Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 21STCV37822, Date: 2025-04-29 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21STCV37822    Hearing Date: April 29, 2025    Dept: F51

Dept. F-51 

Date: 4/28/25

Case #21STCV37822

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F-51

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Motion filed: 1/10/25

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Dewayne Maurice Floyd; Dart International, Inc.; and Prodrivers Staffing, Inc. (collectively, “Moving Defendants”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Estate of Ana Elena Moreno Santos; Arturo Moreno Banda; and Maria Santos Flores (collectively, “Responding Plaintiffs”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Moving Defendants and against Responding Plaintiffs on their complaint in LASC Case No. 22STCV26608.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted, with 30 days leave to amend as to the individual Responding Plaintiffs only. Moving Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted as to Exhibit A, and granted as to the existence, but not the contents, of Exhibit B.

BACKGROUND

This is a consolidated wrongful death action arising from a vehicle collision which resulted in the death of Juan Carlos Menjivar and Ana Elena Moreno Santos (collectively, “Decedents”). On 8/15/21, while traveling on Interstate-5 Southbound, north of San Fernando Mission Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA, decedent Menjivar drove his vehicle into a parked truck driven by defendant Dart International’s employee, moving defendant Dewayne Maurice Floyd, while the truck was parked on the shoulder of the highway. The collision caused the death of both Menjivar and decedent Moreno Santos, who was a passenger in Menjivar’s vehicle. At all relevant times, Floyd was allegedly acting within the scope of his employment with moving defendant Dart International.

On 10/13/21, Plaintiffs Jezebel Moreno (decedent Moreno Santos’ biological daughter and successor-in-interest) and Marvin Merino (plaintiff Moreno’s biological father) filed their complaint against Menjivar, Floyd, and Dart International, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Wrongful Death; and (2) Negligence in the lead case, LASC Case No. 21STCV37822. On 11/23/21, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. On 5/12/22, Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, alleging a sole cause of action for Negligence. On 8/29/22, Plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Wrongful Death; and (2) Survival.

On 1/25/22, Plaintiffs Victoria Menjivar and Sebastien Menjivar (decedent Menjivar’s biological children) filed their complaint against Floyd and Dart International, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence; and (2) General Negligence in LASC Case No. 22STCV02907. On 5/21/22, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint.

On 8/16/22, Responding Plaintiffs Estate of Ana Elena Moreno Santos, Arturo Moreno Banda (decedent Moreno Santos’ father), and Maria Santos Flores (decedent Moreno Santos’ mother) filed their complaint against Menjivar; Floyd; Dart International; Super Center Concepts, Inc.; Super Center Concepts Holdings LLC; and Samantha Malexus Menjivar; alleging the following causes of action: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence; and (2) General Negligence in LASC Case No. 22STCV26608.

On 10/2/23, the parties filed a stipulation to consolidate the three related cases. On 1/10/25, Moving Defendants filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings. On 4/15/25, Responding Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On 4/16/25, Moving Defendants filed their reply.

ANALYSIS

A motion for judgment on the pleadings made by a defendant may be based on the following grounds: (1) the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint or (2) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).) “The grounds for motion … shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Id. at subd. (d).)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings serves the function of a demurrer, challenging only defects on the face of the complaint.” (Richardson-Tunnell v. School Ins. Program for Employees (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1061.) In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts consider whether the factual allegations, assumed true, are sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Fire Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452–453.)

Here, Moving Defendants move for a judgment on the pleadings as to Responding Plaintiffs’ entire complaint, arguing that the Responding Plaintiffs do not have the requisite standing to bring their action.

A.    Meet-and-Confer 

Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party that filed the pleading subject to the motion to determine whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439, subd. (a).)

Here, Moving Defendants do not represent that they met and conferred with Responding Plaintiffs prior to filing the instant motion. However, “a determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Id. at subd. (a)(4).)

B.     Standing

1.      Decedent’s Estate

A wrongful death action may be brought either by the decedent’s personal representative (an administrator or executor of the estate) or by the decedent’s heirs, but not both. (Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60.) Here, Moving Defendants argue that responding plaintiff the Estate of Ana Elena Moreno Santos lacks standing to bring its action because “the Court register of actions for the [underlying] probate case does not reflect that any letters of administration or any legal rights to pursue legal remedies or claims on behalf of the Estate of Ana Elena Moreno Santos was ever granted.” (Defs.’ Mot. 7:8–10.) Moving Defendants therefore argue that “the Plaintiff named as ‘Estate of Ana Elena Santos Moreno’ is a nonexistent entity with no standing whatsoever.” (Id. at 10:11–12.)

As Moving Defendants observe in reply, the individual Responding Plaintiffs concede that “they are not attempting to obtain and/or represent the Estate of their daughter.” (Pls.’ Opp. 1:3.) No argument is made on behalf of the Estate plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff the Estate of Ana Elena Moreno Santos lacks standing to bring the instant action. Accordingly, the motion is granted as to this plaintiff without leave to amend.

2.      Decedent’s Parents

A decedent’s statutorily designated heirs include her surviving child, or her parents, if they were dependent on the decedent. (Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60, subds. (a), (b)(1).) “For purposes of this subdivision, dependence refers to financial support.” (Chavez v. Carpenter (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1445.) “If a parent receives financial support from their child which aids them in obtaining the things, such as shelter, clothing, food and medical treatment, which one cannot and should not do without, the parent is dependent upon their child. The death of that child in this type of situation results in a distinct pecuniary loss to the parent which requires the parent to find aid elsewhere for the basic things we all need.” (Id. at 1446.)

Here, Moving Defendants argue that “the parents of decedent Ana Moreno, have no rights superior to those of the minor child, Jezebel Moreno.” (Defs.’ Mot. 11:22–23.) “These parents of Decedent, due to the existence of the minor child, and as well in the absence of any other legal basis for standing cannot proceed in this case. They quite simply lack standing under CCP§377.60(a).” (Id. at 12:8–10.)

Moving Defendants further argue that “there are no allegations sufficient to satisfy the financial dependency requirement to allow these two individual Plaintiffs to establish standing to file this suit.” (Id. at 12:21–23, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60, subd. (b).) Responding Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that “as a result of their relationship with Decedent Moreno Santos, Plaintiffs Arturo Moreno Banda and Maria Santos Flores suffered wrongful death damages, including, without limitation: (1) loss of financial support; (2) loss of gits [sic] and/or benefits from the Decedent; (3) funeral and burial expenses; (4) the reasonable value of household services of the Decedent; (5) loss of Decedent’s love, companionship, comfort, care, assistance, protection, affection, society, and moral support; and (6) loss of Decedent’s training and guidance.” (Compl. pp. 5–6.)

Moving Defendants argue that “the vagueness of the generic allegation of ‘financial support’ does not equate to the specific requirement of financial dependence, let alone that it be dependence for the necessities of living e.g. rent, food, medical bills.” (Defs.’ Mot. 13:24–27.) In opposition, Responding Plaintiffs argue that their “Complaint sufficiently alleges Plaintiffs had a relationship of financial and emotional dependence with Decedent Ms. Moreno Santos and, in doing so, suffered a loss of financial support, including as to their rent, shelter, and/or food.” (Pls.’ Opp. 6:3–6.)

The Court notes that these contentions are not clearly alleged in Responding Plaintiffs’ complaint, nor in any matters judicially noticeable. At this stage, the Court declines to consider such extrinsic matters as Responding Plaintiffs’ discovery responses. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the individual Responding Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to show that they were financially dependent on Decedent such as to give them standing to bring their wrongful death claims. Accordingly, the motion is granted as to the plaintiffs Arturo Moreno Banda and Maria Santos Flores.

C.    Leave to Amend

“In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action.” (Consolidated Fire Protection Dist. of Los Angeles County v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers' Ass'n (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 211, 219.) “The plaintiff has the burden of showing what amendment can be made, and how it will change the legal effect of the pleading, so that it states a cause of action.” (Ventura Coastal, LLC v. Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1, 33.) “Denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion if the pleading does not show on its face that it is incapable of amendment.” (Ibid.)

Here, Responding Plaintiffs argue that “should this Court determine greater specificity is required from Plaintiffs’ allegations, Plaintiffs can amend their pleadings to plead their financial and emotional dependence to their daughter, Decedent Ms. Moreno Santos, with greater specificity.” (Pls.’ Opp. 8:7–9.) In reply, Moving Defendants argue that Responding Plaintiffs should be denied leave to amend because “Plaintiffs have made no effort to file their own requisite motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint.” (Id. at 4:23–24.)

Nevertheless, under the Court’s liberal policy of granting leave to amend, the Court grants the individual Responding Plaintiffs 30 days leave to amend the complaint to cure the defects set forth above. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438, subd. (h)(1).) The Court also notes that plaintiff Arturo Moreno Banda has recently passed away, and that “Plaintiffs’ [Proposed] First Amended Complaint seeks to substitute Plaintiff Arturo Moreno Banda with Plaintiff Estate of Arturo Moreno Banda, by and through its Administrator.” (Pls.’ Opp. 9:21–23.)

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted, with 30 days leave to amend as to the individual Responding Plaintiffs only.