Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 21STCV17369, Date: 2023-05-10 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21STCV17369    Hearing Date: May 10, 2023    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51 

Date: 5/10/23 

Case #21STCV17369

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Motion Filed: 2/22/23

MOVING PARTY: Defendant County of Los Angeles (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Mauricio Martinez; Richard Martinez; and Mario Martinez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment in favor of Moving Defendant and against Plaintiffs.¿

TENTATIVE RULING: The unopposed motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

This is a wrongful death and survival action brought by Plaintiffs, individually, as heirs to decedent Sonia Martinez (“Decedent”), and as co-executors of Decedent’s estate. On 5/21/20, Decedent was struck by a vehicle and sustained fatal injuries while she was crossing Pico Canyon Road in the unincorporated area of Stevenson Ranch, Los Angeles County, California. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Moving Defendant owns and maintains the roadway where the collision occurred.

On 5/7/21, Plaintiffs filed their complaint against nine named defendants, including Moving Defendant, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Dangerous Condition of Public Property; (2) General Negligence; and (3) Failure to Warn.

On 2/22/23, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. No opposition has been filed to date.

ANALYSIS

Legal Standard 

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 65, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381–382.) 

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519–1520.)  

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

Dangerous Condition on Public Property 

Government Code section 835 provides that “a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property” where a plaintiff establishes several conditions. To prevail, the plaintiff must show that (1) the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury; (2) the dangerous condition caused the injury; (3) the condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury incurred; and either (4a) a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the condition or (4b) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in time to have taken measures to protect against it. (Gov. Code § 835; Song X. Sun v. City of Oakland (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1183.)

Here, Moving Defendant argues that all of Plaintiffs’ claims against it amount to a cause of action for a dangerous condition on public property, for which Plaintiffs cannot establish any of the requisite elements. Plaintiffs allege that the dangerous condition presented includes “the roadway’s markings, lanes, curbs, pedestrian median and/or islands, signage, traffic control signals, warnings, [and] crosswalks.” (Compl. ¶ 26.)

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1.      Dangerous Condition

A dangerous condition is “a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Gov. Code § 830, subd. (a).)

Here, Moving Defendant presents evidence that Decedent violated Vehicle Code section 21954, subdivision (a) by illegally jaywalking across the four-lane roadway. (UMF #3.) Under the statute, “every pedestrian upon a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard.” (Veh. Code. § 21954, subd. (a).)

Moving Defendant argues that such illegal conduct demonstrates a lack of due care on Decedent’s part. (MSJ 10:10–20, citing Schoenfeld v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462.) Moreover, Moving Defendant proffers evidence that there were two marked crosswalks less than 500 feet from the area of the subject collision, and that traffic history shows only two prior collisions in the vicinity, neither of which involved a midblock pedestrian crossing. (UMFs #11, 34–36.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Moving Defendant has sufficiently presented evidence to establish that the condition of the property does not create a substantial risk of injury when used with the reasonably foreseeable due care. As Plaintiffs have failed to oppose the instant motion, the Court finds that there is no triable issue of material fact as to this element of the cause of action for dangerous condition on public property.

2.      Causation

Moving Defendant argues that “this accident was caused by Decedent’s own conscious decision to forego use of a nearby crosswalk.” (MSJ 13:10–11.) “The evidence establishes that no condition of the road caused Decedent’s injuries. Decedent’s injuries were caused when she left the safety of the sidewalk by walking into the middle of the street without looking for traffic.” (Id. at 13:21–23, citing UMFs #2, 3.)

In support of this argument, Moving Defendant proffers the sworn testimony of a witness to the collision, the investigating police officer, and a civil engineer employed by Moving Defendant. (Exs. 12 and 14 to MSJ; Decl. of Daniel Quintana.) This testimony appears to establish that Decedent stepped into the unmarked roadway without looking for oncoming traffic.

As Plaintiffs have failed to oppose the instant motion, there has been no offer of evidence to establish a triable issue relating to the causal link between the condition of the roadway and Decedent’s injuries. Accordingly, the Court finds in favor of Moving Defendant as to this element of the cause of action for dangerous condition on public property.

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3.      Reasonably Foreseeable Risk

As previously discussed, Moving Defendant has presented evidence to show that the risk of injury to a pedestrian crossing the subject roadway mid-block, between two marked crosswalks, was not reasonably foreseeable, particularly where there were no prior similar instances. As Plaintiffs have failed to oppose the instant motion and proffer any opposing evidence, the Court finds that there is no triable issue of material fact as to this issue.

4.      Wrongful Act/Notice

Government Code section 835 requires a showing that the public entity “created the dangerous condition,” or, alternatively, that it “had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.” (Gov. Code § 835, subd. (a)–(b).)

Here, Moving Defendant presents evidence that the subject roadway was properly designed and constructed consistent with Department of Public Works standards. (Decl. of Jose Suarez.) As Plaintiffs have failed to oppose the instant motion, there has been no offer of opposing evidence to show any “negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment” which created the condition. (Gov. Code § 835, subd. (a).) Likewise, there has been no offer of any “evidence that County had actual or constructive notice, let alone notice for a sufficient time to take action to protect against injury.” (MSJ 14:11–12.)

Accordingly, the Court finds in favor of Moving Defendant as to this element of the cause of action for dangerous condition on public property.

CONCLUSION¿ 

As Plaintiffs have failed to offer any responsive evidence to show a triable issue of material fact as to any of the elements of a cause of action for dangerous condition on public property, the Court finds that Moving Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. As such, the Court declines to reach Moving Defendant’s arguments relating to governmental and design immunity.

The unopposed motion is granted.