Judge: Andrew E. Cooper, Case: 22CHCV00468, Date: 2024-08-02 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).

Case Number: 22CHCV00468    Hearing Date: August 2, 2024    Dept: F51

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Motion Filed: 3/12/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Hector Garza; and Erma Garza (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)¿ 

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”)¿ 

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting Plaintiffs attorney fees in the amount of $15,957.00, and costs in the amount of $5,818.43.

TENTATIVE RULING: The unopposed motion is granted. Plaintiffs are awarded $21,775.43 in attorney fees and costs.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendant under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle they purchased on 1/16/17, and for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s warranty. (Compl. ¶¶ 8–9.)

On 6/27/22, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2. On 7/28/22, Defendant filed its answer.

On 7/17/23, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. (Pls.’ Mot. p. ii, ll. 6–7.) On 3/12/24, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion. No opposition has been filed to date.

ANALYSIS

A.    Right to Recovery

An award of attorney fees is proper when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1032, subd. (b); 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) Here, the Song-Beverly Act authorizes a buyer “to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the instant motion is authorized by statute.

B.     Attorney Fees Incurred

A buyer prevailing under the Song-Beverly Act may recover “reasonable” attorney fees and costs as determined by the Court. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).) “The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove that the fees it seeks are reasonable.” (Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 162, 169.) In determining a reasonable fee award, the Court begins with the lodestar method of calculation, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.¿(Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 744; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095–1096.)

Here, Plaintiffs seek to recover $15,957.00 in attorney fees, encompassing 40.5 hours of their attorneys’ time, billed at the following rates:

1.      Counsel’s Hourly Rate

When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts consider whether the stated rates “are within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded [to] comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.)

Here, Plaintiffs assert that “the attorneys’ fees sought in this matter for the fees incurred by the mere five attorneys who worked on this matter are consistent with numerous court findings that Plaintiffs’ counsels’ hourly rates are reasonable.” (Pls.’ Mot. 2:26–28.) Plaintiffs support their argument with their counsel’s sworn declaration attesting to various Los Angeles Superior Court cases approving Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hourly billing rates. (Decl. of Kevin Y. Jacobson ¶¶ 21–28.) The Court notes that Defendant has failed to oppose the instant motion.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that their attorneys’ hourly billing rates are commensurate with their experience and fall within the range of reasonable rates charged by attorneys and judicially awarded in similar cases.

2.      Hours Expended

Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney fees for the 40.5 hours expended by their attorneys on this matter, totaling $15,957.00. Plaintiffs proffer an itemized list of time entries detailing their attorneys’ work on this matter. (Ex. A to Jacobson Decl.) The Court again notes that the instant motion is unopposed, therefore Defendant has failed to challenge any of the hours expended by Plaintiffs’ counsel.

C.    Costs Incurred

Plaintiffs assert that they incurred costs and expenses totaling $5,818.43, which encompasses: (1) $505.85 in filing and motion fees; (2) $150.00 in jury fees; (3) $30.89 in process server fees; (4) $66.69 in electronic filing/service fees; and (5) $65.00 in court appearance costs. (Ex. B to Jacobson Decl.) The Court again notes that Defendant has failed to oppose the instant motion and challenge the purported costs incurred by Plaintiffs in this action.

CONCLUSION