Judge Andrew E. Cooper, Case Number: 22CHCV00494, Date: 2023-09-05 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assisant in North Valley Department F51, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2251. Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and specially pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org. All hearings on law and motion and other calendar matters are generally NOT transcribed by a court reporter unless one is provided by the party(ies).

DECEMBER 5, 2023

(Form Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents,

Requests for Admission, and Special Interrogatories, Set One)

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 22CHCV00494

RELIEF REQUESTED: Orders compelling Defendant to provide further responses to the following discovery requests within ten calendar days:

· Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 1, 2, and 4–17;

· Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission, Set One, Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 12; and

TENTATIVE RULING: The motions are granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to the subject discovery requests within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant and/or its counsel in the amount of $1,200.00.

Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle he purchased on 12/2/20, and for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s warranty. (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 8.)

On 7/6/22, Plaintiff filed his complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty; and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2(b). On 8/5/22, Defendant filed its answer.

On 9/21/22, Plaintiff served his first set of Form Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, Requests for Admission, and Special Interrogatories on Defendant. (Ex. C to Decl. of Sepehr Daghighian.) On 10/25/23, Defendant served its responses thereto. (Ex. D to Daghighian Decl.)

On 6/21/23, Plaintiff filed the instant motions to compel Defendant’s further responses to his first set of discovery requests. Defendant’s oppositions and Plaintiff’s replies were filed on the following dates:

On 9/6/23, this Court continued the hearings on the subject discovery motions, and ordered the parties “to meet and further confer either telephonically or in-person within 60-days, to resolve and/or narrow all outstanding discovery issues. Plaintiff’s counsel is to file a declaration with the Court which confirms compliance with this order or explains why no meaningful meet and confer occurred.” (9/6/23 Min. Order, p. 1.)

On 11/3/23, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a declaration stating that no meaningful meet and confer between the parties occurred, because “to date, I have been unable to schedule a teleconference with counsel for Defendant to discuss the outstanding discovery issues.” (11/3/23 Decl. of Brian T. Shippen-Murray ¶ 4.)

“The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of the following: (1) An answer containing the information sought to be discovered; (2) An exercise of the party’s option to produce writings; or (3) An objection to the particular interrogatory.” (Code Civ Proc. § 2030.210, subd. (a).)

“Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. … If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible. … If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” (Code Civ Proc. § 2030.220 [emphasis added].)

A propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses to interrogatories if any of the following apply: “(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate; or (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

California law requires a responding party to respond to each request for production of documents with either a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a).)

If the response includes an objection to the demand in part, it must also include a statement of compliance or noncompliance as set forth above. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240, subd. (a).) Additionally, the response must (1) identify the particular document that falls within the category of the request to which the objection is being made, and (2) expressly set forth the extent of, and specific ground for, the objection. (Id. at subd. (b).)¿A propounding party may move for an order compelling further response to a discovery request if it decides that “an objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (a).)¿

A responding party must respond to each propounded request for admission with either a substantive answer or an objection to the request. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.210.)

“Each answer shall: (1) Admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party; (2) Deny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue; and (3) Specify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge.” (Code Civ Proc. § 2033.220, subd. (b).)¿“If a responding party gives lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admit all or part of a request for admission, that party shall state in the answer that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.” (Id. at subd. (c).)

Because requests for admission are not limited to matters within the responding party's personal knowledge, that party has a duty to make a reasonable investigation of the facts before answering items that are not within the party's personal knowledge. (Doe v. Los Angeles County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 690.)

A propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses to requests for admission if any of the following apply: “(1) An answer to a particular request is evasive or incomplete; or (2) An objection to a particular request is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.290, subd. (a).)¿

A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating, “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (b)(1); 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2033.290, subd. (b)(1); 2016.040.)

Here, the Court previously found the parties’ meet and confer efforts to be inadequate, and therefore ordered the parties to further meet and confer in an effort to resolve all outstanding discovery issues. (9/6/23 Min. Order.) As the parties failed to meet and confer in accordance with the Court’s prior ruling, the Court will consider additional monetary sanctions against Defendant for failing to meet and confer in good faith.

Discovery is relevant if it is admissible as evidence, or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Ibid.)¿

Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s scope and relevance objections to the subject discovery requests are meritless because “the information sought … will allow Plaintiff to understand and evaluate the factual bases of support for Defendant’s denials, qualified admissions and affirmative defenses regarding alleged nonconformities with the Subject Vehicle, Defendant’s repair efforts, other factors (such as Plaintiff’s own negligence or misuse) alleged to have caused problems with the Subject Vehicle, and, generally, Defendant’s compliance, or lack thereof, with the Song-Beverly Act.” (Pls.’ FROG Mot. 10:3–8.) “These documents seek technical information that Plaintiff’s expert needs to provide reliable opinion testimony regarding the nature of the defects in Plaintiff’s vehicle.” (Pls.’ RFP Mot. 8:14–16.)

Defendant argues in opposition that the requests are overbroad and seek irrelevant information about Defendant’s internal policies and procedures, and other vehicles. “This breach of warranty case is about Plaintiff’s Corvette and repairs to that Corvette under warranty. GM has already produced all the documents relevant to Plaintiff’s breach of warranty claims. GM maintains its objections that documents about other vehicles, complaints from or by other consumers, or the design of specific component systems or parts are not relevant to Plaintiff’s claim that GM failed to repair her [sic] Corvette within a reasonable number of attempts, rendering Plaintiff’s Motion unwarranted.” (Def.’s Opp. to RFP Mot. at 4:16–21 [emphasis in original].)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has provided sufficient support that the further responses are relevant and discoverable. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) To obtain civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s failure to comply was willful, which may be based on the defendant’s knowledge of a certain defect. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Information regarding vehicles other than Plaintiff’s is relevant to the subject matter of this action as it could assist Plaintiff in proving Defendant’s willful violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Documents responsive to these requests may reasonably lead to the discovery of information as to the nature and duration of the defects, Defendant’s knowledge of the defects, and Defendant’s inability to repair the defects. While the cases relied on by Plaintiff (i.e., Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967) may not involve the exact circumstance before this Court, they are sufficient to show that the requested information could itself be admissible or lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this case.

Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s undue burden objections to the subject discovery requests are meritless. The party objecting to a discovery request on this basis bears the burden of supplying evidence of “the quantum of work required.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549.)

In opposition, Defendant observes that Plaintiffs have propounded 81 total discovery requests, and Defendant has already produced various requested documents in response to Plaintiffs’ first set of RFPs. (Def.’s Opp. 1:4–2:4.) However, the Court notes that Defendant has not supplied evidence to show the “quantum of work required” to respond in full to Plaintiff’s discovery requests as set forth in the instant motions, nor has Defendant stated the categories of sources of ESI that are not reasonably accessible.

Moreover, the Court is unclear at this juncture whether Defendant has produced documents responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. In the instant motions, Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to produce any documents. (Pl.’s SROG Mot. 5:21–24.) In opposition, Defendant contends that it did in fact produce a number of responsive documents. (Def.’s Opp. to FROG Mot. 2:13–15.) In reply, Plaintiff maintains that no documents were produced. (Pl.’s Reply to FROG Mot. 2:13–15.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s objections to the requests to the extent that they are unduly burdensome or oppressive are without adequate support.

“If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240, subd. (c)(1).)

Here, Defendant objected to the subject document requests on the bases of attorney-client and attorney work product privileges. However, as Plaintiff observes, Defendant’s responses do not mention any factual information supporting its claims of privilege, nor has Defendant produced a privilege log. (Pl.’s RFP Mot. 6:16–25.) Plaintiff therefore argues that “because Defendant has not complied with the requirement under C.C.P. § 2031.240(c)(1) that it produce a privilege log, Defendant has cut off Plaintiff’s ability to make a ‘determination of whether each withheld document is or is not [in] fact privileged.’” (Id. at 6:22–24, quoting Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 130.)

The Court notes that Defendant does not address this issue in its opposition papers. Accordingly, the Court finds that to the extent that Defendant intends to withhold any responsive documents based on any privilege, Defendant is ordered to produce a privilege log.

Defendant further objected to the subject RFPs on the basis that each request “seeks confidential, proprietary and trade secret information in the form of GM’s internal policies and procedures.” Evidence Code section 1060 provides that the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret and to prevent others from disclosing it, unless allowing the privilege will conceal fraud or result in injustice. A party that is claiming the trade secret privilege has the burden of proving the party's entitlement to that privilege. (Amgen Inc. v California Correctional Health Care Servs. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 716, 733.)

“‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” (Civ. Code § 3426.1, subd. (d).)

Here, Defendant argues that “the documents Plaintiff seeks may relate to and contain confidential communications between GM employees and GM’s suppliers and/or sub-suppliers concerning technical, mechanical, and commercial issues and analyses.” (Def.’s Opp. to RFP Mot. 7:14–16.) “Because the wholesale disclosure of GM’s internal, confidential materials would cause GM competitive harm, GM should not be compelled to produce any additional documents without Plaintiff having satisfied their heightened burden to show why he needs the documents in this breach of warranty case, which Plaintiff has not done.” (Id. at 8:6–9.)

In support of its argument, Defendant offers the sworn declaration of Huizhen Lu, a Senior Manager/Technical Consultant of Engineering Analysis employed with Defendant, attesting that the documents sought may include, “design specifications, evaluations, and performance analysis relative to specifications, material selection, cost, and quality. Such information is not generally available to the public. GM LLC derives value from this information’s confidentiality and would be harmed by the loss of confidentiality. Consequently, GM LLC makes considerable effort to keep this information confidential.” (Ex. C to Decl. of Darshnik Brar, ¶ 11.)

The Court notes that Defendant appears to be amenable to a protective order, which would protect against the disclosure of any claimed private, trade secret or confidential proprietary information. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that production of any documents Defendant contends contain trade secret or confidential proprietary information shall be so designated and may be subject to a protective order.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motions to compel Defendant’s further responses to Plaintiff’s first set of Form Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, Requests for Admission, and Special Interrogatories. The Court notes the parties’ arguments regarding Defendant’s verifications but declines to reach them considering the foregoing.

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction ... against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (d); 2033.290, subd. (d); 2031.310, subd. (h).)¿Additionally, “the court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

Here, the Court again notes that Defendant failed to meet and confer with Plaintiff regarding the present issues as previously ordered by this Court. Therefore, in granting the instant motions, the Court finds it reasonable to issue monetary sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $1,200.00.

The motions are granted. Defendant to provide further code-compliant responses to the subject discovery requests within 30 days. The Court imposes sanctions against Defendant and/or its counsel in the amount of $1,200.00.