Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 21CHCV00701, Date: 2024-07-29 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21CHCV00701    Hearing Date: July 29, 2024    Dept: F51

JULY 26, 2024

 

MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 21CHCV00701

 

Motion Filed: 2/23/24

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants/Cross-Defendants Pinnacle Estate Properties, Inc.; and Sulmery Martinez (collectively, “Cross-Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: None

NOTICE: OK

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order finding the settlement entered between Cross-Defendants and Defendant/Cross-Complainant Richard R. Famiglietti, dba Global Realty & Investment Co. (“Cross-Complainant”) to be in good faith pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.

 

TENTATIVE RULING: The unopposed motion is granted.

 

BACKGROUND

 

This action arises out of Plaintiff Cruz Concrete and Stone, Inc.’s purchase of vacant property located in Agua Dulce, California from defendant Alberto Garibay. Plaintiff alleges that the wrong property was purchased due to Defendants’ misrepresentations and/or breaches of duties. Plaintiff alleges that defendants William Manriquez and Cross-Defendant Sulmery Martinez were employed by Cross-Defendant Pinnacle Estate Properties, Inc. (“Pinnacle”), and represented Garibay in the transaction.¿(FAC ¶¶ 2, 5–6.)¿Plaintiff was allegedly represented/assisted by Cross-Complainant Richard R. Famiglietti, Maribel Padilla and Global Realty Investment Co. in the purchase transaction.¿(Id. at ¶¶ 3, 7).

 

On 9/13/21, Plaintiff filed this action alleging against Defendants causes of action for: (1) Rescission of Contract; (2) Breach of Contract; (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (4) Fraudulent Misrepresentation in Matters of Real Estate; (5) Negligent Misrepresentation In Matters of Real Estate; (6) Cancellation of Grant Deed; (7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (8) Unjust Enrichment.

 

On 2/8/22, Plaintiff filed its first amended complaint (“FAC”), alleging the following causes of action: (1) Rescission of Contract; (2) Breach of Contract; (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (4) Breach of Duty of Disclosure; (5) Fraudulent Misrepresentation in Matters of Real Estate; (6) Negligent Misrepresentation in Matters of Real Estate; (7) Cancellation of Grant Deed; and (8) Unjust Enrichment.

 

On 1/24/23, Cross-Complainant filed his answer to Plaintiff’s FAC. On 1/25/23, Cross-Complainant filed his original cross-complaint, alleging causes of action for (1) Negligence; and (2) Fraud. On 4/27/23, Cross-Complainant filed his first amended cross-complaint (“FAXC”), alleging the following causes of action: (1) Negligence; (2) Negligent Misrepresentation; and (3) Intentional Misrepresentation.

 

On 2/23/24, Cross-Defendants filed the instant application for determination of good faith settlement. No opposition has been filed to date.

 

ANALYSIS

 

In determining whether a settlement was entered in good faith pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, the Court considers several factors: (1) A rough approximation of the plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) The amount paid in settlement; (3) A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than if found liable at trial; (4) The allocation of the settlement proceeds among the plaintiffs; (5) The settlor’s financial condition and insurance policy limits, if any; and (6) Evidence of any collusion, fraud, tortious conduct between the settlor and the plaintiff aimed at making the non-settling parties pay more than their fair share. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) 

 

However, the Court need only weigh the Tech-Bilt factors when the good faith nature of the settlement is disputed, whereas “when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient.” (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.) 

 

Here, the terms of the settlement provide, inter alia, that Cross-Complainant agrees to release his claims against Cross-Defendants, with prejudice, in exchange for $25,000.00, with each party to bear their own attorney fees and costs. (Decl. of Alana Anaya ¶¶ 2–3.) Cross-Defendants assert that the settlement satisfies each Tech-Bilt factor because “the settlement sum of $25,000 is more than 30% of the $81,000 purchase price paid for Plaintiff for the subject wrong raw land. Said figure of $25,000.00 is not disproportionate, particularly given that the liability of [Cross-Defendants] (seller agent and broker) to [Cross-Complainant] (buyer’s agent) is questionable in light of the evidence produced to date and applicable case law pertaining to a seller’s agent duties to a buyer’s agent, such as [Cross-Complainant].” (Mot. 5:12–18.)

 

The instant motion and assertions contained therein are accompanied by a declaration of Cross-Defendants’ attorney attesting thereto. Therefore, the unopposed motion satisfies the standard set forth in Grand Terrace. (192 Cal.App.3d at 1261.) Accordingly, the Court finds the settlement entered between Cross-Defendants and Cross-Complainant to be in good faith pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6. 

 

CONCLUSION

 

The unopposed motion is granted.