Judge: Alison Mackenzie, Case: SC129938, Date: 2023-05-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: SC129938    Hearing Date: May 17, 2023    Dept: 207

Background

Plaintiff David Dwyer, individually and as trustee of The 1987 Dwyer Living Trust (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against Defendants Nicole Homme and Matthew Homme (“the Hommes”). The Hommes then brought a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff and his wife, Maria Dwyer (collectively with Plaintiff, “the Dwyers”). The parties are neighbors in a community development known as Sunset Mesa in Malibu, California, and brought claims against each other for breach of restrictive covenants and nuisance concerning structures and landscaping located on their respective properties. The Court held a bench trial on the parties’ claims and on February 22, 2023, entered judgment in favor of the Hommes, finding them to be the prevailing parties in the action. The Hommes now move for an order awarding them their attorney’s fees incurred in this action. The Dwyers oppose the motion.

Legal Standard

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs, including attorneys’ fees, when such fees are authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032(a)(4); § 1033.5(a)(10).)

The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. . . . The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. [Citations.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.) 

Analysis

The Hommes claims they are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act as codified at Civil Code §§ 4000-6150. Specifically, they point to Civil Code § 5975(c), which provides than “In an action to enforce the governing documents, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” The Dwyers argue the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (the “Act”) does not apply to Sunset Mesa community in which the parties reside. The Court agrees.

The Act applies to a common interest development. (Civ. Code § 4200.) Civil Code § 4100 defines a “common interest development” as a community apartment project, condominium project, a planned development, or a stock cooperative. There is no dispute Sunset Mesa is not an apartment or condominium project, nor a stock cooperative. Thus, the Act only applies here if Sunset Mesa meets the definition of a “planned development.” Civil Code § 4175 defines a planned development as follows:

“Planned development” means a real property development other than a community apartment project, a condominium project, or a stock cooperative, having either or both of the following features:

(a) Common area that is owned either by an association or in common by the owners of the separate interests who possess appurtenant rights to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the common area.

(b) Common area and an association that maintains the common area with the power to levy assessments that may become a lien upon the separate interests in accordance with Article 2 (commencing with Section 5650) of Chapter 8.

Under Civil Code § 4095(b), mutual or reciprocal easement rights appurtenant to separate interests in a development qualify as “common areas” for purposes of section 4175(b).

Sunset Mesa does not have any common area owned by an association or in common with the owners of the homes in the development. (Ross Decl. at ¶3.) Therefore, Sunset Mesa cannot meet the definition of a planned development under section 4175(a). The Dwyers acknowledge the Sunset Mesa development has restrictive covenants that establish mutual or reciprocal easements, but correctly argue these are insufficient to meet the definition of a planned development under section 4175(b) because there is no homeowners association for the community with the power to assess or levy assessments. Neither the original 1964 covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“CC&Rs”) for the community, nor the amended 2005 CC&Rs appear to give the Sunset Mesa Property Owners Association any power to levy assessments. (Exs. 2 and 3 to Ross Decl.) The Hommes argue that the fact that the Sunset Mesa Property Owners Association (“SMPOA”) can assess dues to its members qualifies as having the power to levy assessments for the restrictive covenants in the Sunset Mesa development, but nothing in the SMPOA Articles of Incorporation or By-Laws (or the CC&Rs) supports this argument. (Exs. A and B to Homme Decl.)    

On such facts, the Court finds that the Sunset Mesa community in which the parties reside does not meet the definition of a “planned development” under Civil Code § 4175, and thus does not meet the definition of a common interest development under section 4100. As such, the Hommes have not shown the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act applies to this case. As the Act is the sole basis for the Hommes’ claim for attorney’s fees, their motion for an award of such fees is DENIED.

Conclusion

Defendants Nicole Homme and Matthew Homme’s motion for attorney’s fees is DENIED.