NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Sonsray Machinery, LLC’s Motion for Change of Venue

 

Sonsray Machinery, LLC’s Motion for Change of Venue is granted.

 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jackson Haslam  (Plaintiff) filed this action against Sonsray Machinery, LLC (Sonsray), Jeremiah Daniel Morris, and Michelle R. Herstad (Defendants), alleging discrimination, retaliation, and various violations of the labor code.

The causes of action are: (1) Whistleblower Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5; (2) Race Discrimination in Violation of FEHA; (3) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; (4) Hostile Work Environment – Harassment; (5) Failure to Prevent Harassment, Discrimination, and Retaliation; (6) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention; (7) Breach of Implied-in-Fact Contract Not to Terminate Employment Without Good Cause; (8) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; (9) Nonpayment of Wages; (10) Waiting Time Penalties; (11) Retaliation in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 98.6; and (12) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Sonsray filed a Motion for Change of Venue

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Court rules on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to the declaration of Joanna Verastegui as follows:

1.      Overruled.

2.      Overruled.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 396a, subd. (b) provides “[i]f it appears from the complaint or affidavit, or otherwise, that the superior court or court location where the action or proceeding is commenced is not the proper court or court location for the trial, the court where the action or proceeding is commenced, or a judge thereof, shall, whenever that fact appears, transfer it to the proper court or court location, on its own motion, or on motion of the defendant, unless the defendant consents in writing, or in open court (consent in open court being entered in the minutes of the court), to the keeping of the action or proceeding in the court or court location where commenced.”

“Upon the hearing of the motion the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the action or proceeding transferred to the proper court.” Code Civ. Proc., § 396b, subd. (a).

 

California’s general venue provision, Code of Civil Procedure, Section 395(a), states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.” The phrase “except as otherwise provided by law” that leads off Section 395(a) makes the general venue provision subject to statutory exceptions. FEHA is such an exception, for it has its own “special” venue provision. Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 487 (Brown).

FEHA’s special venue provision, Government Code Section 12965(c)(3), contains four clauses setting forth the eligible counties within California in which a FEHA action seeking redress for unlawful employment practices can be brought. The first clause refers to “any county in the state in which the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed.” The second is “the county in which the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered.” The third is “the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked . . . but for the alleged unlawful practice.” The fourth clause states that “if the defendant is not found within any of these counties, an action may be brought within the county of the defendant’s residence or principal office.” Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(3). FEHA’s venue provision is intended to facilitate the ability of persons with FEHA claims to vindicate their rights by furnishing them with a wide selection of possible venues. Brown, supra, 37 Ca1.3d at p. 486.

FEHA’s special venue provision “controls in cases in which FEHA claims are joined with non-FEHA claims arising from the same facts.” Brown, supra, 37 Ca1.3d at p. 487.)

There is a presumption that the plaintiff’s selection of the venue is proper, and the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is not. Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 830, 836.)

ANALYSIS

I. Appropriate Venue

Sonsray argues that venue is not proper in Los Angeles because all unlawful employment practices are alleged to have occurred in Kern County, no records relevant to the alleged unlawful practice are maintained and administered in Los Angeles, and Plaintiff would have continued to work in Kern County, but for his allegedly unlawful termination.

Sonsray provides the declaration Joanna Verastegui, its Director of Human Resources, who testifies as to Plaintiff’s work history with Sonsray. In January 2024, Plaintiff was hired as a sales account manager for Sonsray in Bakersfield, California. Verastegui Decl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff was terminated in August 2024. Verastegui Decl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff worked for the duration of his employment with Sonsray in Bakersfield. Verastegui Decl. 4. But for his termination, Plaintiff’s employment would have continued in Kern County. Verastegui Decl. ¶ 9. ¶

Plaintiff does not argue that any of the alleged unlawful conduct occurred in Los Angeles County, or that, but for his allegedly wrongful termination, he would have worked in Los Angeles County. Instead, Plaintiff argues that venue is appropriate in Los Angeles because that is where the records relevant to the alleged unlawful practice are maintained and administered.

Plaintiff testifies that as part of his onboarding, he was informed that all workplace complaints or grievances would be directed to Sonsray’s human resources department located at their headquarters in the County of Los Angeles, and that all employment records would likewise be maintained at Sonsray’s Los Angeles County headquarters. Haslm Decl. ¶¶ 2,3.

However, Verastegui testifies that “[d]uring Plaintiff’s employment all his physical employment records were initially collected at the Sonsray Bakersfield office directly from Plaintiff and then uploaded into Sonsray’s electronic records management system.” Verastegui Decl. ¶ 8. In a supplemental declaration, she clarifies that during Plaintiff’s employment and through his termination, Sonsray used Paylocity, a cloud-based record-keeping software, to maintain all employment records. Verastegui Supp. Decl. ¶ 3. These digital records are accessible virtually and are available at any of Sonsray’s locations, but are not physically present at any one location. Ibid. Sonsray has no physical storage site in LA County where it maintains its records. Ibid. She further testifies that employment records are administered to the employees where they individually work, and employees fill out those records either at the physical office location where they are assigned or from their home. Verastegui Supp. Decl. ¶ 5.

The Court concludes that no employment records relevant to the alleged unlawful employment practice are maintained or administered in Los Angeles County. Accordingly, the Court is required to grant Sonsray’s motion. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 306, 310. (“[T]his action was not properly brought in Los Angeles County and the respondent court could not deny defendants’ venue change motion.”).

II. Attorney’s Fees

Sonsray seeks to recover attorney’s fees incurred in bringing this motion.

“In its discretion, the court may order the payment to the prevailing party of reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in making or resisting the motion to transfer, whether or not that party is otherwise entitled to recover his or her costs of action. In determining whether that order for expenses and fees shall be made, the court shall take into consideration (1) whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably made and rejected, and (2) whether the motion or selection of venue was made in good faith given the facts and law the party making the motion or selecting the venue knew or should have known. Code Civ. Proc., § 396b, subd. (b).

Here, Defendants’ Counsel contacted Plaintiff’s counsel to request Plaintiff stipulate to transferring the venue to Kern County. Setian Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B. Plaintiff’s counsel stated that he believed Los Angeles County was an appropriate forum.

Defendant’s Counsel’s initial email seeking a stipulation to transfer venue to Kern County focused only on the fact that Plaintiff and the key witnesses were employed there, the alleged conduct took place there, and his client is based there. Setian Decl. at p. 42, Ex. B. While a subsequent email discussed the FEHA-specific venue rules, it did not include the information contained in Verastegui’s declarations regarding Sonray’s use of Paylocity. Setian Decl. at p. 45, Ex. C. Nor is there any evidence that Plaintiff had that information when he filed the Complaint. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff had a good faith basis for believing that records relevant to his allegations were maintained or administered in Los Angeles County. Accordingly, the Court declines to award attorney’s fees.

 

III. Transfer Costs and Fees

 

Sonsray requests that the Court order Plaintiff pay the costs and fees of transfer.

 

“If the transfer is sought solely, or is ordered, because the action or proceeding was commenced in a court other than that designated as proper by this title, those costs and fees, including any expenses and attorney’s fees awarded to the defendant pursuant to Section 396b, shall be paid by the plaintiff before the transfer is made.” Code Civ. Proc., § 399.

 

Because the Court is ordering the transfer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 396b, Plaintiff is ordered to pay the transfer costs and fees before the transfer is made.

 

 

CONCLUSION

Sonsray’s Motion for Change of Venue is granted. The action is ordered transferred to Kern County Superior Court.