Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 25STCV00135, Date: 2025-03-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25STCV00135 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 Dept: 55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)
BACKGROUND
Xiubo Cheung and Zengli
Wang (“Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against Fang Yang (“Defendant”), alleging
that Defendant made false and defamatory statements in a community WeChat group
to damage their reputation, falsely implying that Plaintiff Cheung was immoral
and that Plaintiff Wang was not her husband or a resident, causing them public
embarrassment and emotional distress.
The causes of action are:
(1) Defamation; and (2) Slander per se.
Defendant
filed a corrected motion for anti-SLAPP. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
The Court rules as
follows to Defendant’s evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Zengli Wang:
OVERRULED: paragraphs 5
and 6c
SUSTAINED: paragraph 6b,
7 on lack of personal knowledge and speculation
LEGAL STANDARD
“If
a defendant brings a special motion under the anti-SLAPP statute [CCP § 425.16]
to strike a cause of action, the trial court evaluates that motion using a
two-step process: The first examines the nature of the conduct that underlies
the plaintiff's allegations to determine whether the conduct is protected by
section 425.16; the second assesses the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.
[Citation]” Laker v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 759.
“The
defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the activity each challenged claim
rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute. A ‘claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning
activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just
evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which
liability is asserted.’ [Citation.] To
determine whether a claim arises from protected activity, courts must ‘consider
the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply
those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.] Courts then must evaluate whether the
defendant has shown any of these actions fall within one or more of the four
categories of ‘act[s]’ protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citations.]” Wilson
v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 [italics in
original].
“In
the first step of the analysis, the trial court determines whether the cause of
action ‘arises from’ an ‘‘‘act in furtherance of a person's right of petition
or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection
with a public issue.’’’ [Citation] The first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis
‘turns on two subsidiary questions: (1) What conduct does the challenged cause
of action ‘arise[] from’; and (2) is that conduct ‘protected activity’ under
the anti-SLAPP statute?’ [Citation]” Laker,
supra, 32 Cal.App.5th. at p.760.
“The
Supreme Court has clarified that ‘arising from’ means ‘based on.’ [Citation]
This element of the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis is sometimes referred
to as the ‘nexus’ requirement. [Citation] Conduct constitutes ‘protected
activity,’ if it falls within one of the categories set out in section 425.16,
subdivision (e). Section 425.16, subdivision (e), in turn, applies to (1) ‘any
written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law’; (2)
‘in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law’; (3) ‘in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with
an issue of public interest’; or (4) ‘any other conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.’
[Citation] The defendant bringing the anti-SLAPP motion to strike must make a
prima facie showing that the allegations that form the basis of the plaintiff's
claims arise from conduct that falls under one of these categories. [Citation]”
Ibid.
“If
the defendant prevails in this step of the analysis, the trial court must then
assess the merits of the plaintiff's claim. The Supreme Court has described
this second step of the SLAPP analysis as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’
[Citation.] The plaintiff carries the
burden of demonstrating that its claim has ‘at least ‘minimal merit.’’
[Citation.] If the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that his or her claim has
at least minimal merit, then the trial court should deem the cause of action a
SLAPP and should strike it. [Citation.]” Ibid.
At this “second stage of an anti-SLAPP hearing, the court
may consider affidavits, declarations, and their equivalents if it is
reasonably possible the proffered evidence set out in those statements will be
admissible at trial. Conversely, if the evidence relied upon cannot be admitted
at trial, because it is categorically barred or undisputed factual
circumstances show inadmissibility, the court may not consider it in the face
of an objection. If an evidentiary objection is made, the plaintiff may attempt
to cure the asserted defect or demonstrate the defect is curable.” Sweetwater
Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 949.
The trial court properly considers the evidentiary
submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant, but it may not weigh the
credibility or comparative strength of the evidence and must instead simply
determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence would, if believed by the trier of
fact, be sufficient to result in a judgment for plaintiff. McGarry v. Univ.
of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 108-09. The court “accept[s] as
true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate[s] the
defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the
plaintiff as a matter of law.’ [Citations.]” Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39
Cal.4th 299, 326. Further, whether or not the evidence is in conflict, in the
context of a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, if the plaintiff
has presented a sufficient pleading and has presented evidence showing that a
prima facie case will be established at trial, the plaintiff is entitled to
proceed. Moore v. Shaw (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 193. Only a minimal
showing of merit is required. Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
1416, 1421.
ANALYSIS
I. First Prong: Protected Activity
“To prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion, the movant
must first make ‘a threshold showing the challenged cause of action’ arises
from an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech in
connection with a public issue.” Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180,
192. “[T]he focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that
gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity
constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’ [Citation.]” Park v.
Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063. “‘The only means specified in section
425.16 by which a moving defendant can satisfy that [‘arising from’]
requirement is to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff
claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described
in subdivision (e) . . . .’ [Citation.]” Ibid.
“At the first step, the
moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected
activity, and the claims for relief supported by them.” Baral v. Schnitt (2016)
1 Cal.5th 376, 396; accord Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019)
7 Cal.5th 871, 884 [“The defendant's first-step burden is to identify the
activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.”]. “[T]he moving defendant must identify
the acts alleged in the complaint that it asserts are protected and what claims
for relief are predicated on them. In turn, a court should examine whether
those acts are protected and supply the basis for any claims. It does not
matter that other unprotected acts may also have been alleged within what has
been labeled a single cause of action; these are ‘disregarded at this stage.’
[Citation.]” Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995,
1010. Moreover,
“while courts may strike less than the entirety of a complaint or pleaded cause
of action, the trial court is not required to take on the burden of identifying
the allegations susceptible to a special motion to strike. If a defendant wants
the trial court to take a surgical approach, whether in the alternative or not,
the defendant must propose where to make the incisions. This is done by
identifying, in the initial motion, each numbered paragraph or sentence in the
complaint that comprises a challenged claim and explaining ‘the claim's
elements, the actions alleged to establish those elements, and wh[y] those
actions are protected.’ [Citation.]” Park v. Nazari (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 1099, 1109.
This case arises from the
statements posted on the Vellano Home Owners’ Association’s (Vellano HOA”)
public WeChat group, relating to Vellano HOA’s election for board members.
(Declaration of Fang Yang (“Yang Decl.”), 7 3).
“[Plaintiffs] live together in the residential
community of Vellano in Chino Hills, California. There are over 200 homesites
within the Vellano community, and many of the residents and homeowners of
Vellano joined and participate in a WeChat group to 8 discuss the various
matters pertinent to community members (the “Vellano WeChat Group” [labeled
“Vellano Community Chinese Forum”]. The Vellano WeChat Group currently has
approximately 172 participants.”
(Complaint, at p. 2:14-18.)
Defendant argues that his
statements in the Vellano WeChat Group constitute protected activity under
California’s anti-SLAPP statute because they concern a matter of public
interest, namely, the eligibility of individuals to participate in the Vellano
HOA elections and community discussions. He contends that discussions regarding
HOA governance, including voting rights and candidate qualifications, are
widely recognized as protected speech under California law. Damon v. Ocean
Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 479-480. Defendant points
out that the WeChat group serves as a public forum where residents communicate
about community issues, making his statements subject to First Amendment
protections. (Complaint, p. 2:14-18.) He further argues that his statements
were not aimed at Plaintiffs’ personal lives but were instead focused on
whether Plaintiff Wang was a qualified resident entitled to vote and
participate in HOA affairs. (Yang Decl., ¶¶ 6, 8, Exh. A.) Defendant asserts
that his statements fall within the category of speech concerning
self-governance and public interest, which courts have found to be the
strongest form of protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute. Matson v.
Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 540, 548. Since his statements relate to a
public controversy about HOA election integrity and voting eligibility, Defendant
asserts they satisfy the first prong of the anti-SLAPP test, shifting the
burden to Plaintiffs to establish a probability of prevailing on their claims.
In opposition, Plaintiffs
argue that Defendant’s statements do not qualify as protected activity under
California’s anti-SLAPP statute because they were not made in connection with a
public issue or a matter of public interest. They assert that while the
statements were made in a community WeChat group, they were not related to the
Vellano HOA election, community governance, or any public concern. Instead,
they were personal attacks directed specifically at Plaintiff Wang and, by
implication, his wife, Plaintiff Cheung, questioning Wang’s residency status
and insinuating that their relationship was illicit. Opp., p. 4. Plaintiffs
emphasize that private grievances cannot be transformed into public issues
merely because they are expressed in a public forum. Rand Resources, LLC v.
City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621. They argue that Yang’s statements
did not contribute to any broader public discussion but were unprovoked,
defamatory remarks aimed at damaging their reputation without any legitimate
connection to community governance. Opp., p. 5. Since the anti-SLAPP statute
only applies to speech related to public concerns, Plaintiffs contend that
Defendant’s motion should be denied at the first prong.
In reply, Defendant
reaffirms that his statements in the Vellano WeChat Group constitute protected
speech under California’s anti-SLAPP statute because they were made in a public
forum concerning a matter of public interest, which was the integrity of HOA
elections and the eligibility of individuals to vote and participate in HOA
affairs. Reply, p. 2. He argues that Plaintiffs themselves initiated the
controversy by publicly accusing him of election fraud, making their
participation in the discussion a matter of public concern. Reply, p. 3. He
further contends that Plaintiffs misapply case law by relying on authorities
that address only subsection (e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP statute, which requires a
connection to constitutional free speech rights, while ignoring subsection
(e)(3), which broadly protects statements made in a public forum on issues of
public interest (Reply, p. 2). Since Plaintiffs acknowledge that the WeChat
group was a public forum and California courts have held that discussions about
HOA elections qualify as protected speech, Yang asserts that he meets the first
prong of the anti-SLAPP test.
The Court finds that
Defendant has satisfied the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis by
demonstrating that his statements in the Vellano WeChat Group constitute
protected activity under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Code Civ. Proc. §
425.16. Defendant shows that the WeChat group serves as a public forum where
residents of the Vellano community discuss HOA-related matters, including board
elections and governance issues. Plaintiffs’ own Complaint acknowledges that
the WeChat group is used for discussions among residents regarding community
affairs, supporting Defendant’s position that the statements in question were
made in connection with an issue of public interest. Complaint, p. 2:14-18.
Furthermore, California
courts have consistently recognized that discussions regarding HOA governance,
including board elections and voting eligibility, constitute matters of public
interest subject to anti-SLAPP protections.
“A ‘public forum’ is traditionally defined as a place
that is open to the public where information is freely exchanged.” (Damon v.
Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 475, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 205
(Damon ).) Homeowners association board meetings **82 constitute a public forum
within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute because they “serve [ ] a function
similar to that of a governmental body. As our Supreme Court has recognized,
owners of planned development units ‘ “comprise a little democratic
subsociety....” ’ [Citations.] In exchange for the benefits of common
ownership, the residents elect a[ ] legislative/executive board and delegate
powers to this board. This delegation concerns not only activities conducted in
the common areas, but also extends to life within ‘ “the confines of the home
itself.” ’ [Citation.] A homeowners association board is in effect ‘a
quasi-government entity paralleling in almost every case the powers, duties,
and responsibilities of a municipal government.’ [Citation.]” (Damon, supra, at
p. 475, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 205.)
Furthermore, “[b]ecause of a homeowners association
board's broad powers and the number of individuals potentially affected by a
board's actions, the Legislature has mandated that boards hold open meetings
and allow the members to speak publicly at the meetings. [Citations.] These
provisions parallel California's open meeting laws regulating government
officials, agencies and boards. [Citation.] Both statutory schemes mandate open
governance meetings, with notice, agenda and minutes requirements, and strictly
limit closed executive sessions. [Citation.]” (Damon, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at
p. 475, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 205.)
Cabrera v. Alam (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1087.
Defendant’s statements regarding
Plaintiff Wang’s eligibility to vote and participate in HOA affairs were
directly tied to the broader issue of election integrity, making them the
strongest form of protected speech under the statute. Plaintiffs argue that
Defendant’s statements were personal attacks unrelated to governance; however,
the Court finds that Defendant’s statements were made in response to
Plaintiffs’ accusations of election fraud, demonstrating that the statements
were part of an ongoing public discussion within the community forum. Yang
Decl., ¶¶ 6, 8, Exh. A.
Since Defendant has met
his burden under prong one, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to establish a
probability of prevailing on their claims.
II. Second Prong: Probability of Prevailing
For
the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing a probability of succeeding on the merits. See Kyle v. Carmon
(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 901, 907. However, Plaintiff is “not required ‘to prove
the specified claim to the trial court;’ rather, so as to not deprive the
plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate inquiry is whether the plaintiff has
stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” Whitehall
v. County of San Bernardino (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 352, 364.
At
the second stage “‘[t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve
conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has
stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing
sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff's evidence
as true, and evaluates the defendant's showing only to determine if it
defeats the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” Wilson
v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891, [italics added].
Plaintiffs
argue that they have a high probability of prevailing on their defamation
claims. They dispute Defendant’s claim that Plaintiffs are limited-purpose
public figures, arguing that they did not voluntarily insert themselves into a
public controversy. Opp., p. 7. Plaintiffs assert that merely discussing HOA
elections does not make them public figures, especially when the defamatory statements
had nothing to do with the election itself but were instead personal attacks.
Opp., p. 6. Even if they were considered limited-purpose public figures,
Plaintiffs argue that they can prove actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence. They point out that Defendant knew Plaintiff Wang was a resident
because they had been in the same WeChat groups for years and that Vellano
WeChat groups are restricted to residents only. Wang Decl., ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiffs
argue that Defendant’s false statements about Wang not being a resident were
made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, which meets the
standard for actual malice. Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984)
37 Cal.3d 244, 257. Additionally, they challenge Defendant’s reliance on
property records, arguing that ownership records do not equate to residency and
that Yang’s claim of a “good faith investigation” lacks credibility. Opp., p.
9.
On
the other hand, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs, by actively engaging in a
public dispute over the 2023 HOA election, have become limited-purpose public
figures, requiring them to prove actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence. He emphasizes that Plaintiffs publicly accused him of election fraud
in the WeChat group, which prompted his response questioning Wang’s residency
status. Yang Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. A. Because Plaintiffs voluntarily inserted
themselves into this controversy, they must show that Yang knowingly made false
statements or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 279-280. However, Defendant contends
that he did not make false factual statements but merely posed a legitimate
question about Wang’s residency, relying on public property records that did
not list Wang as an owner. Yang Decl., ¶ 7, Exh. B; Reply, p. 4. He asserts
that a question is not defamatory, and his good faith reliance on public
records negates any claim of actual malice. Additionally, Defendant refutes
Plaintiffs’ claim that he accused them of unchastity, stating that no such
language appears in the WeChat conversation. Reply, p. 6. Even if Plaintiffs
were private individuals, Yang argues they still cannot establish negligence,
as his reliance on public records was reasonable in questioning Wang’s
eligibility to vote. Because Plaintiffs fail to provide evidence of actual
malice or negligence, Defendant asserts that their claims fail as a matter of
law. He therefore requests that the court grant his anti-SLAPP motion, dismiss
the complaint with prejudice, and award $17,415.25 in attorney’s fees and costs.
Kim Decl., ¶ 5; Reply, p. 7.
The
Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden under the second prong of
the anti-SLAPP analysis, which requires them to establish a probability of
succeeding on the merits of their defamation claims. Because the statements at
issue arose from a public controversy over the 2023 HOA election, Plaintiffs
qualify as limited-purpose public figures, requiring them to prove actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence.
Plaintiffs argue that
they did not voluntarily inject themselves into a public controversy and that
Defendant’s statements were personal attacks unrelated to HOA governance. Opp.,
p. 6-7. However, the evidence demonstrates that Plaintiffs themselves publicly
accused Defendant of election fraud in the WeChat group, which directly led to
Defendant’s response questioning Wang’s residency status. Yang Decl., ¶ 5, Exh.
A. By initiating and engaging in a dispute over election integrity, Plaintiffs
placed themselves at the center of a public controversy, satisfying the
criteria for limited-purpose public figures.
As limited-purpose public
figures, Plaintiffs must prove that Defendant acted with actual malice, meaning
he knowingly made false statements or acted with reckless disregard for the
truth. However, the Court finds that Defendant’s question regarding Wang’s
residency does not constitute a false factual assertion. Further, Defendant
shows he had good faith reliance on public records. Plaintiffs challenge the
credibility of Defendant’s investigation but fail to provide evidence that he
knew his statements were false or acted recklessly.
Plaintiffs fail to
present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice or negligence, thus, they
cannot meet their burden under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
Therefore, the Court
grants Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion.
III. Attorney’s Fees
Defendant
seeks to recover $17,415.25 in attorney’s fees and costs under Code of Civil
Procedure § 425.16(c)(1), which mandates that a prevailing defendant in an
anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to recover fees and costs. The fee-shifting
provision is intended to discourage frivolous lawsuits that aim to chill free
speech and ensure SLAPP defendants can afford legal representation. Ketchum
v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131. The Court exercises its discretion
to order Defendant to file a separately noticed motion for fees pursuant to
statutory requirements.
CONCLUSION