Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 21CHCV00807, Date: 2023-07-21 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21CHCV00807    Hearing Date: February 23, 2024    Dept: F51

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Motion Filed: 12/8/23                                                                                    Jury Trial: 6/16/25

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Business Alliance Insurance Company (“Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Eve Sagi (“Plaintiff”)

NOTICE: OK 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE: Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted as to the existence, but not the contents, of Exhibits A–C.

Despite having been previously warned to comply with the “TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS” set forth in the 5/13/19 First Amended General Order Re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil, Defendant’s counsel has again failed to bookmark the declarations, exhibits and proof of service attached to the motion. (5/13/19 First Amended General Order, pp.4:4–5; CRC 3.1110(f)(4); 7/21/23 Minute Order.) Accordingly, the Court imposes $100.00 in monetary sanctions against Defendant’s counsel.

BACKGROUND 

On 12/29/20, Plaintiff entered into a contract for the provision of labor and materials towards the improvement of certain real property with an unidentified “contractor” party. The total contract price was $100,000. Plaintiff made a $40,000 partial payment, and alleges that the contractor defendant abandoned the project, thereby forcing Plaintiff to hire a new contractor. Defendant provided the surety bond to the contractor. Plaintiff allegedly submitted a claim on the bond for $15,000, which Defendant eventually denied.

On 10/13/21, Plaintiff filed her original complaint against Defendant, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Recovery on Contractor’s License Bond; (2) Violation of Unfair Competition Law; and (3) Conversion. On 11/5/21, Plaintiff amended her complaint to name Marcos Quintanilla, the contractor, as Doe Defendant 11.

On 7/28/23, Plaintiff filed her operative fourth amended complaint (“4AC”), alleging the following causes of action: (1) Recovery on Contractor’s License Bond; (2) Conversion; and (3) Recovery of Payments Made to Unlicensed Contractors. Only the first cause of action is alleged against Defendant. On 8/9/23, Defendant filed its answer to the 4AC.

On 12/8/23, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On 2/9/24, Plaintiff filed her opposition. No reply has been filed to date.

ANALYSIS

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 65, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381–382.) 

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519–1520.)  

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

A.    Collateral Estoppel

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, “applies when (1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits, (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding, and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding. Upon satisfaction of these conditions, claim preclusion bars not only issues that were actually litigated but also issues that could have been litigated. (Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 226 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is narrower than that of res judicata, and operates to bar the relitigation of issues previously litigated, applying only “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 327.)

Here, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff already filed and obtained a judgment for the exact same damages she now seeks against Quintanilla. As such, she cannot seek damages for the same loss in this action.” (MSJ 8:8–10.) Defendant proffers Plaintiff’s complaint in her 5/4/21 Small Claims action (LASC Case No. 21CHSC00536) against Quintanilla relating to the monies owed to her stemming from the same abandoned project as in the instant case. (Ex. A to Def.’s RJN.) Defendant also proffers the 7/2/21 Minute Order in the Small Claims action, in which the Court entered judgment for Plaintiff and against Quintanilla in the principal amount of $10,000.00 and costs of $115.00 for a total of $10,115.00. (Ex. B to Def.’s RJN.) Defendant therefore argues that under the theory of collateral estoppel, “Plaintiff cannot now make an identical claim for the same damages in a subsequent suit.” (MSJ 8:28–9:1.)

Small claims court judgments are given special treatment for purposes of res judicata because of the special characteristics of small claims court actions: “the small claims court functions informally and expeditiously. The chief characteristics of its proceedings are that there are no attorneys, no pleadings and no legal rules of evidence; there are no juries, and no formal findings are made on the issues presented. At the hearings the presentation of evidence may be sharply curtailed, and the proceedings are often terminated in a short space of time. The awards—although made in accordance with substantive law—are often based on the application of common sense; and the spirit of compromise and conciliation attends the proceedings.” (Sanderson v. Niemann (1941) 17 Cal.2d 563, 573.)

 Here, Plaintiff argues that collateral estoppel is inapplicable to bar the instant action because “the prior proceeding in the current case is a small claims court matter for which BAIC has failed to actually provide any competent or otherwise admissible evidence relating thereto, where we have no record or evidence of what transpired in the small claim proceeding.” (Pl.’s Opp. 4:7–10.) “Questions remain … of whether identical issues were ‘actually litigated’ when comparing the small claims case to the current matter.” (Id. at 4:10–12.) “Without a complete, clear, and concise record of the proceedings in the small claims action, or any admissible record it is entirely unclear what issues were addressed, much less if ‘identical’ issues were litigated, and what conclusions may have been drawn therefrom.” (Id. at 4:22–24.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff, and finds that the evidence proffered by Defendant is insufficient to show that the issues presented in Plaintiff’s Small Claims action are identical to the instant claims, and that those claims were “actually litigated and necessarily decided” in the previous action. (Samara, 5 Cal.5th at 327.) Here, Defendant proffers the complaint filed in the Small Claims action, the Minute Order ruling in favor of Plaintiff, and the Notice of Entry of Judgment. (Ex. A–C to Def.’s RJN.) However, as Plaintiff observes, the proffered documents do not contain any record of the issues actually considered and litigated in the Small Claims action, such that would allow for this Court to determine whether collateral estoppel applies.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that a triable issue exists. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

The motion is denied.