Judge: Andre De La Cruz, Case: 2022-01278429, Date: 2023-08-14 Tentative Ruling
1. Demurrer to Amended Complaint filed by Jeffrey Peterson on 4/7/23
Defendant Jeffrey Peterson, individually and as Trustee of the Peterson K. Family Trust, (“Defendant”) demurs to the Second Amended Complaint of Plaintiff Nathan Castro (“Plaintiff”) on the grounds that the SAC and third cause of action fail to state a cause of action.
Negligence / Premises Liability
The elements of a negligence cause of action are a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff to use due care, breach of that legal duty, causation, and injury to the plaintiff. Holmes v. Summer, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1528 (2010). The existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court. Id. at 1518. “The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence.” Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp, 220 Cal. App. 4th 994, 998 (2013).
Whether to impose a legal duty to protect from injuries caused by a third party is governed by a two-step inquiry: “First, the court must determine whether there exists a special relationship between the parties or some other set of circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect. Second, if so, the court must consult the factors described in Rowland to determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that duty.” Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal. 5th 204, 209 (2021).
Step 1: A Special Relationship Existed Between Plaintiff and Defendant
Generally, “there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.” Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 36 Cal. 4th 224, 235 (2005). However, there are several exceptions to this general rule. Id. Under the “special relationship” doctrine, “[a] defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third parties if he or she has a ‘special relationship’ with the other person.” Id. “The relationship between a possessor of land and an invitee is a special relationship giving rise to a duty of care.” Hanouchian v. Steele, 51 Cal. App. 5th 99, 107 (2020) (citations omitted). “‘The duty of care includes a duty to take reasonable steps to protect persons on the property from physical harm caused by the foreseeable conduct of third parties,’ including foreseeable criminal acts.” Id.
Defendant does not dispute that he is the possessor of land where the party and incident underlying this action took place. Nor does he dispute that Plaintiff was an invitee on his property as a guest of the wedding. Thus, the Court finds that there existed a special relationship between the parties.
Step 2: Whether Relevant Policy Considerations Counsel Limiting Defendant’s Duty
In Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108 (1968), the California Supreme Court set forth the several factors to be considered in determining a duty’s existence and scope. They are: “[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” Id. at 113.
“‘Foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are ordinarily the crucial considerations, but in a given case one or more of the other Rowland factors may be determinative of the duty analysis.’” Id. at 107. Where the burden of preventing the harm is high, a high degree of foreseeability may be required. Castaneda v. Olsher, 41 Cal. 4th 1205, 1213 (2007). Where, however, there is a strong policy for preventing the harm or the burden of preventing the harm is low, a lesser degree of foreseeability may be required. Id.
The relevant allegations in the SAC are: Defendant was aware of excessive alcohol consumption and corresponding wild behavior by the guests and was aware of escalating and ongoing tensions between Walker and his girlfriend and other guests of the event, including Plaintiff. SAC ¶ 17; Walker’s girlfriend loudly stated in front of Defendant that she and Walker were angry and Walker was a trained “ex-marine” and if they continued to be angry or aggravated, there would be trouble. SAC ¶ 18; Defendant should have been aware of the repeated and loud threats regarding Walker’s status as an ex-marine and the increasingly imminent attack. SAC ¶ 18; Defendant was aware of Walker’s combat training and his capability to engage in violent behavior, as well as his highly intoxicated condition and increasing anger. SAC ¶ 38; Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to take reasonable measures to prevent unreasonable risks of harm including proper supervision and security, proper management and service of alcohol consumption on the premises, proper storage of potential weapons, and ceasing to serve alcohol to guests who showed signs of obvious intoxication. SAC ¶ 38; and Defendant was aware of dangerous tools which could be used as weapons located in an unlocked and open shed in the immediate proximity of the bar area. SAC ¶ 40.
The newly alleged facts in the SAC are that Walker’s girlfriend loudly stated in front of Defendant that Walker is an ex-marine and there would be trouble if other wedding guests continued to aggravate them. This allegation, combined with the allegations that Defendant was aware of the increasingly imminent attack arising out of the hostility among the wedding guests, is sufficient to support knowledge of a propensity to assault and a finding of foreseeability. The allegations amount to more than the mere assertion that Defendant was negligent in providing alcohol to wedding guests. Rather, the SAC asserts that he was negligent in allowing guests who were already visibly intoxicated to continue to consume alcohol, failing to take any measures against increasing hostility and threats of attack among guests, and allowing guests access to a shed with tools that could be used as weapons.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the SAC adequately alleges facts to support the duty element of the Negligence/Premises Liability cause of action.
Social Host Immunity
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to social host immunity to the extent the event stems from the service of alcohol. Plaintiff argues the social host immunity does not apply because Plaintiff’s claim is not based on the service of alcohol but the whole scenario and the failure to protect generally.
Code of Civil Procedure Section 1714 provides that everyone is responsible for their own willful or negligent conduct, and that “no social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person may be held legally accountable for damages suffered by that person, or for injury to the person or property of, or death of, any third person resulting from the consumption of those beverages.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1714(a), (c).
Moreover, Business and Professions Code Section 25602(b) provides: “No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage [to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person] shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such alcoholic beverage.”
Plaintiff cites to Cantwell v. Peppermill, Inc., 25 Cal. App. 4th 1797 (1994). That case involved Business & Professions Code section 25602 and whether the defendant, operator of a bar and lounge, could be liable for an assault and stabbing of the plaintiff by another patron. The appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded with instructions to overrule the defendant’s demurrer. Id. at p. 1803. The court noted that, “[a]though the proprietor is not an insurer of its patrons’ safety, he has a duty of care to protect patrons from the reasonably foreseeable criminal or tortious conduct of third persons. Thus, he is liable for ‘receiving or harboring guests of known violent or vicious propensities.’” Id. at p. 1801 (citations removed). The court further noted that the gravamen of the cause of action against the respondent was that the injury resulted from the respondent’s failure to protect against the tortious or criminal conduct of others, and not from the provision of alcohol. Id.
In Biles v. Richter, 206 Cal. App. 3d 325 (1988), the plaintiff, a social guest, was injured by a fire that had been started by another intoxicated guest smoking cigarettes. The complaint alleged that the defendant negligently failed to supervise, maintain, or inspect their premises or the activities of their social guests, knowing those guests had consumed alcohol and were smoking in the defendant’s living room. Id. at p. 328. The Biles court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to avoid the social host immunity statutes by alleging liability was based on the separate act of failing to supervise persons to whom alcoholic beverages were furnished. Id. at 330-332. The Biles court stated:
“If a plaintiff could hold a social host liable for failure to supervise those to whom he had furnished alcohol, the immunity afforded by [the social host immunity statutes] would be seriously eroded. This is because the duty of supervision is premised upon the need to look after those whose coordination and judgment have been adversely affected by the consumption of alcohol. If allowed, the duty would appear to exist in many if not most cases where alcohol is furnished by social hosts.”
Id. at 331.
The court went on to state: “On the other hand, if the complaint’s numerous allusions to the guests’ consumption of alcohol are disregarded, defendants are not liable for plaintiff’s injuries because they had no obligation to satisfy their duty of care by supervising their sober guests simply because they smoked cigarettes.” Id.
Though Cantwell addresses the immunity under Business and Professions Code Section 25602, and not the social host immunity found in Section 1714, its reasoning is still instructive here. As in Cantwell, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s SAC is not the mere provision of alcohol but the failure to protect against the acts of Walker, despite the alleged knowledge that Walker’s girlfriend had threatened other guests and there was growing hostility between Walker and others. These allegations do not seek to hold Defendant liable for simply providing alcohol to the wedding guests, but for failing to protect against guests in the face of an imminent and reasonably foreseeable attack. In other words, Defendant could be liable to Plaintiff even in the absence of alcohol at the wedding because it is alleged that he breached the duty of care to supervise guests who were capable of and threatening violence.
Based on all of the above, the Demurrer is OVERRULED.
Defendant to file an Answer to the SAC within 15 calendar days.
Defendant to give notice.
2. Case Management Conference
CMC will be continued to September 29, 2023 in Department C14 at 9:00 a.m.
Defendant to give notice.