Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: BC684669, Date: 2024-01-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC684669 Hearing Date: March 8, 2024 Dept: 55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Defendant Los Angeles Unified School
District’s Motion For Leave Of Court To Conduct Independent Medical
Examinations Of Plaintiff And Reopen Discovery For Medical Records Subpoenas
And Plaintiff’s Deposition.
Background
On 1/24/24, the Court continued Defendant LAUSD’s (“Defendant”)
motion requesting leave to have Plaintiff Camilla Lopez Magallanes (“Plaintiff”)
submit to further neurological, psychiatric, and neuropsychological IMEs, and to
reopen discovery for the limited purpose of subpoenaing Plaintiff’s medical
records, and for the deposition of Plaintiff. As explained in the Court’s 1/24/24
order, good cause exists for Plaintiff to submit to further IMEs but the number
of potential tests that the neuropsychologist Dr. Hope E. Goldberg and psychiatric
examiner Dr. Jeff Sugar (along with associates or assistants) planned to administer
was abusive and needed to be culled to a more manageable number.
The Court concluded that Defendant’s time estimates for
the IMEs were appropriate, that Plaintiff may audio-record the mental
examination portions of the testing and such recording may include the written
part of any tests performed by Dr. Goldberg, and that Plaintiff is entitled to
obtain copies from any testing along with the raw data from such tests.
The Court continued the motion and ordered Defendant
to provide a revised notice of the three examinations listing a more narrowed
set of potential tests to be administered by the examiners and to include that
all mental examinations may be audio-recorded and that the Plaintiff is
entitled to copies of reports from the testing, including raw data. Defendant
filed revised notices of the three IMEs, which Plaintiff opposes.
Legal Standard
A party may seek a court order for additional IMEs
based on a showing of good cause. Code Civ. Proc., §2032.310(a), §2032.320(a). A notice of motion for a mental or physical
examination “‘shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, scope, and
nature of the examination, as well as the identity and the specialty, if any,
of the person or persons who will perform the examination.’” Carpenter v. Sup. Ct (2006) 141 Cal.
App. 4th 249, 259 (hereafter, “Carpenter”); Code Civ. Proc.,
§2032.310(b). Code of Civil Procedure
Section 2032.320(d) provides that an order granting a physical or mental
examination “shall specify the person or persons who may perform the
examination, as well as the time, place manner, diagnostic tests and
procedures, conditions, scope and nature of the examination.”
Analysis
Dr. Jo-
In its revised demand, Defendant seeks a neuropsychological examination of
Plaintiff by Dr. Mi-Yeoung Jo, PsyD. (no longer Dr. Goldberg). The demand lists
29 “possible” tests that Dr. Jo may administer to Plaintiff but then also
states that “additional measures may be added or substituted depending on the
child’s presentation on the day of the evaluation.” (Def’s Revised Notices, Jo
Demand, p. 4.) The reasonable conclusion from this language is that Dr. Jo may administer
one or more of the 29 tests listed in the demand and/or may use other tests
that are not listed in the demand. Such a broadly worded demand makes it
impossible to discern all of the specific tests that Dr. Jo will (or
even may) administer, as is required for an IME order pursuant to Code Civ. Proc.,
§2032.320(d). This revised demand, which would permit the examination to
include all manner of tests not specifically identified, is totally contrary to
the Court’s previous direction to Defendant to narrow the list of potential
tests.
The revised demand contains other problems. It states
that Dr. Jo’s evaluation will include a parent interview. The prior notice made
no mention of a parent interview as part of the neuropsychological examination
and the Court is unaware of any authority that would permit an IME order to include
an interview of a parent as part of a neuropsychological exam.
The revised demand repeats the language from the prior
notice that the raw data from the testing will only be exchanged with Plaintiff’s
psychological expert subject to a mutually agreeable protective order. This
does not address the Court’s prior direction that Plaintiff is entitled to copies
of reports along with the raw data pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., §2032.610(a).
Defendant has not filed a motion for a protective order, which would require a
showing of good cause. Under these circumstances, the Defendant has no basis to
demand a protective order to produce information that it is required to turn
over pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Dr. Sugar-
Defendant’s revised demand reiterates that Plaintiff must submit to a
psychiatric examination by Dr. Sugar. Defendant states that Dr. Sugar “may” use
certain scales, checklists, and/or inventories as part of a “detailed mental
status examination” but then also vaguely states that he may use “other” unnamed
scales. This is the same problem as the revised demand for Dr. Jo. The Court cannot
discern the tests and procedures that will be part of the ”mental status
examination” to include in any order, as is required under Code Civ. Proc.,
§2032.320(d). The revised demand for Dr. Sugar states that the examination will
include interviews with Plaintiff’s caregivers (the prior notice also said
this), but the Court is unaware of any legal basis for such a request.
Dr. Partikian-
The Court’s prior order did not specify any issues with the prior notice for
Dr. Partikian. Defendant’s revised demand is for Plaintiff to submit to a
neurological examination by Dr. Partikian. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that
the revised demand is impermissibly vague in stating that Plaintiff must submit
to a “basic mental status exam” without naming any specific diagnostic tests as
is required for any mental examination under Code Civ. Proc., §2032.320(d). And
again, the demand reiterates the statement from the prior notice that the
examination will include interviews with Plaintiff’s caregivers without
providing any authority for such an order.
Conclusion
The motion is granted in part and denied in part. The
motion is granted in part because good cause exists to re-open discovery to subpoena
Plaintiff’s recent medical records and to depose Plaintiff regarding her new
complaints. The motion is denied in part because the revised demands for
additional IMEs remain overly broad in scope. Defendant already had an
opportunity to reasonably narrow the demands and simply did not do so.