Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: 25STCV02442, Date: 2025-05-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV02442    Hearing Date: May 2, 2025    Dept: 55

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.

 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Luisa Zapo Reyes, Pedro Cobix Olin, and Celia Alegria Dominguez, individually and as successor in interest to Decedent Pedro Cobix Zapo; Isidro Olea Alvarez, Natalia Cano Moreno, Guillermina M. Garcia, individually and as successor in interest to Decedent Fernando Olea Cano; Zenon Osorio Vasquez and Vereranda Castillo Clemente, as wrongful death heirs of Decedent Juan Osorio Castillo; and Fabiana Maldonado Ortiz, and Andres Jimenez Mendes, as wrongful death heirs of Decedent Alfonso Jimenez Maldonado (Plaintiffs), filed this action against Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc. (Defendant), alleging that Defendant distributed a defective portable generator which resulted in the deaths of the decedents.

The causes of action are: (1) Strict Product Liability; (2) Negligence – Wrongful Death and Product Liability; (3) Breach of Warranties; (4) Survival Action; and (5) Survival Action.

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition.

 

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Court rules on Defendant’s evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Adam K. Shea as follows:

1.      Declaration of Adam K. Shea ¶ 2. Sustained. Lacks foundation/personal knowledge. See Evid. Code, §§ 403, 702.

2.      Declaration of Adam K. Shea ¶ 3. Sustained. Lacks foundation/personal knowledge. See Evid. Code, §§ 403, 702.

3.      Declaration of Adam K. Shea ¶ 4. Sustained. Lacks foundation/personal knowledge. See Evid. Code, §§ 403, 702.

4.      Declaration of Adam K. Shea ¶ 5. Sustained. Lacks foundation/personal knowledge. See Evid. Code, §§ 403, 702.

5.      Declaration of Adam K. Shea ¶ 8. Sustained. Lacks foundation/personal knowledge. See Evid. Code, §§ 403, 702.

6.      Declaration of Adam K. Shea ¶ 10, Ex. 2. Sustained. Lacks foundation/personal knowledge. See Evid. Code, §§ 403, 702.

7.      Declaration of Adam K. Shea ¶ 12. Overruled.

8.      Declaration of Adam K. Shea ¶ 15. Overruled.

9.      Declaration of Adam K. Shea ¶ 16. Overruled.

10.  Declaration of Adam K. Shea ¶ 17. Overruled.

11.  Declaration of Adam K. Shea ¶ 18. Overruled

12.  Declaration of Adam K. Shea ¶ 19. Overruled.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

“The doctrine of forum non conveniens is firmly established in the law of California. The principle has now been codified … as Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30. That section states: ‘When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.’” Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 105, 109-110.

“Forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine invoking the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the action may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere.” Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 751 (Stangvik). “[The California Supreme Court] described the basis of the doctrine as follows: ‘“There are manifest reasons for preferring residents in access to often overcrowded Courts, both in convenience and in the fact that broadly speaking it is they who pay for maintaining the Courts concerned.” . . . [T]he injustices and the burdens on local courts and taxpayers, as well as on those leaving their work and business to serve as jurors, which can follow from an unchecked and unregulated importation of transitory causes of action for trial in this state . . . require that our courts, acting upon the equitable principles . . . , exercise their discretionary power to decline to proceed in those causes of action which they conclude, on satisfactory evidence, may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere.’” Ibid (quoting Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 577, 582-84).

“In determining whether to grant a motion based on forum non conveniens, a court must first determine whether the alternate forum is a ‘suitable’ place for trial. If it is, the next step is to consider the private interests of the litigants and the interests of the public in retaining the action for trial in California. “ Ibid (citations omitted).

The defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of proof on a motion based on forum non conveniens.” National Football League v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 902, 918 (NFL). “[A] resident of one of our sister states who files suit in California is entitled to due deference under the circumstances presented, not a strong presumption, in favor of its choice of forum. That deference is to be weighed and balanced by the trial court along with all the other pertinent factors, including the defendant’s residence or principal place of business, and has no direct bearing on the moving defendant’s burden of proof.” Id. at p. 929. Where plaintiff is a nonresident, defendant need not show that California is a “seriously inconvenient forum.” Fox Factory, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 197, 205. “A corporate defendant’s state of incorporation and principal place of business is presumptively a convenient forum.” Morris v. AGFA Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1465. However, “[a] resident defendant may overcome the presumption of convenience by evidence that the alternate jurisdiction is a more convenient place for trial of the action.” Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p.756.

I. Suitable Alternative Forum

Defendant argues that South Carolina is a suitable alternative forum.

“An alternative forum is suitable if it has jurisdiction and the action in that forum will not be barred by the statute of limitations.” Guimei v. General Electric Co. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 689, 696.

Defendant is willing to stipulate its submission to jurisdiction in South Carolina and tolling all statutes of limitations applicable to plaintiffs’ asserted causes of action for the time the action has been pending in California. Mot. at p. 9:4-8; O’Hern Decl. ¶ 15. In Roman v. Liberty University, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 670, 683, the court “accept[ed] the representation of an officer of the court as equivalent, in binding effect, to a stipulation that [defendant] will not raise any statute of limitations defense in the [alternative forum].” Additionally, “[O]ther courts have found an ‘agreement’ or ‘offer’ to stipulate sufficient to find the alternate forum suitable.” Doe WHBE 3 v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1135, 1153 (collecting cases).

Moreover, Plaintiffs do not dispute that South Carolina is a suitable alternative forum. Opp. at p. 4:5. (“South Carolina appears to be a suitable forum….”). Thus, the Court concludes South Carolina is a suitable alternative forum and Defendant has met the first prong of the test.

II. Private and Public Interests

Next, the Court considers the private interests of the litigants and the interests of the public in retaining the action for trial in California.

“[T]he private and public interest factors must be applied flexibly, without giving undue emphasis to any one element. A court should not decide that there are circumstances in which the doctrine will always apply or never apply. Otherwise, the flexibility of the doctrine would be threatened, and its application would be based on identification of a single factor rather than the balancing of several.” Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p.753.

“[T]he inquiry is not whether any out-of-state witness or evidence might be needed, but whether, on balance, the location of the witnesses and evidence makes California an inconvenient forum.” Animal Film, LLC v. D.E.J. Productions, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 466, 474

A. Private Interest

Defendant argues that private interests favor dismissal.

“The private interest factors are those that make trial and the enforceability of the ensuing judgment expeditious and relatively inexpensive, such as [1] the ease of access to sources of proof, [2] the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and [3] the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses.” Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p.751.

The parties dispute which state, California or South Carolina, contains greater ease of access to sources of proof or will involve greater costs of obtaining witnesses.

Defendant argues that South Carolina is the more convenient location because evidence relevant to causation, comparative fault, liability, and damages is located in South Carolina. Defendant argues that the live testimony of first responders and police officers explaining the location and their observations of the generator will be critical to its defense. Defendant further argues that decedents’ South Carolina employer will be important witnesses because decedents borrowed the generator from their employer. Therefore, it argues that the South Carolina employer is likely to have critical information concerning the loaning of the generator, what information and documentation was provided to the decedents, the decedents’ prior use of the generator, the condition of the generator, decedents’ awareness of risks associated with using the generator, and Plaintiffs’ claims for lost wages based on the decedents’ earnings. Reply at p. 3:7-11.

Plaintiffs argue that because their claims do not turn on the physical location of the injury, but on Defendant’s corporate decision-making, California is the more convenient location. Opp. at p. 4:20-22. Plaintiffs argue that California is more convenient for obtaining witnesses and documentary evidence because that is where Defendant is located, and presumably where their officers and employees made the relevant decisions regarding the design and safety of the generator at issue here. Opp. at p.5:9-20.

Plaintiffs provide links to Harbor Freight’s YouTube channel, which features an advertisement stating that its Predator Multi-Fuel Generators are “ENGINEERED BY OUR U.S. TEAM OF INDUSTRY EXPERTS.” Shea Decl. ¶ 18. This advertisement appears to contradict the declaration of Sean O’Hern, Harbor Freight’s Director of Forensics and Reliability, which states, “Harbor Freight Tools does not design or manufacture any portable generators …All portable generators that Harbor Freight Tools distributes are designed and manufactured by third-party companies located in Asia.” O’Hern Decl. ¶¶12, 13.

Another advertisement appearing on the Harbor Freight YouTube channel depicts its Quality and Engineering Development Center located at its corporate campus, and states, “we put our tools through thousands of hours of intense testing to ensure they perform in all conditions…” Shea Decl. ¶ 19. Plaintiffs also provide a link to Defendant’s website advertising corporate careers, which states, “Our state-of-the-art quality assurance lab is right next to our corporate office….” Therefore, the extent to which any part of the subject generator was designed or tested in California remains in dispute. Shea Decl. ¶ 20, Ex. 3.

While the location of Defendant’s headquarters in California is not dispositive, the Court agrees it is reasonable to conclude that its executives, key employees, and relevant documentary evidence within its control are all in California. See Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p.760 (“[Defendants’] alleged wrongful conduct was committed here, and there is a close connection between such conduct and plaintiffs’ causes of action. We agree with plaintiffs that defendants’ cumulative connection with California is an appropriate matter for consideration in deciding a forum non conveniens motion.”).

Both parties plausibly argue that their intended witnesses reside in their preferred forum. However, as a party, Defendant must make its employees available to testify. In contrast, Plaintiff cannot guarantee the availability of any South Carolina witnesses. While Plaintiffs provide the declarations of three first responders declaring that they would be willing to travel to California to testify, all are conditioned on their expenses being paid. Shea Decl., ¶¶ 21-23.Exs. 4-6. Moreover, regardless of their present intent to travel, the witnesses may not be available on the trial date. Nor are those the only South Carolina witnesses Defendant intends to call.

The Court concludes that private interests lightly favor South Carolina as the preferred forum.

B. Public Interest

Next, the Court considers public interest factors.

“The public interest factors include [1] avoidance of overburdening local courts with congested calendars, [2] protecting the interests of potential jurors so that they are not called upon to decide cases in which the local community has little concern, and [3] weighing the competing interests of California and the alternate jurisdiction in the litigation.” Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p.751.

1. Court Congestion

First, the Court considers the effect of this case on California court congestion.

There is only one Defendant and, despite the number of Plaintiffs, this matter ultimately concerns a single incident that killed the four decedents. Therefore, this case will have little impact on court congestion. See Roulier v. Cannondale (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1190 (“Here, we have a single plaintiff with two defendants, represented by the same counsel…. [L]ittle or no impact on court congestion may be expected to result from a trial in this state.”).

2. Burden on Jurors

Next, the Court considers the impact on potential jurors.

“‘California courts … have little or no interest in litigation involving injuries incurred outside of California by nonresidents. It seems unduly burdensome for California residents to be expected to serve as jurors on a case having so little to do with California.’” Morris v. AGFA Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1467 (quoting Hansen v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 753, 760).

Here, it is undisputed that the injury occurred in South Carolina and that none of the decedents were California residents. Additionally, none of the Plaintiffs are California residents. Therefore, the Court concludes that it would be burdensome for California residents to serve as jurors in this case.

3. Competing Interests

Finally, the Court looks at the competing interests of California and South Carolina in this case.

“California has a strong interest in regulating the conduct of manufacturers that produce products in this state which cause injury to persons in other jurisdictions… This interest … is to deter negligent conduct; the likelihood of a substantial recovery against such a manufacturer strengthens the deterrent effect.” Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p.759.

Plaintiffs argue that California and its jurors have a vested interest in regulating the conduct of one of its local corporations … which continues to sell substantially similar products throughout the state.” Opp. at p. 3:21-23. However, Plaintiffs offer no evidence that there would be any greater likelihood of substantial recovery, and therefore a greater deterrence effect, from California court hearing this case than a South Carolina Court. See ibid. (“We are persuaded that under the facts in the present case, the additional deterrence that would result if defendants were called to account for their allegedly wrongful conduct in a California court rather than in the courts of Scandinavia would be negligible.”).

Therefore, while the effect on California court congestion is low, because this case would burden California jurors, and South Carolina has a greater interest, the public interest factors favor South Carolina.

Weighing all the factors, the Court concludes that dismissing the case is in the interest of substantial justice.

 

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.





Website by Triangulus