Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 21STCV21563, Date: 2024-08-07 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21STCV21563    Hearing Date: August 7, 2024    Dept: F51

AUGUST 6, 2024

 

MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 21STCV21563

 

Motion Filed: 4/30/24

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Defendant Mario Mendoza, Jr. (“Moving Defendant”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Toyota Motor North America, Inc. (“Cross-Complainant”)

NOTICE: OK

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order finding the settlement entered between Moving Defendant and Plaintiff to be in good faith pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, and dismissal of Cross-Complainant’s cross-complaint against Moving Defendant.

 

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied without prejudice.

 

BACKGROUND

 

This is a motor vehicle negligence and products liability action in which Plaintiff City of Los Angeles alleges that on 6/29/20, two of its employees were injured in an auto collision caused by Moving Defendant, who was driving a vehicle manufactured by Cross-Complainant. (Compl. pp. 3–5.)

 

On 6/9/21, Plaintiff filed its complaint, alleging against Defendants the following causes of action: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence; and (2) Products Liability. On 8/19/22, Cross-Complainant filed its answer.

 

 

On 10/25/23, Cross-Complainant filed its cross-complaint, alleging against Moving Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Total Indemnity; (2) Partial Indemnity; (3) Declaratory Relief; (4) Contribution; and (5) Negligence. On 1/31/24, Moving Defendant filed his answer thereto.

 

On 4/30/24, Moving Defendant filed the instant application for determination of good faith settlement. On 7/24/24, Cross-Complainant filed its opposition. No reply has been filed to date.

 

ANALYSIS

 

A plaintiff may settle with one of several joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract without releasing the others, provided that the settlement is made in “good faith” pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6. “Where there are multiple defendants, each having potential liability for different areas of damage, an allocation of the settlement amount must be made. … Failure to do so may preclude a ‘good faith’ determination because there is no way to determine the appropriate set off pursuant to section 877 against the nonsettling defendant.” (L. C. Rudd & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 742, 750.)

 

Once there is a showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the non-settlor who asserts that the settlement was not made in good faith. (Fisher v. Superior Court (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 47; Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6, subd. (d).) The ultimate determinant of good faith is whether the settlement is grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the settlor’s liability to be. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1262.)

 

In making such a determination, the Court considers several factors: (1) A rough approximation of the plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) The amount paid in settlement; (3) A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than if found liable at trial; (4) The allocation of the settlement proceeds among the plaintiffs; (5) The settlor’s financial condition and insurance policy limits, if any; and (6) Evidence of any collusion, fraud, tortious conduct between the settlor and the plaintiff aimed at making the non-settling parties pay more than their fair share. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.)

 

Here, Moving Defendant asserts that he “settled the claims of Darren Hutchinson and Jimmy Brants and their respective workers’ compensation claims with the City of Los Angeles. With respect to Darren Hutchinson’s claim, the parties reached the following agreement: the plaintiff CITY OF LOS ANGELES received $39,000 and Darren Hutchinson received $26,000. With respect to Jimmy Brants’ claim, plaintiff CITY OF LOS ANGELES received $40,000 and Darren Hutchinson received $24,000.” (Mot. 3:24–4:1.) Moving Defendant further asserts that the settlement satisfies each Tech-Bilt factor because “these settlements for both of Defendant MENDOZA’s insurance policies reflect his proportionate responsibility to the parties involved in the accident.” (Id. at 6:1–2.)

 

Cross-Complainant argues in opposition that the motion is premature because Moving Defendant “does not include any facts in the declaration filed concurrently with his motion that points to his actual liability in the underlying case.” (Opp. 5:11–13.) “As such, declaring Mendoza’s settlement with Plaintiff to be in good faith would be an abuse of discretion without adequate and essential discovery being completed.” (Id. at 5:19–21.)

 

The Court agrees with Cross-Complainant, and further notes that the motion lacks facts or evidence measuring Plaintiff’s damages in this action. Without an approximation of the total damages, there can be no determination of whether the proposed settlement is reasonably within the ballpark based on Moving Defendant’s proportional liability. Therefore, the Court is unable to make a good faith determination based on “rough approximation of the plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability.” (Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal.3d at 499.)

 

The Court notes that Moving Defendant has failed to reply to Cross-Complainant’s opposition. Based on the foregoing, the Court agrees with Cross-Complainant that, at this juncture, there is insufficient evidence before the Court to make a determination of whether the settlement entered into between Plaintiff and Moving Defendant was made in good faith. Accordingly, the motion is denied without prejudice.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The motion is denied without prejudice.