Judge Alison Mackenzie, Case Number: 25STCV00129, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 25STCV00129, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV00129 Hearing Date: March 13, 2025 Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Defendants The Walt Disney Company, Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., and Disney Worldwide Services, Inc.’s Motion to Transfer Venue

The Court GRANTS, Defendants The Walt Disney Company, Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., and Disney Worldwide Services, Inc.’s Motion to Transfer Venue. This case is transferred to Orange County, CA.

BACKGROUND

BRANDEN BARTILET (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY; WALT DISNEY PARKS AND RESORTS U.S., INC.; DISNEY WORLDWIDE SERVICES, INC.; JAMES HEATH, and individual (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging that Defendants discriminated against him due to his disability, which required Plaintiff to use a mobility device and failed to accommodate him based on this disability.

The causes of action are:

1) Discrimination in Violation of the FEHA;

2) Hostile Work Environment Harassment in Violation of the FEHA;

3) Retaliation in Violation of the FEHA;

4) Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation in Violation of FEHA;

5) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of FEHA;

6) Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation in Violation of FEHA;

7) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy;

8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and

9) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY (“TWDC”); WALT DISNEY PARKS AND RESORTS U.S., INC. (“WDPR”); and DISNEY WORLDWIDE SERVICES, INC. (“DWWS”) (collectively, “Disney Defendants”) filed a motion to transfer venue to Orange County.

BRANDEN BARTILET (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Disney Defendants request judicial notice of the following: (1) 9/2/20 Order Granting Disney Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue in Arturo Chavez Ascencion v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., et al. in Case No. 20STCV18112 – Ex. A; (2) 10/1/20 Appellate Court’s Denial of Arturo Chavez Ascencion’s Petition for Writ of Mandate in Arturo Chavez Ascencion v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., et al. in Case No. B307646 – Ex. B; (3) 12/4/20 Order Granting Disney Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue in Douglas Keith Harris v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., et al. in Case No. 20STCV22722 – Ex. C; and (4) Dictionary definitions of the word “administer” – Ex. D.

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the following: (1) Secretary of State, Statement of Information filed on behalf of Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. on 3/12/24 – Ex. 1; (2) Secretary of State, Statement of Information filed on behalf of Disney Worldwide Services, Inc. on 12/12/24 – Ex. 2; and (3) Secretary of State, Statement of Information filed on behalf of The Walt Disney Company on 3/12/24 – Ex. 3.

“A court may judicially notice the ‘[r]ecords of ... any court of this state.’ [Citation].” (Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360, 382, disapproved of by Vo v. Technology Credit Union (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 632 on other grounds.) “We may take judicial notice of the existence of judicial opinions and court documents, along with the truth of the results reached—in documents such as orders, statements of decision, and judgments—but cannot take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions or court files, including pleadings, affidavits, testimony, or statements of fact.” (Id.)

“While courts take judicial notice of public records, we do not take judicial notice of the truth of all matters stated therein.” (Love v. Wolf (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 378, 403.)

The Court grants Disney Defendants’ request for judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code Sections 452(d) and (h).

The Court grants Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code Section 452(c).

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Disney Defendants object to portions of Plaintiff’s declaration in support of Opposition to the Motion to Transfer Venue. The Court rules on the objections as follows:

OVERRULED: 1-6

SUSTAINED: None

ANALYSIS

Disney Defendants argue this action can only properly proceed in Orange County, California because pursuant to Government Code Section 12965, subdivision (c)(3) (the “Venue Statute”), FEHA claims must be filed in the county where (1) the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed; (2) the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered; or (3) the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful practice. (See Not. of Mot. 2:10-19.) The Venue Statute provides that venue is appropriate in the county of the defendant’s residence or principal office only when none of the three bases for venue noted above are met. Government Code Section 12965, subdivision (c)(3).

Disney Defendants have demonstrated that all three statutory criteria in the Venue Statute point to Orange County as the proper venue for this case. Here, Plaintiff worked as a Cast Member at a Disneyland Resort (the “Resort”) located in Anaheim, California, which is located in Orange County. The Resort is owned and operated by WDPR. (Santana Decl., ¶3.) As such, Plaintiff’s allegations of unlawful practices, i.e., FEHA violations by WDPR occurred in Orange County. (Compl., ¶¶13-17.) Defendant WDPR has also provided evidence from its Vice President of Human Resources – Disneyland, Harriett S. Santana and the Director of eDiscovery of DWWS showing that all relevant records pertaining to Plaintiff’s employment are maintained and administered in Orange County. (Santana Decl., ¶¶11-12; Nozaki Decl., ¶3.) Similarly, documents related to requests for accommodations made by employees working at the Resort were and are submitted to relevant personnel in Orange County in-person or electronically. (Santana Decl., ¶¶13, 15.) The evidence establishes that Plaintiff would have continued to work in Orange County at the Resort were it not for his separation from the company. (McClure Decl. ¶6; Santa Decl., ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff’s argument that the general venue statute in Code of Civil Procedure Section 395 applies to this case is incorrect. The Supreme Court has held that the Venue Statute subordinates the general venue statute in cases, like this one, that contain both FEHA and non-FEHA claims. Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal. 3d 477, 487.

The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that he was jointly employed by TWDC or DWWS and their residence in Los Angeles means venue in Los Angeles is proper. First, the residence of a defendant only comes into play if none of the other three statutory criteria in the Venue Statute are met. Here, Disney Defendants have demonstrated that Orange County is the proper venue under all three statutory criteria and thus it is immaterial where any defendant resides.

Second, while Plaintiff claims he was also an employee of Defendants TWDC and DWWS, the Confidentiality Agreement submitted by Plaintiff does not specify that he was employed by the TWDC or DWWS. In fact, the Confidentiality Agreement explicitly states: “In consideration for my employment and for the compensation to be paid to me by The Walt Disney Company or a division, subsidiary, or affiliate thereof, or any successor of the foregoing (hereinafter termed the “Company”), and in addition to any other obligation, at all times during the term of my employment and thereafter…” (Bartilet Decl., ¶, Ex. 1.) The inclusion of “or a division, subsidiary, or affiliate” suggest that Plaintiff was employed by a division, subsidiary, or affiliate of TWDC not necessarily a direct employee of TWDC. Likewise, Plaintiff presents no evidence indicating that he was ever employed by DWWS. By contrast, all of the evidence submitted by WDPR shows that Plaintiff was employed solely by them, which is an affiliate of TWDC. (Santana Decl., ¶¶4, 6-7; Grossman Decl., ¶3.) Additionally, the Vice President and Assistant Treasurer of TWDC, Daniel F. Grossman attests that TWDC does not employ cashiers and/or guest relations Cast Members nor employees who work at the Resort. (Grossman Decl., ¶4.) While DWWS admits to providing administrative and benefits related services to WDPR as an affiliate and indirect subsidiary of TWDC, it avers that it does not employ cashiers and/or guest relations Cast Members nor employees who work at the Resort. (Steed Decl., ¶¶2-4.) Lastly, Plaintiff would have continued to work at the Resort for WDPR had he not been terminated. (McClure Decl., ¶6; Santana Decl., ¶16.)

Therefore, the Disney Defendants have shown that Orange County is the proper venue for this action not Los Angeles, County under the applicable and controlling FEHA Venue Statute.

Conclusion

Disney Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue is granted. This case is transferred to Orange County, CA.