Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 24STCV23067, Date: 2024-12-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV23067    Hearing Date: December 3, 2024    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Defendants’ Motion to Reclassify (Walker Motion)

 

Defendants’ Motion to Reclassify is denied.

                                                                                                                                       

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ofunne Obiamiwe, a substitute teacher, filed this action against Inglewood Unified School District, Sarah Appleton, the principal of Bennett-Kew Elementary School, and doe defendants 1 to 50 (“Defendants”), alleging that Defendants retaliated against her for objecting to feeding students lasagna covered by burnt plastic.

The causes of action are: (1) Retaliation in violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5; (2) Negligence; and (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

 

Defendants filed a Motion to Reclassify. Plaintiff filed an Opposition.

 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of the following documents: (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint; (2) Sample Substitute Teacher Job posting at Inglewood Unified School District; and (3) Transparent California report on “Ofunne Obiamiwe.”

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted as to Plaintiff’s Complaint and denied as to the other two documents.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 403.040, subdivision (a) provides in part: “The defendant or cross-defendant may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to respond to the initial pleading.... The court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification, regardless of any fault or lack of fault, if the case has been classified in an incorrect jurisdictional classification.” Limited civil cases include cases “in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts to thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) or less.” Code Civ. Proc., § 86, subd. (a)(1).) Attorney’s fees, which may be recoverable by statute or contract, are not included in the amount in controversy. Code Civ. Proc., § 85, subd. (a) (“As used in this section, ‘amount in controversy’ means the amount of the demand, or the recovery sought, or the value of the property, or the amount of the lien, that is in controversy in the action, exclusive of attorneys’ fees, interest, and costs.”).

“[A] matter may be reclassified as a limited civil action ‘when (i) the absence of jurisdiction is apparent before trial from the complaint, petition, or related documents, or (ii) during the course of pretrial litigation, it becomes clear that the matter will “necessarily” result in a verdict below the superior court’s jurisdictional amount ….’” Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 276-277 (Ytuarte) (quoting Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262 [Walker]). “Even more appropriately, ‘… the test [is] … whether “lack of jurisdiction is clear”…’ [or] virtually unattainable….”’” Id. at p. 277 (quoting Walker, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 269). “This standard involves an evaluation of the amount fairly in controversy, not an adjudication of the merits of the claim….” Ibid. “The court may believe it highly unlikely that plaintiff will recover the amount demanded, but this is not enough to defeat jurisdiction, unless it appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the amount which he has demanded.” Walker, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 27 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Accordingly under Walker the superior court must deny the motion to reclassify the case as limited (and thus keep the matter in the unlimited civil court) unless it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff’s damages will necessarily be less than $[3]5,000. This standard of ‘legal certainty’ is not met when it appears a verdict within the unlimited court’s jurisdiction is ‘possible.’” Ytuarte, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.

In deciding whether a matter should be transferred, a trial court may look beyond the pleadings but not so far as to trespass into the province of the trier of fact. See Singer v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 (quoting Walker, supra, 53 Cal. 3d, at p. 269) (“‘Pain and suffering are not subject to precise measurement by any scale, and their translation into money damages is peculiarly the function of the trier of the facts.’”)

 

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to have the case reclassified as limited, arguing that the amount in controversy does not exceed $35,000.

Prayer for Relief

As an initial matter, Defendant argues that Plaintiff erred in not including the amount of damages in her prayer for relief, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10, subdivision (a). This argument is without merit. Plaintiff properly pleaded that the amount of controversy exceeds $35,000. Compl. at ¶ 15. In Furia v. Helm (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 945, 957, the court held, “the specific dollar amount is necessary only when a default judgment is to be entered. The purpose of such a requirement is to ensure that the defendant is sufficiently aware of the consequences of not answering the complaint. However, ‘in any other case, the court may grant the plaintiff any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue.’” (Quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 580, subd. (a)) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Plaintiff’s failure to include the amount of damages sought in her prayer for relief does not preclude her from establishing the amount of controversy exceeds $35,000.

Economic Damages

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s alleged economic damages total, at most, $681, reflecting three days of lost wages substitute teaching at Bennett-Kew Elementary School. Mot. at p. 7:17-18. Plaintiff does not dispute this figure but argues that Defendants ignore potential future lost wages. Opp. at p.7:7-8. For reasons discussed below, the Court need not decide whether $681 represents Plaintiff's maximum economic recovery. 

Non-Economic Damages

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants’ conduct, she has suffered non-economic damages, including “extraordinary psychological and emotional distress, embarrassment, reputational harm, loss of sleep, humiliation, depression, anxiety, mental and physical injury, pain including exacerbated fibromyalgia, significant psychological stress, and anguish in an amount to be proven at trial.” Compl. at ¶ 50.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain substantial emotional distress damages based on the alleged facts. They cite Martinez v. City of Clovis (2023) 90 Cal. App. 5th 193, 254 (Martinez) for the proposition that “[d]etermining whether a claim is plausible is a context-specific task requiring the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” However, Martinez concerned a motion to dismiss, not a motion to reclassify. Martinez, supra 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 254. The question before the Court on this motion is not whether the damages sought are plausible but possible. See Ytuarte, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.

Similarly, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff fails to support her claims for non-economic damages misstates the standard. By their very nature, non-economic damages are difficult to quantify in monetary terms. For the Court to weigh the evidence to determine the likely damages would improperly invade the providence of the jury as the trier of fact. See Singer, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320. The Court cannot place a monetary value on these non-economic damages and thus cannot find with legal certainty that Plaintiff cannot recover more than $35,000. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to reclassify is denied.

Punitive damages and Penalties

Because the non-economic damages alone may be sufficient to meet the amount in controversy threshold, the Court need not address Defendants’ arguments regarding punitive damages or civil penalties.

 

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion to Reclassify is denied.