

“Malice” is defined in Civil Code § 3294 to mean “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Civil Code § 3294(c)(1). “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” Civil Code § 3294(c)(2). As the court noted in College Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th 704, 713, Section 3294 was amended in 1987 to require that, where malice is based on a defendant’s conscious disregard of a plaintiff’s rights, the conduct must be both despicable and willful. The court further held that “despicable conduct refers to circumstances that are base, vile, or contemptible.” Id. at 725 (citation omitted). Such conduct has been described as “having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.” Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.

A claim for punitive damages may not be based on conclusory allegations of oppression, fraud, or malice but instead must be based on specific factual allegations that support such a conclusion. See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1041-1042 (Court of Appeal issued peremptory writ directing trial court to issue order striking plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages because “[t]he sole basis for seeking punitive damages are … conclusory allegations” which were “devoid of any factual assertions supporting a conclusion [defendants] acted with oppression, fraud or malice”).

A negligence claim generally will not support a claim for punitive damages, as negligence is an unintentional tort, and a negligent party has no desire to cause the harm that results from its conduct, differing from a party who has engaged in willful misconduct and intended to cause harm. Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166-167. Allegations of negligence where injuries might occur but are not probable do not support punitive damages claims. McDonell v American Trust Co. (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 296, 300; see also Woolstrum v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 12 (evidence of negligence insufficient to show that defendant knew or must have known of the danger).

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 (citations omitted). “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (fn. omitted) (citations omitted).

A tenant’s habitability action against the landlord for failure to remedy slum living conditions may be sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. See, e.g., Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921 (Stoiber) (failure to correct defective living conditions sufficient for punitive damages claim; Rivera v. Sassoon (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1046 (affirming general, special, and punitive damages jury award for breach of the warranty of habitability, nuisance, and other torts). Punitive damages may be assessed against an employer where the employer authorized or ratified a malicious act. College Hospital Inc., supra,8 Cal.4th at. p 723.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that their apartment suffered from a cockroach and rodent infestations, water leaks, and chronic mold. Compl. ¶ 12 (a)-(c) Plaintiffs further allege that the apartment suffered from “stained and water damaged ceilings, crumbling walls, peeling paint and plaster, inoperable heaters, cracked and deteriorated floors and carpet, broken or deteriorated cabinets, and other indicia of slum or substandard housing.” Compl. ¶12 (d). Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants were at all times aware of the defective, illegal, non-complying and substandard conditions plaguing the Apartment and the Property” Compl. ¶ 27. However, such conclusory allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truth. While Plaintiffs allege, they “are informed and believe and thereon allege that Plaintiffs and other past and current tenants of the Property have repeatedly complained to Defendants about the above defects” they fail to plead who specifically made complaints, when, or to whom. Compl. ¶ 14. Therefore, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts showing Defendants engaged in malice, fraud, or oppression. The motion to strike punitive damages is sustained with leave to amend.

II. Attorney’s Fees

Defendant’s move to strike the requests for attorney fees from the second, third, fourth, fifth, and eighth causes of action.

“Under the American rule, as a general proposition each party must pay his own attorney fees. This concept is embodied in section 1021 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that each party is to bear his own attorney fees unless a statute or the agreement of the parties provides otherwise.” Gray v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 498, 504.

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs only cite Civil Code section 1942.4 as the basis for attorney’s fees. Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.4 is separately pleaded as the sixth cause of action. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to strike attorney fees from the second, third, fourth, fifth, and eighth cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Defendants' Motion to Strike is granted with twenty days leave to amend.