Judge Andrew E. Cooper, Case Number: 20CHCV00519, Date: 2023-09-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 20CHCV00519, Date: 2023-09-27 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251. Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).

Case Number: 20CHCV00519 Hearing Date: September 27, 2023 Dept: F51

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 20CHCV00519

Motion Filed: 6/22/23 Jury Trial: 8/19/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Farmers Insurance Exchange; Truck Insurance Exchange; Fire Insurance Exchange; Mid-Century Insurance Company; and Farmers New World Life Insurance Company (collectively, “Moving Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Vincent Kody Pappadato (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication in favor of Moving Defendants and against Plaintiff.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted. Moving Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS:

· Moving Defendants’ evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Vincent Kody Pappadato, Nos. 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 29, 30, 33, 40, 50, 52, 55, and 56 are sustained, and Nos. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 34, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 45, 46, 53, and 54 are overruled.

· Moving Defendants’ evidentiary objections to the Exhibits attached to the Declaration of Vincent Kody Pappadato, Nos. 4, 6, 9, and 10 are sustained, and Nos. 7 and 8 are overruled.

· Moving Defendants’ evidentiary objections to the Exhibits attached to the Declaration of Leonard H. Burgess, Nos. 1 and 2 are sustained, and No. 3 is overruled.

Plaintiff is reminded to review the 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil. When e-filing documents, parties must comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” which are set forth at page 4, line 4 through page 5, line 12 of the Court’s 5/3/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil (particularly bookmarking declarations and exhibits). (CRC 3.1110(f)(4).) Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers being rejected, matters being placed off calendar, matters being continued so documents can be resubmitted in compliance with these requirements, documents not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings the instant action against defendants insurance companies and their employees, alleging that all defendants made false representations to induce Plaintiff to leave his position of employment and invest in a new insurance agency to his detriment.

On 9/8/20, Plaintiff filed the instant action. On 10/4/21, Plaintiff filed his operative second amended complaint (“SAC”), which alleges against 9 named defendants the following causes of action: (1) Fraud – Intentional Misrepresentation; (2) Negligent Misrepresentation; (3) Breach of Contract; and (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty. On 11/23/21, the Court sustained a demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action without leave to amend. On 12/2/21, Moving Defendants filed their answer.

On 6/22/23, Moving Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On 8/25/23, Plaintiff filed his opposition. On 9/1/23, Moving Defendants filed their reply.

ANALYSIS

Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 65, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381–382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519–1520.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

A. Justifiable Reliance

Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action allege against all Defendants (1) Fraud – Intentional Misrepresentation; and (2) Negligent Misrepresentation. “The elements of a cause of action for intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) with knowledge of its falsity, (3) with the intent to induce another’s reliance on the misrepresentation, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage.” (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166 [emphasis added].)

The elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation include “[m]isrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, and with intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented; ignorance of the truth and justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the party to whom it was directed; and resulting damage.” (Hydro-Mill Co., Inc. v. Hayward, Tilton & Rolapp Ins. Associates, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154 [quotations omitted] [emphasis added].)

“Reliance is justifiable only when circumstances were such to make it reasonable for plaintiff to accept defendant's statements without an independent inquiry or investigation.” (Philipson & Simon v. Gulsvig (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 347, 363 [quotations omitted].) “The reasonableness of the plaintiff's reliance is judged by reference to the plaintiff's knowledge and experience.” (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 864.)

Here, Moving Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action necessarily fail because Plaintiff cannot prove that he justifiably relied on nonmoving defendant Lou DeAngelis’ alleged misrepresentations about the amount of commission Plaintiff would earn if he signed on as a Farmers Insurance Agent. On 4/1/19, Plaintiff and Moving Defendants entered into an Agent Appointment Agreement (“AAA”) for the duration of three years. (UMF #1.) It is undisputed that the AAA contains an integration clause which states: “this Agreement embodies the entire agreement and understanding between the Parties hereto as to the matters addressed and supersedes all prior agreements and understandings, written or otherwise, relating to the subject matter of this Agreement. With the exception of address changes and changes to commission schedules and rules, no change, alteration or modification of this Agreement can be made unless it is in writing and signed by (a) Agent and (b) an authorized representative of the Companies.” (UMF #6.) “The purpose of an integration clause is to preclude the introduction of evidence which varies or contradicts the terms of the written instruments.” (R.W.L. Enterprises v. Oldcastle, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1019, 1031.)

On 4/12/19, Plaintiff signed a Direct Appointment Policy Assignment Addendum (“DAPAA”), which operated as an addendum to the AAA effective 4/1/19. (UMF #11.) “Section D subsection 3. of the DAPAA provides that Plaintiff ‘voluntarily enters into this Addendum without relying on any representations made by the Companies or any of their representatives not contained in this Addendum.’” (UMF #17.) “Section D subsection 3. (b) of the DAPAA provides that the “Companies have made no representations regarding the value of the service rights and duties assigned pursuant to this Addendum and Agent has made an independent evaluation thereof.” (UMF #18.) “Finally, the AAA contains an acknowledgment provision, executed by Plaintiff, which provides that ‘Agent acknowledges that Agent has read, understands, and agrees to the terms and conditions contained in this Agreement and voluntarily enters into this Agreement without relying on any representations not contained in this Agreement.’” (UMF #7.)

Moving Defendants argue that “the DAPAA makes clear that the Signatory Defendants had the right to reassign the subject policies to another agent at any time and for any reason and that Plaintiff entered into the DAPAA ‘without relying on any representations made by the Companies or any of their representatives not contained in this Addendum.’ As such, Plaintiff cannot now claim that he justifiably relied upon any representations that may have been made to him in connection with his appointment as a Farmers Agent.” (MSJ 1:16–22.)

In support of their argument, Moving Defendants proffer a copy of the DAPAA as an exhibit to the declaration of Zoltan M. Nagy, a Director – Home Office Agencies for Farmers Group, Inc. which provides certain non-claims related administrative services to Moving Defendants. (Ex. N-2 to Nagy Decl.) Moving Defendants also proffer Plaintiff’s deposition testimony wherein Plaintiff stated that he did not recall reading subsection 3 to the DAPAA, despite acknowledging that “he understood from his own professional experience that some of the policies listed on Exhibit A to the DAPAA might not have stayed with his business.” (UMF #24–25.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Moving Defendants have satisfied their initial burden to present facts to negate an essential element to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists with regard to his reliance on the alleged representations made.

Here, Plaintiff reiterates in his opposition that “in reliance on Defendants misrepresentations, Plaintiff invested heavily in an insurance agency to support the promised seed books of business.” (Opp. 11:1–2.) The Court notes that Plaintiff does not appear to contest the proffered AAA or DAPAA in any way, nor does he dispute the material facts submitted by Moving Defendants showing that Plaintiff agreed to the terms therein, including the provision stating: “The undersigned Agent or authorized representative of Agent voluntarily enters into this Addendum without relying on any representations made by the Companies or any of their representatives not contained in this Addendum.” (Ex. N-2 to Nagy Decl., ¶ D.3.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his responsive burden to “produce substantial responsive evidence” challenging the validity or enforceability of the agreements, which expressly state that Plaintiff agreed that his employment was not in reliance on any representations by Defendants. The Court therefore finds that Moving Defendants are not liable to Plaintiff based on any representations made by their agents. Moving Defendants are independently protected by the terms of the AAA and DAPAA, and if Moving Defendants were vicariously liable for nonmoving defendant DeAngelis’ alleged misrepresentations, both Moving Defendants and DeAngelis would then be protected. If DeAngelis were to be found an independent contractor, of which there is little evidence, the Court finds in its analysis of DeAngelis’ motion for summary judgment that he is likewise not liable for the alleged misrepresentations. Therefore, even if there exists a triable issue of vicarious liability, the outcome remains the same.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Moving Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action.

B. Breach of Contract

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges against Moving Defendants Breach of Contract. The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are: “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “DEFENDANTS failed to compensate PLAINTIFF pursuant to the terms of the Agent Appointment Agreement, including, but not limited to, failed to compensate PLAINTIFF for all policies transferred out of PLAINTIFF’[s] Agency; failed to compensate PLAINTIFF for all monies owed under the AGM and UQI programs; failed to compensate PLAINTIFF for all Premium Growth Bonus earned, failed to compensate for lost customers and policies. Further, the failure to properly compensate PLAINTIFF caused a devaluation of PLAINTIFF’s business.” (SAC ¶ 142.)

Moving Defendants contend that they “did not breach the terms of the contract entered into with Plaintiff. The undisputed facts establish that Plaintiff was paid, in full, for all commissions and bonuses that he earned during his appointment.” (MSJ 18:18–20.) In support of their argument, Moving Defendants proffer the sworn declaration of Chris Prester, a Manager, Accounting Field Operations – Agent Compensation for moving defendant Farmers Group, Inc. (Decl. of Chris Prester ¶ 1.) Based on his calculations and analysis of Plaintiff’s records, the declarant “determined that the Signatory Defendants compensated Plaintiff in full for all commissions and bonuses that he earned during his 36-month appointment. Plaintiff’s monthly eFolio commissions statements confirm that Farmers paid Plaintiff the monthly commissions and bonuses to which he was entitled based upon terms of the appointment agreement and the policies identified in the SEED packet. Plaintiff’s commissions and bonuses were based upon productivity levels related to policies identified in the SEED appointment, policy servicing and renewals, and new business generation. Plaintiff was paid in accordance with the terms of the AAA, DAPAA and the applicable commission and bonus schedules in effect at the time the commission or bonus was earned.” (Id. at ¶ 6.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Moving Defendants have satisfied their initial burden to present facts to negate an essential element to Plaintiff’s third cause of action. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists with regard to Moving Defendants’ alleged breach.

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that following an 8/23/19 meeting with DeAngelis, “Plaintiff and his office staff were ‘cut off’ from the District Office” in breach of the AAA, which requires “the ‘A. Companies’ Duties, 2. To provide Agent any approved manuals, guidelines, forms, and policyholder records necessary to carry out the provisions of this agreement.’ … The complete cutting off of all support only a few months into a business relationship clearly is not providing guidelines or the necessary support for Plaintiff and his agency to adequately thrive under the agreement.” (Opp. 14:4–12.)

The Court notes that this alleged breach is not raised in Plaintiff’s SAC, and therefore it is not a material issue framed by the pleadings. Accordingly, the Court declines to consider this opposition argument. Plaintiff argues further that “the farmers Defendants further breached the Agent Appointment Agreement by not paying Plaintiff for Policies transferred out of his agency.” (Opp. 15:21–22.) In support of this argument, Plaintiff offers his own declaration, stating that “I repeatedly complained about the loss of commissions owed to me to Farmers Insurance District Manager LOU DEANGELIS and many others at Farmers. Farmers never provided an accounting regarding the missing policy transfer commissions or evidence of payment. This was not provided in any detail via any source on the Agent site. There would be mysterious additions or subtractions but I never once was notified in advance of a transfer and I was never provided with a written request to transfer signed by the insured despite my requests for such information.” (Pappadato Decl. ¶ 49.)

However, as Moving Defendants observe in reply, Plaintiff “has not identified a single earned commission or bonus for which he has not been paid and has failed to produce evidence establishing how Defendants’ conduct caused him harm.” (Reply 5:14–17.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his responsive burden to show a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Moving Defendants breached the AAA or DAPAA. Accordingly, the Court finds that Moving Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action.

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 20CHCV00519

Motion Filed: 7/12/23 Jury Trial: 8/19/24

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Lou De Angelis (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Vincent Kody Pappadato (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication in favor of Moving Defendant and against Plaintiff.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted. Moving Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS: Moving Defendant’s evidentiary objections Nos. 4 and 11 are sustained, and Nos. 1, 2, and 3 are overruled.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings the instant action against defendants insurance companies and their employees, including Moving Defendant, alleging that all defendants made false representations to induce Plaintiff to leave his position of employment and invest in a new insurance agency to his detriment.

On 7/12/23, Moving Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On 9/13/23, Plaintiff filed his opposition. On 9/21/23, Moving Defendant filed his reply.

ANALYSIS

Legal Standard

A. Intentional and Negligent Misrepresentation

Here, Moving Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action necessarily fail because Plaintiff cannot prove that he justifiably relied on Moving Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations about the amount of commission Plaintiff would earn if he signed on as a Farmers Insurance Agent.

1. Contractual Disclaimer

On 4/1/19, Plaintiff and nonmoving Farmers defendants entered into an Agent Appointment Agreement (“AAA”) for the duration of three years. (UMF #1.) It is undisputed that the AAA contains an integration clause which states: “this Agreement embodies the entire agreement and understanding between the Parties hereto as to the matters addressed and supersedes all prior agreements and understandings, written or otherwise, relating to the subject matter of this Agreement. With the exception of address changes and changes to commission schedules and rules, no change, alteration or modification of this Agreement can be made unless it is in writing and signed by (a) Agent and (b) an authorized representative of the Companies.” (UMF #4.) “The purpose of an integration clause is to preclude the introduction of evidence which varies or contradicts the terms of the written instruments.” (R.W.L. Enterprises v. Oldcastle, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1019, 1031.)

On 4/12/19, Plaintiff signed a Direct Appointment Policy Assignment Addendum (“DAPAA”), which operated as an addendum to the AAA effective 4/1/19. (UMF #6.) “Section D subsection 3. of the DAPAA provides that Plaintiff ‘voluntarily enters into this Addendum without relying on any representations made by the Companies or any of their representatives not contained in this Addendum.’” (UMF #13.) “Section D subsection 3. (b) of the DAPAA provides that the “Companies have made no representations regarding the value of the service rights and duties assigned pursuant to this Addendum and Agent has made an independent evaluation thereof.” (UMF #14.) Finally, the AAA contains an acknowledgment provision, executed by Plaintiff, which provides that “Agent acknowledges that Agent has read, understands, and agrees to the terms and conditions contained in this Agreement and voluntarily enters into this Agreement without relying on any representations not contained in this Agreement.” (UMF #5.)

Moving Defendant argues that “Plaintiff has assented to the terms of the AAA and DAPAA, and is presumed to know its contents and cannot escape being bound by its terms merely by contending that he did not read them.” (MSJ 17:1–3.) “Plaintiff agreed with the unambiguous language of the AAA and DAPAA when he signed the agreement. Therefore, the parol evidence rule precludes recovery by Plaintiff on claims of purportedly intentional or negligent misrepresentations, whose claims are wholly predicated on allegations of a purported oral misrepresentations or agreements made by Defendant concerning the policies that were to be transferred to Plaintiff upon his appointment.” (MSJ 18:1–6.)

In support of his argument, Moving Defendant proffers a copy of the DAPAA as an exhibit to the declaration of Zoltan M. Nagy, a Director – Home Office Agencies for Farmers Group, Inc. which provides certain non-claims related administrative services to the nonmoving signatory defendants. (Ex. B to Nagy Decl.) Moving Defendant also proffers Plaintiff’s deposition testimony wherein Plaintiff stated that he did not recall reading subsection 3 to the DAPAA, despite acknowledging that “he understood from his own professional experience that some of the policies listed on Exhibit A to the DAPAA might not have stayed with his business.” (UMF #24–26.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Moving Defendant has satisfied his initial burden to present facts to negate an essential element to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists with regard to his reliance on the alleged representations made.

2. Reasonable Reliance on Misrepresentations

Moving Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action fail because the alleged misrepresentations concerned future seed books of business promised to Plaintiff, which are not actionable as a matter of law. “’It is hornbook law that an actionable misrepresentation must be made about past or existing facts; statements regarding future events are merely deemed opinions.’” (Reply 3:21–23, quoting San Francisco Design Center Associates v. Portman Companies (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 29, 43–44.)

Here, Moving Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s claim that De Angelis promised that a third party, Farmers®, would give him future books of ‘seed’ business of a particular size and composition cannot support Plaintiff’s claims for negligent and intentional misrepresentation. Rather, this alleged misstatement – which does not comport with the parties’ written communications – is a nonactionable ‘prediction[ ] as to future events ... by some third party.’” (Id. at 4:1–5, quoting Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 158.)

The Court agrees and finds that the alleged misrepresentations about the books of business and commissions that Plaintiff was to receive do not concern past or existing material facts, as required for causes of action for intentional or negligent misrepresentation.

Moreover, based on Plaintiff’s “extensive experience in the insurance industry,” the Court finds that his reliance on any alleged misrepresentations by any defendant are not reasonable, particularly where he signed two contracts which disclaim any such reliance. (SAC ¶ 105, Pl.’s Opp. 3:7.) If Plaintiff reasonably expected to receive a guaranteed certain amount of business, based on defendants’ representations, Plaintiff had the opportunity to negotiate for those terms to be incorporated into the agreements. Plaintiff has failed to present evidence to show that his reliance on Moving Defendant’s representations was reasonable, nor any evidence that the AAA and DAPAA are contracts of adhesion. Additionally, Plaintiff has not shown detrimental reliance where he appears to have admitted to discovering the “truth” of the alleged misrepresentation in September 2019, but continued to work as a Farmers insurance agent for the remainder of the 36-month contract term. (Rochlis v. Walt Disney Co. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 201, 215, as modified (Oct. 6, 1993); UMF #34.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that he reasonably relied on Moving Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations.

3. Damages

Moving Defendant further argues that Plaintiff cannot show that he has suffered any damages stemming from Moving Defendant’s conduct. It is undisputed that “Plaintiff continued to operate his agency until the expiration of the 36-month term of his AAA and sold all asserts of the Vincent Pappadato Agency to a third party for $80,000 at the end of this 36-month appointment.” (MSJ 20:1–3; UMF #36–37.)

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that following an 8/23/19 meeting with Moving Defendant, “Plaintiff and his office staff were ‘cut off’ from the District Office” in breach of the AAA, which requires “the ‘A. Companies’ Duties, 2. To provide Agent any approved manuals, guidelines, forms, and policyholder records necessary to carry out the provisions of this agreement.’ … The complete cutting off of all support only a few months into a business relationship clearly is not providing guidelines or the necessary support for Plaintiff and his agency to adequately thrive under the agreement.” (Pl.’s Opp. 16:11–19.)

The Court again notes that Moving Defendant is not a party to the relevant agreements, and Plaintiff has not alleged any breach of contract against Moving Defendant. Even so, this alleged conduct is not raised in Plaintiff’s SAC, and therefore it is not a material issue framed by the pleadings. Accordingly, the Court declines to consider this opposition argument. Moreover, as Moving Defendant asserts, and as the Court finds above, “Plaintiff could not and did not reasonably rely on any representations made by Defendant and consequently, did not suffer any harm as a result.” (MSJ 19:18–21.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that he suffered injury as a result of Moving Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Moving Defendant’s motion as to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action. The Court notes Moving Defendant’s arguments regarding punitive damages but need not reach them based on the foregoing findings.

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted.