Judge Alison Mackenzie, Case Number: 24STCV27238, Date: 2025-03-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 24STCV27238, Date: 2025-03-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV27238 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Garfield Beach CVS, LLC’s Motion to Strike (not anti-SLAPP) – without Demurrer.

Garfield Beach CVS, LLC’s Motion to Strike is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Chanae Penn (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against defendants Garfield Beach CVS, LLC (“CVS”), Security Enforcement Group, Inc. (“SEG”), alleging that she walked into a CVS retail store and was assaulted and battered by a security guard employed by CVS and/or SEG.

The causes of action in the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) are:

(1) Negligence

(2) Assault and Battery

(3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

(4) Violation of the Bane Act

(5) Violation of the Ralph Act

(6) Violation of the Unruh Act

The motion now before the Court is CVS’s Motion to Strike. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. Id., § 436 subd. (b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. Id. § 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. Id. § 437.

ANALYSIS

CVS moves to strike from the FAC Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.

To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code Section 3294. College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721. These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255. (citations omitted). “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (fn. omitted) (citations omitted). Punitive damages may be assessed against an employer where the employer authorized or ratified a malicious act. College Hospital Inc., supra,8 Cal.4th at. p 723.

For nonintentional torts, punitive damages may be assessed “when the conduct constitutes conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 158; “[A] conscious disregard of the safety of others may [thus] constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. To justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.’” Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 402, (quoting Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896 (Taylor). To establish malice, “it is not sufficient to show only that the defendant’s conduct was negligent, grossly negligent or even reckless.” Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.

When the defendant is a corporation, “the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” Wilson v. Southern California Edison Company (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164; see Civ. Code § 3294(b). Managing agents are “corporate employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate [decision-making] so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.” White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 566-67.

Thus, to properly plead punitive damages against CVS, Plaintiff must allege that an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. See Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that she was assaulted and battered by a security guard (Defendant Doe #2) at CVS who was employed with SEG and/or CVS. Plaintiff alleges that “prior to the subject incident, an officer, director, and/or managing agent of CVS: (1) had advance knowledge of the unfitness of Defendant Doe #2 and employed/authorized him to act as a security guard with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others; and/or (2) ratified the wrongful conduct of Defendant Does #2 and/or #3, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages against Defendant CVS.” Complaint at ¶¶ 33, 33, 44, 54, 65, 77, 90.).

CVS argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts meeting the requirements for punitive damages of a corporate employer because the FAC contains only conclusory allegations, and does not demonstrate who at CVS allegedly ratified or authorized the security guard’s allegedly tortious conduct, how that individual allegedly ratified or authorized the alleged despicable or malicious conduct of the security guard, or whether that person had proper authority to do so on behalf of CVS.

Plaintiff's allegations are sufficiently pleaded to support an award of punitive damages against CVS. While CVS refers to these allegations as conclusory, “[t]he distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate facts is not at all clear and involves at most a matter of degree.” Burks v. Poppy Const. Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463, 473. Further, Defendant fails to provide any authority for the proposition that, at the pleading stage, Plaintiff must specifically name which corporate officer, director, or managing agent authorized or ratified the malicious conduct, or other specifics.

If, as alleged, CVS’s corporate officer, director, or managing agent authorized or ratified the attack of Plaintiff, a jury may permissibly find it liable for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

CVS’s Motion to Strike is denied. CVS has 14 days to file an answer.